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Abstract of thesis  
 
During the battles for East Prussia in the final year of the Second World War, the ruthless conduct of 
German troops resulted in vast material and personal damage. By focusing on the besieged ‘Festung 
Königsberg’ in the spring of 1945, this dissertation argues that the violence that transpired in Germany 
in 1945 can only be understood by devoting sustained attention to local actors and factors. By combining 
social history and military history approaches, the research restores agency to the German army, the 
Wehrmacht, as an active participant in the radicalisation of the German home front. This case study 
demonstrates that due to the fragmentation of Germany, the decisions and orders of Wehrmacht 
commanders had a disproportionately large impact at a local level. The radical nature of these decisions 
was the direct result of the commanders’ violent experiences during the preceding years, while the 
barbarised mindset of the rank-and-file encouraged the rigorous enforcement of military authority. The 
dissertation’s findings contribute to four themes within the historiography of the Second World War. 
First, it contributes to the recent debate surrounding the German Volksgemeinschaft by drawing 
attention to the limits of loyalty to the regime, and the actors and events that prompted this fidelity to 
shift. Secondly, by analysing a large number of unused archival sources, it provides the first in-depth 
urban history of everyday life in Königsberg during its 1945 siege. Thirdly, it challenges the 
conventional historiographical view in which fanatical Party officials were the main perpetrators of late-
war violence by emphasising the significance of the Wehrmacht as a key actor. Even though large 
numbers of German troops operated in close proximity to German civilians, their conduct has hardly 
been considered as an explanation of the events of 1945. Lastly, this dissertation combines and 
transcends the different perspectives on German domestic and martial law, suggesting that the two were 
ever more closely intertwined as the war progressed, resulting in a shift of behavioural patterns. The 
focus on Königsberg and its immediate surroundings has allowed for a re-examination of late-war 
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Map 1: Der Aufbau des Großdeutschen Reiches seit 1933, Deutsche Schulatlas, 1942. 


















Map 2: East Prussia, 1939 (after annexation of Memel, prior to annexation of Sudauen) 










I. Historiography and purpose of the study  
 
In 1945, as part of the last act of the most devastating war in history, a wave of violence swept 
over Germany. For most Germans, the first months of 1945 became synonymous with 
unparalleled destruction, seemingly arbitrary death from without and within, and unequivocal 
and total military defeat.1 How these three notions related to each other is much less known, if 
only because ‘1945’ was almost immediately appropriated. In post-war West-Germany the 
notion of a Stunde Null, or ‘zero hour’, was introduced to represent May 1945, highlighting the 
break with Germany’s totalitarian past. Adhering to this concept meant that all misery that had 
befallen the country had to be traced back to Nazism, which was readily done.2 At the same 
time, East-German scholars presented the violence in 1945 as proof of widespread 
disagreement with a regime that had pursued the ‘imperialist interest of German monopoly 
capital’, while also playing up the role of the anti-Fascist resistance.3 Moreover, virtually from 
the moment Allied troops entered their communities, Germans throughout the country drew on 
the terror and fear they felt in 1945 to present themselves as victims of National Socialism.4 
This dissertation proposes a new approach towards the perception of late-war violence. Above 
all, it seeks to restore agency to the German army, the Wehrmacht, and examines the mark it 
left on the German wartime community.  
 Both the sheer scale and the diversity of violence were unparalleled in German history, 
and to untangle the various strands of responsibility, culpability, and involvement, this 
dissertation will restrict itself to an analysis of events in East Prussia and its capital, 
Königsberg. We will return to further underlying reasons for this decision below, and will first 
address the general narrative. In 1945, the omnipresent violence throughout Germany led to a 
                                                          
1 Richard Bessel, Germany 1945, From War to Peace (New York: Pocket Books, 2010), 4-7.  
2 Manfred Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart 
(Munich, C.H. Beck, 1999), 159-60. 
3 Hajo Dröll,  “Die Zusammenbruchskrise des faschistischen Systems in Deutschland,” in Arbeiterinitiative 
1945: Antifaschistische Ausschüsse und Reorganisation der Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland, ed. Lutz 
Niethammer, Ulrich Borsdorf and Peter Brandt (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer Verlag, 1976), 173.  
4 Saul K. Padover, Lügendetektor: Vernehmungen im besiegten Deutschland 1944/45 (Frankfurt a.M., 
Eichborn Verlag, 1999), 9. 
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sense of ‘general hopelessness’ among its population, as Allied bombardments reduced city 
after city to rubble, while revenge-driven Soviet troops assaulted tens of thousands of women 
in eastern Germany.5 The final months of the war also saw a massive increase in German versus 
German violence, or intra-ethnic violence, mainly in the form of decentralised summary courts-
martial. Since this type of violence took place against the backdrop of the widespread racist 
violence that has come to define the National Socialist regime, it is generally – but inaccurately 
– grouped together with it. During the previous years, the Nazi regime had persecuted racial 
minorities and social outsiders, but within its own borders had at least sought to keep repression 
and mass murder from the public eye.6 In the final months of the war the violence against these 
groups escalated and increasingly took place out in the open. These so-called 
‘Endphaseverbrechen’, ‘Crimes of the final phase’, have been the focus of in-depth research. 
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, these crimes were examined within the 
framework of their respective organisations, such as the Gestapo, the Hitler Youth, the prison 
system, and the concentration camp system. Scholars convincingly demonstrated that there was 
not a single Nazi institution that did not resort to radical measures during the final months of 
the war.7  
Further research followed shortly afterwards, and placed these crimes within the 
context of the crumbling German community. Scholars like Sven Keller stressed that despite 
the Nazi regime’s failure to meet most of its promises, which was clear to most Germans by 
the summer of 1944, it was still able to mobilise the German population for the defence of their 
country by means of increasingly radical laws and orders.8 The radicalised Party official as the 
                                                          
5 Heinz Boberach (ed.) Meldungen aus dem Reich: Die geheime Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 
1938-1945, Band 17 (Herrsching: Pawlak Verlag, 1984), 6734. 
6 David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992), Chapters 4 and 7; Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (London: MacMillan, 2000), 
631-62; Robert Gellately and Nathan Stoltzfus, Social outsiders in Nazi Germany (Princeton: Princeton 
University press, 2001); Saul Friedlander, The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939-
1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), 92-93. Famously, Adolf Eichmann’s December 4, 1940 
memoradum saw ‘The Final Solution of the Jewish Question’ in the ‘transfer of the Jews out of the 
European economic space of the German people to a still-to-be-determined territory’.  
7 Daniel Blatman, The death marches, the final phase of Nazi genocide (London: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011); Nikolaus Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons, Legal Terror in Nazi Germany, London, 
Yale University Press, 2004, 319-331; Michael Kater, Hitler Youth (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 215-230. Gerhard Paul, ““Diese Erschießungen haben mich innerlich gar nicht mehr berührt.”: die 
Kriegsendphasenverbrechen der Gestapo 1944/45.” In Die Gestapo im Zweiten Weltkrieg : 'Heimatfront' 
und besetztes Europa, edited by  Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann, 543-568. Darmstadt, Primus 
Verlag, 2000 
8 Sven Keller, Volksgemeinschaft am Ende: Gesellschaft und Gewalt 1944/45 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 
2013), 419-26; Cord Arendes, Edgar Wolfrun, Jörg Zedler (ed.), Terror nach Innen: Verbrechen am Ende 
des Zweiten Weltkrieges, (Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag, 2006).  
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linchpin of the violence towards the German population was fairly readily accepted, since 
National Socialism and violence are inextricably linked.9 ‘Looking at the ruinous landscape 
left behind by National Socialism – a landscape shaped by war, racism, exclusion and murder, 
violence seems to be the common denominator,’ Richard Bessel rightly observed, further 
noting that when the Third Reich broke down in 1945, violence itself was the only aspect of 
National Socialist system to sustain.10 
Yet, one of the biggest differences between the violence in 1945 to that of earlier years, 
was that it focused on ‘regular’ German Volksgenossen as well, rather than merely on the 
different minority groups. In rapid succession, the regime established summary courts-martial 
(15 February and 9 March), implemented the ‘Nero-order’ (19 March), which called for the 
destruction of the German infrastructure, and the ‘flag order’ (3 April), which, for all German 
men, made hoisting a white flag punishable by death. These orders shared the communality 
that they were meant to affect the larger German public. Instigated by the Nazi elite and steeped 
in Nazi rhetoric, they have been considered ‘the last gasp of the regime’, willing to drag all 
Germans into destruction along with them.11 The decentralised and disparate nature of the 
violence, which, moreover, seemed to flare up with little warning or rationale, further allowed 
scholars to draw parallels between earlier Nazi political violence, such as in 1932-33, and the 
violence in 1945.12 However, the fractured state of Germany by 1945 made it significantly 
harder for policy decisions taken in Berlin to be implemented ‘on the ground’. By confining 
the research to one province, this dissertation examines how the central decision-making 
processes translated into intra-ethnic violence at a local level. 
Within the historiography of ‘1945’, sustained attention has also been devoted to the 
violence committed by Soviet troops against German refugees. The persistent narrative is that 
a failing Party bureaucracy that prevented, and often forbade, the population of threatened areas 
                                                          
9 On Party behaviour in Eastern Germany, see especially: Alastair Noble, Nazi Rule and the Soviet Offensive 
in Eastern Germany, 1944-1945: the darkest hour (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2010)  
10 Richard Bessel “Eine ›Volksgemeinschaft‹ der Gewalt,” in ‚Volksgemeinschaft‘: Mythos, 
wirkungsmächtige soziale Verheißung oder soziale Realität im ‚Dritten Reich‘? ed. Detlef Schmiechen-
Ackermann (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2012), 359.     
11 Manfred Zeidler, “Der Zusammenbruch des NS-Staates”, in Kriegsende in Deutschland ed. Ralph 
Giordano (Hamburg, Ellert & Richter, 2005), 42-49.  
12 Sven Keller, “Volksgemeinschaft and Violence: Some Reflections on Interdependencies.” In Visions of 
Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives ed. Martina Steber, Bernhard Gotto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 226-39.  See also Richard Bessel, Political Violence and the Rise of 
Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany 1925-1934 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 
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from preparing for evacuation, and in turn left them at the mercy of the Soviets.13 This 
dissertation will focus on the considerations that underpinned the different evacuation measures 
in East Prussia, expanding on the research of Heinrich Schwendemann, who examined the 
motivations behind strategic and tactical decisions taken by Wehrmacht commanders during 
the final months of the war.14 It will closely link it to the research of David Yelton, who 
examined the establishment and deployment of the Volkssturm militia during the final year of 
the war.15 These two scholars both established that the military was much more closely 
involved in decisions that directly impacted the German civilian population.  
The continuing focus on Party behaviour means that the largest and most violent player 
present in Germany in 1945, the German Wehrmacht, has remained underappreciated as an 
actor. Although the Wehrmacht’s role in the defeat of the Third Reich has been examined, 
historians rarely link it with the intra-ethnic violence that took place during the final fighting 
in Germany.16 Research into the motivations behind the violent behaviour among the ranks of 
the Wehrmacht goes back to Omer Bartov’s 1985 standard work The Eastern Front, 1941-45, 
German troops and the barbarisation of warfare, which not only addressed the violent 
interaction its members had with an environment they perceived as hostile, but also provided 
an insight into the ideological indoctrination to explain the troops’ motivations.17 In the decades 
that followed, Wehrmacht behaviour on the Eastern Front remained the focus of in-depth 
studies. The crimes committed by the Wehrmacht during the German occupation of the Soviet 
Union are central in these works, and numerous scholars convincingly demonstrated that the 
Wehrmacht was actively involved in the Holocaust, while also participating in countless acts 
of genocide against local populations. The focus on the policies in the Soviet Union, however, 
also means that the examination ‘stops’ at the German border: the summer of 1944 is generally 
the end-point of these studies.18 Whereas numerous studies address the violent behavioural 
                                                          
13 Theodor Schieder (ed.), Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa, Die 
Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neisse, Band I, (1954; repr., 
Munich, Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984). 
14 See for example: Heinrich Schwendemann, “Der deutsche Zusammenbruch im Osten 1944/45.” In 
Kriegsende 1945: Verbrechen, Katastrophen, Befreiungen in nationaler und internationaler Perspektive,  
edited by Bernd-A. Rusinek, 125-150. Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag, 2004 
15 David Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi militia and the fall of Germany 1944 1945, Lawrence, 
University Press of Kansas, 2002.  
16 Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage: Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der 
nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005) 
17 Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German troops and the barbarisation of warfare, (Houndmills: 
Palgrave, 2001). 
18 Among the many work, see for example: Dieter Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche 
Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941-1944 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 2008); Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Dimensionen des 
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patterns of the Wehrmacht in occupied cities in Eastern Europe, so far, no research exists that 
asks critical questions about the relation between the Wehrmacht and its own urban 
population.19 This dissertation addresses this gap by extending this line of research into 
Germany itself by examining in detail conditions in Königsberg during the final months of the 
Second World War.  
Within the research into military behaviour on the Eastern Front, moreover, the first 
occupation years (1941-1942) are examined more extensively, since during this period a string 
of deadly, racially motivated ‘criminal orders’ was implemented that were subsequently 
discussed in the field and elaborated on in war diaries.20 The findings of these studies are 
nevertheless of key importance to understand what happened later in the war as well. Christian 
Hartmann, for example, examined the ‘interplay between the military developments and the 
behaviour of the combatants’ and found that different military circumstances prompted 
different acts of violence.21 That troops continued to be radicalised through interaction with 
their environment is easily overlooked, and especially during times of military defeat the 
mental and physical strain led to a sharp increase in violence.22 As soldiers kept interacting 
with their environment in reaction to different wartime developments, ‘barbarisation’, and thus 
the nature of violence, evolved continuously. It seems therefore unlikely that, after four years 
on the Eastern Front, either as occupiers or as fighters, German troops could simply leave their 
violent mindset behind as they crossed back into Germany. This leads to the central question 
this dissertation asks: what was necessary for the Wehrmacht to turn against its own 
population? 
                                                          
Vernichtungskrieges 1941 - 1944; Ausstellungskatalog (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002); Theo 
Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia, (Oxford: Berg, 1989); Timothy Patrick 
Mulligan, The Politics of Illusion and Empire: German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1942-1943 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988); Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 
and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperPerennial, 1998). 
19 Stephan Lehnstaedt, Okkupation im Osten: Besatzeralltag in Warschau und Minsk 1939-1944 (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2010). 
20 A great introduction to this vast historigraphy is: Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, Ulrike Jureit, 
Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Bilanz einer Debatte (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005). Beyond Bartov’s research, 
two pioneering works are: Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: die deutsche Wirtschafts- und 
Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg, Hamburger Edition, 1999) Christian Streit, 
Keine Kameraden: die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941 - 1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 1978). On the use of courts-martial against Soviet citizens, see: F. Römer “„Im alten 
Deutschland wäre solcher Befehl nicht möglich gewesen”. Rezeption, Adaption und Umsetzung des 
Kriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlass im Ostheer 1941/42.” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 56, no.1 (2008) 
21 Christian Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg: Front und militärisches Hinterland 1941/42 (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009), 245, 243-423.  
22 See, for example: J. Kilian, “Wehrmacht, Partisanenkrieg und Rückzugsverbrechen an der nördlichen 
Ostfront im Herbst und Winter 1943,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 61, no. 2 (2013), 173 – 199. 
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 The rationale behind radical Wehrmacht behaviour has long been sought in the 
ideological indoctrination of the troops, but, although this is undoubtedly important, it means 
that other explanations have been left largely ignored.23 Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius drew 
attention to the German military’s stay in Russia during the First World War, showing that a 
radicalised Nazi mind set was not at all a prerequisite for a harsh occupation and brutal 
behaviour towards populations.24 Other factors, such the strain of war, are still largely left 
unexplored. Whereas war neurosis (what is today called ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’) is 
examined in depth when it concerns the other belligerents during the Second World War, an 
examination of the mental state of German troops is still absent.25 Nazi medicine itself lay at 
the core of this underappreciation, since troops’ mental illnesses did not fit into the idea of a 
healthy fighting Volk. As German soldiers’ mental traumas were equated to cowardice, or even 
considered as treasonous, they remained unaddressed during the National Socialist era, while 
also in post-war Germany the general advice was to ‘trivialise, tone down, consciously forget 
and suppress’ traumatic experiences.26 How Germans dealt with mental trauma has received 
little attention, although the topic is gaining prominence.27  
Only recently has a group of German scholars, led by historian Sönke Neitzel and the 
social psychologist Harald Welzer, set out to assess the ‘military-sociological and social-
psychological’ motivations of German soldiers. With war as the frame of reference, the authors 
found the views of German troops on ‘fighting, killing and dying’ to be rather similar in 
comparison to modern-day American soldiers.28 This group also included Felix Römer, who 
published the landmark work Kameraden, using the bugged conversations of German prisoners 
                                                          
23 Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992). See particularly Chapter 4: The Distortion of Reality 
24 Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German 
Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
25 See for example: Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to 
the Gulf War (Hove: Psychology Press, 2005) 
26 Geoffrey Cocks, Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1997), 82; Hilke Lorenz, Kriegskinder: Das Schicksal einer Generation (Munich: 
List, 2003), 19. 
27 Svenja Goltermann, Die Gesellschaft der Überlebenden: Deutsche Kriegsheimkehrer und ihre 
Gewalterfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2009); Jörg Echternkamp, 
Soldaten im Nachkrieg: Historische Deutungskonflikte und westdeutsche Demokratisierung 1945-1955 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014)  
28 Sönke Neitzel, Harald Welzer, Soldaten, On Fighting, Killing and Dying, The secret World War II 
transcripts of German POWs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012); Christian Gudehus, Sönke Neitzel Harald 
Welzer (ed.), »Der Führer war wieder viel zu human, viel zu gefühlvoll«: Der Zweite Weltkrieg aus der Sicht 
deutscher und italienischer Soldaten (Frankfurt a.M: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2011), See also: Harald 
Welzer, Täter: Wie aus ganz normale Menschen Massenmörder werden (Frankfurt a.M., Fischer Verlag, 
2005)   
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of war, recorded at Fort Hunt, Virginia. For Römer, the National-Socialist indoctrination is 
merely one of the dimensions to explain the behaviour of Wehrmacht soldiers. The ‘actual 
combat and the dynamics of violence, the historical-cultural framework of the respective 
society and its military, the culture within the actual unit, and finally also the individual 
disposition of each combatant’ were the main driving forces behind military conduct.29 The 
troops’ attitude towards their fellow countrymen, however, could not be included in the work, 
since the time of capture of the examined German POWs mostly predated the Allied advance 
into Germany. It is nevertheless noteworthy that among these men the concern for and the 
treatment of the German population was apparently hardly worthy of sustained conversation. 
The research into the role of the German armed forces during times of violent transition is 
currently experiencing a revival, with German military involvement increasingly sought – and 
found – at the centre of intense domestic violence.30 This dissertation fits into this new current. 
We now turn to the main questions this dissertation addresses. It argues that the violence 
against German civilians during the defence of their country can only be understood by 
restoring agency to the soldiers of retreating Wehrmacht units as active participants, thus 
looking beyond the traditionally viewed actors. To what extent could the arrival of military 
units in Germany help to explain the spike in violence in Germany in 1945? Was this violence 
deliberate, or was it a by-product of the fighting? Was it ordered, or was it spontaneous? What 
explains the difference in behaviour between these units and those German troops that were 
already garrisoned throughout the country? Every possible answer, in turn, only prompts more 
questions. What could be gained by exercising violence, and who gained from it? Most 
importantly: why would German troops and Party officials decide to resort to violence against 
their fellow countrymen, and how did they justify this to themselves? Finally, this dissertation 
seeks to distinguish continuities and discontinuities in military behaviour as troops returned 
from fighting abroad to fight on the home front. Thus, the purpose of this study is to determine 
to what extent the violence in 1945 can be separated from its totalitarian context. By presenting 
a microhistory of East Prussia and Königsberg, this dissertation presents a new view on the 
role of the Wehrmacht within the German society. As we saw, research so far mainly addresses 
the extent to which National Socialism impacted the Wehrmacht, yet it hardly examines what 
mark the Wehrmacht left on the German wartime community. Analysing the interplay between 
                                                          
29 Felix Römer, Kameraden, Die Wehrmacht von innen (Munich: Piper, 2012), 468. 
30 See particularly: Mark Jones, Founding Weimar: violence and the German Revolution of 1918-1919 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
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Party and Wehrmacht bodies, this dissertation seeks to clarify how the two actors shaped late-
war German society. 
 
II. Methodology and source base 
 
Examining events that occurred in Germany in 1945 means wading through a dense 
historiography. The secondary literature is virtually infinite, and some of the most highly 
regarded historians have written about it in recent times.31 It seems therefore almost impossible 
to take a fresh look at the way events transpired, especially when it concerns a loaded topic 
such as violence. Therefore, rather than examining Germany as a whole, this dissertation will 
examine the events in Germany’s easternmost province, East Prussia, from the autumn of 1944 
onwards, with a particular focus on its capital, Königsberg. Soviet troops reached the 
province’s borders in the late summer of 1944, which led to a series of defensive measures 
being taken. That autumn Königsberg was declared a fortress (Festung), and as such was 
besieged by Soviet troops between late January and April 1945, after Soviet troops had overrun 
much of the rest of East Prussia. The German city Königsberg no longer exists; today it is 
known as Kaliningrad, the capital of the Russian Oblast with the same name, an often-
overlooked exclave wedged between Poland and Lithuania. As the area fits awkwardly in the 
story of (West and East) Germany its recent history has been largely ignored by historians.32 
This means that many generalisations still dominate our current perception of the city, while 
the lack of scholarship, in some extreme cases, forced established scholars to resort to citing 
amateur historians.33 
 The first obstacle in researching East Prussia is the highly fractured source base. Parts 
of Königsberg’s archives were evacuated in late-1944, and, as of early 2017, archival sources 
                                                          
31 See, for example: Ian Kershaw, The End, Hitler’s Germany, 1944-45 (London: Allen Lane 2011); Richard 
Bessel, Germany 1945, From War to Peace (New York, Pocket Books, 2010); Stephen Fritz, Endkampf, 
Soldiers, Civilians, and the Death of the Third Reich (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2004); Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014), 
Ch. 10: Untergang.  
32 It fits, however, in the story of “Germans”, and played an important role in the Historikerstreit. See: 
Andreas Hillgruber, Zweierlei Untergang. Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des 
europäischen Judentums (Berlin: Siedler, 1986); Collection of essays by multiple authors, Historikerstreit: 
Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung 
(Munich: Piper, 1991). 
33 Kershaw, in The End, uses the work of Isabel Denny, The fall of Hitler’s Fortress city: The battle for 
Königsberg 1945 (London, Greenhill Books, 2007). 
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concerning the city are still on the move.34 Sources that specifically focus on East Prussia and 
Königsberg were found in the Archiv Stadt Königsberg in Duisburg, the archive of the 
Ostpreußisches Landesmuseum in Lüneburg and the Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Kaliningradskoi 
Oblasti in Kaliningrad, although none of these can boast a coherent or organised collection of 
primary source material focusing on the era. The broader German context has been 
reconstructed with considerably more ease, with sources found in the larger archives of the 
Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichtenfelde, the Bundesarchiv-Lastenasugleich in Bayreuth, the 
Bundesarchiv-Militärachiv in Freiburg, the National Archives in Kew, and the archives of the 
Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich. This Europe-wide search, and the wide range of sources 
encountered there, has inevitably led me towards considering the different variables at play 
during Germany’s final defence of East Prussia. Important regional studies, such as that of Jill 
Stephenson, who analysed Württemberg during the National Socialist era, drew attention to the 
differences existing between the German provinces, urging future historians not to draw 
sweeping conclusions.35  
If East Prussia is to serve as a case study for violence in late-war Germany, appreciating 
the province’s unique factors, while at the same time providing a framework that allows us to 
better understand the larger context of this violence, is the most challenging task of this 
dissertation. After Soviet forces had cut through East Prussia in January 1945, Königsberg 
became one of the clearest examples of what is referred to as the late-war ‘islandization’ 
(‘Verinselung’) of Germany: the fragmentation of the regime that allowed local authorities to 
assume a more active role.36 Between late January 1945 and early April 1945 the city was 
besieged, limiting its contact with the outside world. As such it can be rightly considered a 
‘microcosm’, whose uniqueness should be examined before continuing to the main questions 
this dissertation seeks to answer.37 At the same time, the inclination to generalise always lures, 
                                                          
34 Fabienne Piepiora “Museum Haus Königsberg verabschiedet sich,” Der Westen, January 10, 2015, 
http://www.derwesten.de/staedte/duisburg/museum-haus-koenigsberg-verabschiedet-sich-
id11449984.html The holdings of the Archive and Museum of Stadt Königsberg are transferred to the 
Ostpreussische Landesmuseum, which is currently being expanded. Most archival files are still boxed.  
35 Jill Stephenson, Hitler’s Home Front, Württemberg under the Nazis (London: Hambledon Continuum, 
2006); “The Volksgemeinschaft and the Problems of Permeability: The Persistence of Traditional 
Attitudes in Württemberg Villages” German History 34, no. 1 (2016): 49-69. 
36 Wolfgang Franz Werner, »Bleib übrig!« Deutsche Arbeiter in der nationalsozialistischen Kriegswirtschaft 
(Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1983), 329. Andreas Kunz refers to this process in the military contect as 
‘atomisation. See: Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage: Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der 
nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005)   
37 The term ‘microcosm’ is borrowed from: Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse, Microcosm: A Portrait 
of a Central European City (London: Pimlico, 2003) 
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if only because Nazi propaganda was determined to present a view of an egalitarian society.38 
Moreover, due to years of practice, by 1945 most high-ranking Nazi officials were extremely 
skilled in presenting their message. As a result, using their orders can indeed seem more 
appealing to historians than using the stiff, telegram-style orders of commanders, who had little 
reason – and even less time – to devote energy to style or sentence structure. The risk of 
following National Socialist principles as a base for understanding German behaviour becomes 
particularly apparent in a diary entry of Reich Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, dated 27 
March, 1945:  
I express my astonishment to Slesina that in the west not one symbol of resistance 
has manifested itself, as it has in the east, like in Breslau or Königsberg. He asserts 
that the population in the West is beaten senseless by the months and years of enemy 
bombing, and that they prefer a horrible end over an endless horror. I believe it has 
also to do with the fact that the people in the west are by nature not as tough as those 
in the east. The people in the west are closer to France, that over-civilized country, 
while the people in the east are closer to Poland and Russia, the more primitive 
countries of Europe.39 
 
This simplified explanation, rooted in the pseudo-scientific Social-Darwinist theories held so 
dear by the Nazis, is a logically insufficient answer. At the same time, Goebbels’ statement 
highlights that after twelve years of National Socialist propaganda, there were still local 
differences that needed to be observed. Despite continuous efforts of different East Prussian 
expellee organisations, who after the war had sought to present the strong local culture as a 
kind of hurdle that prevented any significant change, it is nevertheless clear that National 
Socialism reached deeply into East Prussia. By retracing its appeal and reach in the province, 
we can determine the factors with which East Prussians identified as the war reached the 
borders of their province in the summer of 1944. Borrowing from the field of nationalism 
studies, we find that most of its scholars ‘share the understanding that identities are something 
opposed to [self-] interests’, and, therefore, establishing which actors challenged those interests 
                                                          
38 Richard Bessel, “The War to End All Wars: The Shock of Violence in 1945 and Its Aftermath in 
Germany,” in No Man’s Land of Violence. Extreme War in the 20th Century, ed. Alf Lüdtke and Bernd 
Weisbord (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2006), 85.  
39 Joseph Goebbels, Tagebücher 1945: Die letzte Aufzeichnungen (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1977), 
391-92. Horst Slesina was to run the Werwolf guerrilla radio station in the areas conquered by the Allies 
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during the final stage of the war gives us the best indication of the balance of power in 
Königsberg.40 
 The assessment of these different factors forms a substantial ‘preamble’ to what is the 
main aim of the dissertation: examining the role of the German Wehrmacht in the intra-ethnic 
violence in Germany in 1944-1945. Establishing who benefited from the violence is an 
important aspect of this dissertation, but a Germany-wide approach can lead to a singling out 
of sources that fit the presumptions of the researcher. By limiting this dissertation to East 
Prussia, the cross section will seek to uncover actors that have previously been 
underappreciated. This will be achieved though juxtaposing Party and Wehrmacht orders to a 
wide variety of situation reports, journals, diaries, questionnaires, and private recollections. 
These sources allow us to retrace the decisions of the perpetrators and the motives that lay 
behind them, and might help us to better understand why Germany’s defeat was so total. Above 
all, it can tell us much about the priorities of those in charge in the final months of the war.  
 
III. Structure of the thesis 
 
This dissertation consists of two parts: attention is equally divided between the environment in 
which violence occurred, and the violence itself, since only through a reinterpretation of the 
environment can we reappraise the different actors. Although current research is grounded in 
a solid primary source base and presents a nuanced perspective, our view of the violence in 
Germany during the final months of the war is essentially the same as in 1950.41 Therefore, we 
will first assess some of the core concepts that form the framework of this thesis.  
Chapter 1 starts with an analysis of the relationship between the Volksgemeinschaft and 
Total War in East Prussia. Establishing the native population’s mentality towards the war 
teaches us about those people who would become the main victims of late-war violence. 
Subsequently, we will determine what impact the Party and the Wehrmacht had on their 
behaviour, using the construction of the Ostwall and the establishment of the Volkssturm as 
‘stress-tests’. Having for the first time connected the three actors to East Prussia, we then turn 
                                                          
40 Siniša Malešević, Identity as Ideology, Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism (Houndmills: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2006), 17-18.  
41 The link between ‘the fanatical Nazi’ and violence can be found as early as the late 1940s. The work that 
stands out in this regard is: Jürgen Thorwald, Es Begann and die Weichsel – Das Ende am Elbe (1949 and 
1950; repr., Munich: Knaur Zeitgeschichte, 1979). An examination of the appeal of this work is: D. Oels: 
“„Dieses Buch ist kein Roman“. Jürgen Thorwalds „Die große Flucht“ zwischen Zeitgeschichte und 
Erinnerungspolitik,” Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 6, no.3 (2009), 367-390.  
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to the assessment of a concept that has so far been largely ignored: the actors’ appreciation of 
their immediate environment, and more precisely their appreciation of a city. Although the 
violence in 1945 was not restricted to cities, we will see that they form the most suitable 
platforms to examine it. Once these core concepts are assessed, we can turn to Königsberg in 
1945, seeking to answer the first main question of this thesis: what was the balance of power 
in the city? Chapter 2 concerns itself with the question about how this balance of power 
manifested itself, analysing the way propaganda in Königsberg presented the different events 
that took place on a local, national and international level. An assessment of the themes 
explored in local media will help to reveal how, in a fractured Germany, local authorities 
presented their message, and how they sought to link it to the larger picture.  
 Chapter 3 then shifts to an examination of the evacuation in East Prussia, where we will 
examine the collaboration between the Party and the Wehrmacht. It will help to establish their 
authority, as well as the radicalising nature of their proximity. Nowadays, ‘evacuation’ is 
understood as the transportation of civilians, and it is this view that perseveres about the 
provinces in Eastern Germany as well. Analysing the evacuation measures, retracing what their 
exact purposes were, moreover, can help us to understand the relationship between the Party 
and Wehrmacht on one hand, and the civilian population on the other. Lastly, Chapter 4 will 
continue to explore the consequences of the German troops’ proximity to the German 
population. It focuses on two elements: the introduction of the radicalised mindset of the 
German troops in German society, and the adherence to military law in German society. How 
did these two elements shape the behaviour in Königsberg? It traces the radicalised legislation 
that was implemented to the origins of military law, once again highlighting that this law did 
not take the need of civilians into account.  
The conclusion will above all focus on the findings of the last chapters. It will show 
that, as earlier on the Eastern Front, there are clear limits to the well-worn idea of the 
Wehrmacht as an obstacle for the radicalisation of German society, instead showing that, once 
back in Germany, it played a key role in the practice of violence during the last months of the 








In late January 1945, the East Prussian capital of Königsberg was threatened with encirclement. 
The city was still packed with civilians, and many of them, such as Wilhelm Strüvy, a 
prominent and well-respected member of the East Prussian community, had a small window 
of time to flee Königsberg and leave East Prussia. Despite his age – Strüvy was 58 – he 
repeatedly turned the opportunity down, choosing to take part in the defence of the city instead, 
feeling that ‘If the province falls, I can fall as well!’1 During those same days, a woman 
explained her motivation to stay in Königsberg to her doctor, assuring him that the city would 
hold out: ‘Our Führer will not let us be captured by the Russian, he’ll rather gas us.’2 These 
radical statements reveal a willingness of German contemporaries to closely connect personal 
well-being to their immediate environment, an environment that, with few exceptions, had been 
completely transformed during the previous years of ‘Total War’. Germans’ perception of war 
had – due to the lack of alternative news sources – above all been shaped by their own 
propaganda and their personal experiences. Therefore, although these fanatical sentiments 
reveal the permeability of the regime’s language, they hardly reveal which legislation and 
which bodies shaped the day-to-day decisions civilians had to make at the time. Indeed, to fully 
understand the place of the German civilian during times of Total War, we should venture 
beyond their perception of it, outlining the processes that lay at its foundation. 
This chapter follows the path of the population of Königsberg throughout the war by 
examining their direct environment, starting with an examination of East Prussia as a whole 
and continuing with Königsberg in particular. The interplay between actors and environment 
lies at the core of this chapter and is crucial to an understanding of the radical behaviour that 
manifested itself in 1945. Contemporaries and historians alike have so far traced late-war 
violence in Germany back to two tracks of thought. As a rule, the violence is treated both as a 
                                                          
1 “Wilhelm Strüvy siebzig Jahre,” Das Ostpreussenblatt, October 10, 1956, 3.  
2 Hans Graf von Lehndorff, Ostpreußisches Tagebuch. Aufzeichnungen eines Arztes aus den Jahren 1945–
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continuation of radicalised domestic Nazi policy, while further excesses are explained through 
the age-old adage ‘war is war’: since war is inherently violent in nature, the barbarity it 
engenders is a logical result.3 This sentiment has allowed both the Wehrmacht, as well as the 
German civilian population, to be portrayed as passive actors, swept up in the maelstrom of 
war, subject to this radicalisation, but hardly contributing to it. The focus on East Prussia and 
its capital Königsberg allows us to trace back the motivations of the bodies involved, the 
language that was used in the decision-making process, as well as the friction the 
implementation of policy caused in German society. Moreover, restoring agency to the 
different actors on a local level will help us separate thought-through deliberations from 
decisions prompted by circumstances, providing us with a more nuanced view of what led to 
the radicalisation of German wartime society. 
 
I. East Prussia’s path to 1945 
 
To establish what underlay the violence in East Prussia, the first step is to determine how the 
behavioural patterns of the different actors had developed during the prior years. It is tempting 
to explain the violence as a product of a society shaped by National Socialism by following the 
official line of the regime. Propaganda at the time consistently portrayed Germany as a Nazified 
state, which was encapsulated in the word Volksgemeinschaft, or ‘people’s community’. On 24 
February 1945, Königsberg’s Preußische Zeitung, like most other party outlets, celebrated the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the declaration of the National Socialist party programme. Shortly 
after the First World War, the Nazis presented twenty-five points to achieve their vision for 
Germany. According to the editors of the Preußische Zeitung, the existence of a 
Volksgemeinschaft had emboldened the German people: ‘Then a crippled nation, today a 
people fighting with extreme fanaticism. Then a survivor of a disintegrated social order, today 
a developing [and] unwavering Volksgemeinschaft.’4 Progress within German society was 
consistently traced back to the added value of institutions and policies introduced by the Nazis, 
                                                          
3 Sven Keller, “Volksgemeinschaft and Violence: Some Reflections on Interdependencies,” in: Visions of 
Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives, ed. Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto 
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thereby downplaying the continuities with the pre-Nazi era. Yet, every adult had a frame of 
reference that extended beyond the twelve years of the National Socialist dictatorship. This 
section therefore will address the social changes that took place prior and during the National 
Socialist era, and determine which impact they had on East Prussia. 
 Psychological studies tell us that behavioural patterns of both individuals and groups 
can largely be determined by evaluating the perception of past experiences, and it seems 
therefore sensible to start the examination of East Prussia at the beginning of the populations’ 
living memory, in the late nineteenth century.5 During this period, the heyday of the Second 
Reich, German nationalism, actively fuelled by the monarchy and völkisch movements, 
reached previously unknown heights. Sustained energy was devoted to the question what it 
meant to be German, resulting in debates about where the borders of ‘Germandom’ lay, how 
these had come about historically, and how they corresponded with the current situation. In the 
age of Empire, the predictable conclusion was that Germany needed to expand, a notion that it 
shared with virtually every other European state. Within the German debates, the county’s 
eastern borderlands were presented as points of friction between the Germans and the Slavs. 
East Prussia, Germany’s easternmost province, played a prominent role in these debates, as it 
was both the province that embodied Germany’s aspirations for a colonial empire that would 
expand eastwards, as well as the province where the angst for an invasion by barbaric Slavic 
neighbours took its clearest shape.6 
East Prussians saw their fears confirmed in late 1914, during the first months of the 
First World War, when three major battles and numerous smaller border fights were fought out 
between German defenders and the Russian armies that had entered East Prussia. Although the 
battles ended in clear German victories, the material and personal damage had been enormous. 
More than a third of the population fled in August and September 1914, while of those who 
stayed behind some 1,500 died at the hands of the Russian troops. Besides vast material damage 
to the province, some 13,000 of its civilians were deported to Russia, of whom well over a third 
would not return. The fighting for the province reached every front page in Germany with the 
German victory at Tannenberg in August 1914, and ended in late February 1915 with a 
following victory at the Winter Battle of the Masurian Lakes. As such, East Prussia held a 
                                                          
5 D. Dietrich, “National Renewal, Anti-Semitism, and Political Continuity: A Psychological Assessment,” 
Political Psychology 9, no. 3 (1988): 385-411.  
6 Gregor Thum, “Megalomania and Angst: The Nineteenth-Century Mythization of Germany’s Eastern 
Borderlands,” in Shatterzones of Empire: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and 
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unique position in Germany’s First World War experience, being the only German province to 
have experienced actual combat.7   
During the interwar period, few East Prussians are likely to have changed their attitude 
towards their neighbours. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles had given birth to the ‘Polish Corridor’ 
which granted the newly-formed state of Poland access to the sea, thereby cutting East Prussia 
off from the rest of Germany. It was a ‘thorn in the flesh’ that most Germans – East Prussians 
in particular – wanted extracted. Much of the fear they felt, stemmed from the realisation that 
the German army, the Reichswehr, (with a strength of a mere 100,000 men as a result of the 
restrictions of Versailles) would be unable to provide any opposition to the Polish army, which 
possessed some 300,000 troops.8 As Poland waged a number of wars with neighbouring states, 
most importantly with Lithuania and the Soviet Union, war remained on East Prussia’s 
doorstep (primarily in the east and south), adding to the feelings of unease and insecurity. 
Shortly after the First World War, the western part of the Neidenburg district, which included 
the city of Soldau, had to be handed over to Poland. A last humiliation came in 1924, when as 
a result of the ‘Klaipeda Revolt’ the area north of the river Memel was separated from the 
province and incorporated into Lithuania. Moreover, ‘in the region of the corridor’, Roger 
Moorhouse found, ‘ethnic cleansing against the German population was on the rise.’9 On all 
sides East Prussia was compromised, becoming the embodiment of what throughout Germany 
was referred to as ‘the bleeding frontier’.10  
During this period, the fate of East Prussia continued to be placed within a history of a 
centuries-long battle with the east: the victories at Tannenberg in 1914 were widely publicised 
as a revenge for the battle lost by the Teutonic Knights in 1410 on that ‘same’ location. 
Numerous books were published along this line, most famously Schlachtfelder in Ostpreußen, 
a work written by officers from the province, which addressed all the battles that took place 
between the Middle Ages and 1918.11 The Tannenberg-Denkmal, of which construction started 
in 1924, also embraced this medieval memory culture, its layout deliberately reminiscent of a 
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Teutonic castle.12 The feeling of being beleaguered by ‘the East’ had a tangible impact on East 
Prussia, and resulted in the construction and strengthening of fortification works throughout 
the province. Moreover, paramilitary organisations spawned in the province, arising out of the 
fear that the small Reichswehr would be unable to defend East Prussia in case of a Polish 
incursion. Already prior to the National Socialist dictatorship, the Reichswehr actively tapped 
into this fear, and particularly members of the armed wing of the NSDAP, the Sturmabteilung 
(SA) proved willing to assist in the country’s defence. The army offered military training to 
these men, and these efforts were particularly successful in East Prussia.13 
More widely, Germany, which in the early 1920s was seriously politically divided, also 
had to overcome severe domestic crises. On numerous occasions unrest turned violent, as 
different factions and parties made grabs for power.14 This led to a rise of a yearning to be part 
of a stable country, unified behind a set of core values, which had last been the case during the 
first weeks of the First World War, when a ‘manufactured image’ of euphoric nationalism had 
taken hold of the country.15 Many parties and organisations therefore stressed the importance 
of creating a Gemeinschaft, a community, which they considered far superior to the traditional 
Gesellschaft, or society. The National Socialists also believed in the added value of a 
Gemeinschaft, which they, in line with a popular strand of thought, structured around the Volk, 
the ‘healthy, undefiled members of the community, whose devotion to the national good had 
not been corrupted by selfish materialism.’16 They connected to this idea of a 
Volksgemeinschaft the ‘promise of normality’, both in the private and public sphere, a ‘goal 
that ordinary Germans had been longing for since at least 1915, after hopes of a quick victory 
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in the First World War had been dashed.’17 They saw the Volksgemeinschaft as a promise for 
a better future, and, to achieve this community, it required the constant participation of the 
people. As such, the Volksgemeinschaft was meant as a dynamic process, rather than a clearly-
defined final objective.18 Central to the National Socialist Volk-thinking was the emphasis on 
Germany as a self-sufficient state, which meant that East Prussia, as an agricultural province, 
would continue to receive considerable economic benefits.19 This vision resonated particularly 
well among the majority of the East Prussian population, especially its rural protestant 
inhabitants, and during the March 1933 elections, the last elections before Hitler established a 
dictatorship, East Prussia was the province with the highest percentage of NSDAP voters, an 
absolute majority of 56.5 per cent.20 Much of this support should be traced back to the tireless 
efforts of Erich Koch (1896-1986), who in 1928 came to the province to head the newly-created 
Nazi ‘Gau Ostpreußen’ as its Gauleiter (provincial leader).21 Since most Gauleiters – Koch 
included – were Party members from the first hour (‘Alter Kämpfer’) they could count on 
Hitler’s unconditional trust and support. As such, they yielded massive informal powers as 
well, which allowed them to assert increasing control over every aspect of their provinces.22  
What certainly struck a chord locally during the Nazi rule were the efforts to incorporate 
East Prussia’s martial heritage into the regime’s official line, placing it, like before, into the 
perceived centuries-long struggle with ‘the East’.23 The Nazi regime took over care for the 
Tannenberg Denkmal, which up to then was privately funded, rechristening it Reichsehrenmal 
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Tannenberg.24 A straight line was also drawn from the war Nazi Germany was to wage to the 
battles of the Teutonic Order in the Thirteenth century against the pagan Pruzzi; its Grand 
Master, Hermann von Salza (1165-1239), for example, had an SS Panzer battalion named after 
him, which, dripping with symbolism, would in July and August 1944 even defend the 
‘Tannenberg Line’ in Estonia.25 Gauleiter Koch further adhered to the martial narrative: ‘The 
history of East Prussia’, he wrote in a guide about the province, ‘is one of struggle. Struggle 
shaped the East Prussian people, it created their spiritual attitude.’26 Meanwhile, the resonance 
of National Socialist principles and prejudices among large swaths of the East Prussian nobility 
shows that the Nazis achieved considerable success in fashioning their movement as a worthy 
standard bearer of Prussian militarism.27  
In line with both the traditional way of thinking about the province and the National 
Socialist line, Gauleiter Koch saw East Prussia as ‘a vanguard, path breaking outpost for the 
German people on their way from the west to the east.’28 According to the Deutsches Institut 
für Außenpolitische Forschung (German Institute for the Research of Foreign Policy) the 
German cities in the East, ‘founded and settled by the knights of the German Order and citizens 
of the old tribes, became the centres of higher culture, and were able to radiate their formative 
power far beyond the borders of the German people (…) upon the Slavic hinterland.’29 
According to a widely-published speech of Reichswirtschaftsminister Walther Funk at the 
opening of the October 1941 Ostmesse (Königsberg’s biannual fair to promote eastern goods), 
East Prussia was to serve as a ‘transit highway’ between the rest of Europe and the Ostraum.30 
The province’s agricultural heritage was harnessed to this imperialist martial reading in the 
form of the ‘Blut und Boden’ (blood and soil) rhetoric. Slogans like ‘The German sword has 
liberated the east. Now the farmer follows with the plough’ met with agreement of most East 
Prussians.31  
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As a Grenzland (border region), East Prussia was strongly affected by Lithuanian and 
Polish influences. Large parts of the province, especially its south-eastern part, the Masuren, 
consisted of people who spoke either Polish or their own distinct language, Masurian 
(Masurisch). These people, mainly protestant farmers, considered themselves Germans, which 
they convincingly showed in 1920, when in the plebiscite for self-determination of the region, 
an overwhelming 98 per cent of them voted to stay part of Germany. Thirteen years later, a 
majority of them also voted for the NSDAP.32 This cultural and ethnical diversity had long 
been celebrated as a positive, but in the 1920s it was increasingly seen as a threat to Volk unity, 
prompting a fervent Germanisation drive of different newly-established Heimat- und 
Deutschtumsverbände.33 After the Nazi takeover, these associations were disbanded or 
incorporated (Gleichgeschaltet) into the National Socialist Bund Deutsche Osten, which 
stepped up the efforts. Many place names were Germanised, in some areas of the Masuren up 
to 70 per cent.34 Nevertheless, it took until 1939, until it was explicitly forbidden, for church 
services in the region to discontinue in Polish.35  
The change in the appreciation of the multi-ethnic nature of the province, and the 
challenges this posed, can best be observed in Königsberg’s academic culture. Scholars from 
Königsberg’s Albertus-University, a ‘Grenzland-university’, had been at the forefront of 
Ostforschung, the research on Eastern Europe and the region’s relation to the German people. 
As Nazi officials saw the potential of these efforts for their racial agenda, they redirected 
funding to different research projects, which increasingly served to provide a pseudo-scientific 
foundation for German questions about ethnicity, resettlement, or population control.36 
Michael Burleigh considered these scholars ‘hardened warriors’ in issues of Germandom, eager 
to align their scholarship to political priorities. Many of these ‘experts’ were subsequently 
deployed in the occupied east, posing increasingly radical solutions to race matters, as such 
actively giving shape to Germany’s war of annihilation.37 It would therefore be incorrect to 
consider East Prussia as untouched by National Socialism, as the regime’s racism permeated 
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important parts of its community, rallying both members of East Prussia’s smaller 
communities, as well as its academia. 
Also Gauleiter Koch, who in the early 1930s still occupied the socialist left wing of the 
Nazi Party, eventually became one of the regime’s most notorious racist hardliners.38 In the 
second half of the decade, he adopted, internalised, and eventually propagated, the regime’s 
discriminatory dogmas in East Prussia. On 16 July 1941, in extension to his duties in East 
Prussia, Hitler appointed him as ‘Reichskommissar für die Ukraine’, Reich commissar of 
Ukraine, which he would govern with an iron fist.39 Koch brought many of his East Prussian 
subordinates with him, and left little doubt as to what was expected of them: ‘I will draw the 
very last out of this country. I did not come to spread bliss. I have come to help the Führer. The 
population must work, work, and work again’, he told a Party meeting in Kiev. ‘We definitely 
did not come here to give out manna’, he continued, ‘We have come here to create the basis 
for victory.’40 
 Although the province’s close ties to National Socialism were unmistakable, there were 
also large parts of East Prussia, especially its countryside, where the Volksgemeinschaft was 
less influential. This was mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, East Prussia was sparsely 
populated, which did not justify the presence of different National Socialist offices.41 
Moreover, on average only one in 25 people on the country side possessed a radio set, and, as 
there were also hardly any cinemas in these less populated areas, the regime struggled to get 
its message across.42 Secondly, most farmers were content with their rural lifestyle, which 
meant that few of them used the institutions of the Volksgemeinschaft to challenge their socio-
cultural position.43 For most people on the East Prussian countryside, as indeed a report from 
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Königsberg’s Gestapo observed in July 1935, the Volksgemeinschaft remained an abstract idea 
that few of them subscribed to on their own accord.44  
In September 1939 Germany went to war, which brought a new, yet not completely 
unfamiliar, set of challenges for the East Prussian population. Immediately prior to the start of 
the war, rationing was introduced throughout Germany for many major consumer goods.45 In 
conjunction with this, laws were passed to counter the illicit slaughter of animals, although the 
practice nonetheless grew throughout the course of the war. Sentences were particularly harsh 
in East Prussia, and even included death penalties, causing an outrage among the rural 
population.46 Nevertheless, the strict laws remained in place, as the regime was determined to 
avoid a collapse of the home front as a result of undernourished urban populations. These 
measures could not prevent some people from feeling disadvantaged by the new situation, 
which led to a polarisation between townspeople and farmers, echoing themes from 1914-18, 
further highlighting the differences which traditionally existed between townspeople and the 
rural population.47 
In East Prussia, mobilisation for war significantly changed the community structure. 
East Prussia ranked among the provinces with the lowest number of indispensable (so-called 
uk-gestellt) workers, which meant that a large proportion of men could be taken out of the work 
force to serve in the armed forces. For example, in terms of percentage, East Prussian industries 
provided the highest numbers of industrial workers to the army.48 As former farmers 
constituted the largest segment of the German army, the men of Wehrkreis I (East Prussia 
military district) were disproportionately represented among its ranks from early on. As a 
result, entire school classes were sent to the countryside to perform Erntedienst, harvest duty, 
during extended summer holidays to make good their absence.49 Concurretly, the regime’s 
wartime measures to conscript women into the work force encountered less indignation in East 
Prussia than in Germany’s urbanised provinces; since agricultural enterprises traditionally 
depended on female labour, this movement was not an uncommon one.50  
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The community structure was also effected by evacuation from bombed areas. As 
Germany’s easternmost province, which, moreover, possessed little heavy industry, East 
Prussia was bombed significantly less than the western parts of the country, and few East 
Prussians could therefore relate to the plight of their bombed-out compatriots.51 Memel and 
Königsberg were bombed by the Soviet Air Force immediately after the commencement of 
Operation Barbarossa, but these attacks were considered as little more than ‘little fleabites’ 
back in Berlin. As a result of the limited bombing of the province, East Prussia, from mid-1943 
onwards, became a reception area for almost 200,000 ‘Luftkriegsevakuierte’, air war evacuees, 
mainly from Berlin. Their reception was a matter of adjustment, and the personal sacrifices its 
population had to make whilst billeting these people caused some friction. Population levels in 
the province had never been so high, which resulted in a stricter rationing of food, gas, and 
electricity.52 Furthermore, many former city dwellers, mainly Berliners, had trouble adjusting 
to the unfamiliar food and conditions of East Prussia’s country side, and, according to Dr. Max 
Draeger, the president of Königsberg’s Higher Regional Court, ‘“complained” far more than 
the quiet, reserved East Prussians.’53 In turn, when relatively well-fed Königsbergers were 
evacuated to Saxony after their city was bombed in August 1944, the young Sigrun Pluske was 
placed with a ‘kind’ family, which nevertheless ‘really did not want us, because they said “You 
had so much food during the years of war, while we had all the bombing and very little food. 
Now you come and eat our little food”, so there was a little hate on account of that.’54 The war 
forced the German population to confront deep-routed local differences that had long existed 
between the different provinces, but, as these remarks show, little effort was made to bridge 
the divide. 
During the war, East Prussia again played its traditional role as bridgehead, and was 
used twice as a springboard for military campaigns: in the autumn of 1939, in the period leading 
up to the invasion of Poland, and in the spring of 1941, in preparation to ‘Operation 
Barbarossa’, the invasion of the Soviet Union. Numerous reports from the Sicherheitsdienst 
(SD) show that it was common among East Prussians to pride themselves on their close 
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proximity to the troops, as they were able to hear soldiers’ stories before the rest of the 
population, an extra source of first-hand information at a time when this was scarce.55 The 
province was to remain a bridge between the rest of Germany and the northern and central 
sector of the Eastern Front throughout the war, and trainloads of supplies passed through the 
province constantly, while wounded soldiers were brought back to the province’s many army 
hospitals.56 Indeed, in an attempt to downplay the rate at which the war was claiming its toll, 
East Prussian magazine and newspaper editors were ordered to keep obituaries limited in size.57 
Although these factors firmly tied East Prussians to a war that was portrayed as being waged 
for the benefit of the Volksgemeinschaft, at the same time its institutions (such as the 
Ortsgruppe or the Kreisleitung) devoted less and less attention to the concerns of civilians, 
instead increasingly adopting auxiliary military roles.58 This development meant that these 
local Party offices lost their relevance: rather than being manifestations of a society based on 
reciprocity between the state and its citizens, they represented a one-sided arrangement where 
the population gave and the regime took, and the offices’ decreased interaction with the local 
community encouraged the East Prussian population to return to more traditional loyalties.    
It is considerably harder to determine how well the Nazi racial agenda resonated within 
the province. The conquest of vast territories in Eastern Europe opened up new opportunities 
for the regime to pursue its genocidal policies, which meant that it had to divert resources away 
from more easily relatable domestic issues, as such putting a strain on the promise of the 
Volksgemeinschaft. The regime’s attention to the different minority groups considered racially 
inferior revealed the disparity between the concerns of the regime and those of the German 
public. By 1944, over 200,000 foreign labourers worked in East Prussia, a number that 
increased to 237.000 by September 1944.59 Polish forced labourers had been the first to arrive 
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in East Prussia in larger numbers, mainly as farm hands. With most German men at the front 
this led, despite a strict ban, to many unauthorised contacts between German women and Polish 
men; an unremarkable development given the significant Polish influence in the province’s 
history. Nevertheless, penalties for those caught were notoriously harsh as the court of 
Königsberg, its judges felt, had to be exemplary in its convictions, since, as East Prussia was 
the German province closest to the East, its inhabitants were more likely to succumb to racial 
impurity.60 This approach revealed the tensions between the requirements of war and achieving 
a racially-pure Volksgemeinschaft: pursuing one goal inevitably meant compromising the 
other, which was nevertheless something the German leadership was unwilling to accept. 
Moreover, while most Germans had still hardly internalised the regime’s anti-semitic 
line, and did not share its sense of urgency, in East Prussia, as elsewhere, the execution of the 
Holocaust could count on the ‘tacit support’ of the majority of the population.61 As early as 
1929 Jewish gatherings had been disrupted by armed Nazi gangs, and in 1935 police reports 
mention near-lynchings in the province. During the Kristallnacht, on 9 November 1938, 
Königsberg’s Neue Synagoge went up in flames, and from January 1939 onwards, the city’s 
Jews were increasingly forced into special ‘Jew-houses’.62 In June 1942 most of East Prussia’s 
Jewish population were deported and were killed in the Maly Trostenets extermination camp 
on the outskirts of Minsk, and in August of that year a last large group of elderly Jews was 
deported to Theresienstadt.63 Meanwhile, East Prussia’s Roma and Sinti Gypsy communities 
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were persecuted. Initially they were herded into a purpose-built camp in Königsberg, being 
used as forced labourers in an adjacent factory, but in March 1943 the camp was closed down, 
after which  its inhabitants were deported to Auschwitz.64 By then, the killing conducted by 
Einsatzgruppen, the SS paramilitary death squads, would have been widely known in the 
province German population, but, as David Bankier stressed, a ‘conscious decision’ was made 
to ‘turn a deaf ear’ to it across Germany.65 This stemmed from two uneasy realisations: they 
had defined themselves opportunistically in the light of their changing environment, and their 
perverted consciousness had, as a result, enabled the province to actively facilitate the racial 
war of extermination.66 
The remote and recent past placed East Prussians in a situation where at the one hand 
they could rationalise their actions in terms of their own history, while on the other fully 
satisfying the demands of the National Socialist regime. Thus, while the regime encouraged 
the persistence of local ideas and traditions, it would also champion its central message, which 
revolved around the creation of a national Volksgemeinschaft. The lack of consistency between 
the two currents of thought did not seem to bother the regime unduly, as long as the population 
acquiesced in the direction it took. The absence of the Party institutions in large parts of East 
Prussia, and the lack of their appeal, meant that the Nazi efforts to recast life on a local level 
were unsuccessful in the province. War only increased the gap between East Prussians and the 
larger German society, as the insecurity of the war meant that few of their concerns ventured 
beyond their immediate horizon. It seems therefore unlikely that the population’s behaviour 
during the last year of the war can be traced back to the permeability of the Nazi ideology. At 
the same time, it is likely that most East Prussians felt that they, along with the majority of the 
German population, had ‘burned their bridges’ and had no option but to tie their fate to the 
outcome of the war.67 The East Prussians’ commitment to the war efforts should not be judged 
along the lines of agreement with the regime. Instead, their compliance was largely routed in 
the lack of viable alternatives. As the war went on, the regime’s demands towards its population 
continued to increase, culminating in the proclamation of Total War. The effects of this 
development will be discussed in the next section.  
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II. Total War in East Prussia 
 
What encompasses ‘Total War’ has proven hard to determine. East Prussia’s diarists, when 
describing the increasingly drastic measures that were being taken on the home front, do not 
use the word ‘Total’ in their description of the war. Instead, they point to personal changes in 
their lives without necessarily linking them to a larger picture. Perhaps in an effort to emphasize 
the communality of human suffering during war time, there is a certain tendency to view Total 
War as a monolithic concept.68 When it concerns the Second World War, most historians have 
rightly pointed out that the war Germany waged could hardly be considered ‘Total’; instead, 
these debates stress the unwillingness of the German leadership to fully commit its resources 
to it.69 The German military historian Jürgen Förster points out that the term ‘Total War’ was 
hardly used at the time, but instead distinguishes five terms German military and political 
leaders often put forward: ‘total armament’, ‘total mobilisation’, ‘total administration’, ‘total 
control’, and ‘total command of operations’.70 Although Förster does not imply that this 
enumeration should be considered complete, these terms prove useful as tools of measurement 
in the analysis of the factors that contributed to the prolonged defence of East Prussia. Perhaps 
the most outstanding observation about our current perception of ‘Total War’ is the small role 
the army seems to play in it. Looking at Förster’s concepts, we see that only ‘command of 
operations’ belongs on the battlefield itself. Total War is thus about providing the Wehrmacht 
with the means to continue the fight, rather than about the fight itself.   
This section reconstructs the dialogue that underpinned Germany’s Total War efforts. 
It first considers the importance of analysing Total War on a local level, after which it will 
move toward a discussion of two case studies, the construction of the Ostwall around the 
borders of East Prussia, and the formation of the East Prussian Volkssturm. A useful starting 
point for this reconstruction is Generalleutnant (later Field Marshal) Wilhelm Keitel’s 1937 
assertion that Total War demanded ‘the marching in step of the Wehrmacht and the civil 
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administration’, as it immediately introduces the three major groups of actors involved: the 
Wehrmacht, Party and state bodies, and civilians.71 So far, the Wehrmacht has received little 
attention, mainly because, due to propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels’ landmark Sportpalast 
speech of 18 February 1943, the Party became associated with the term. Yet, the Wehrmacht’s 
sheer size warrants further examination of this question – by 1945 it still consisted of some 10 
million troops, the majority of whom was either garrisoned in Germany or fighting on its 
territory.72  
Initially, the proclamation of Total War in February 1943 changed little in the everyday 
lives of most Germans, since, in the words of Jochen Hellbeck, ‘Nazi leaders remembered 
acutely the course of the First World War and distrusted civilians’ ability to shoulder the 
burdens of war.’73 Until early 1944 the envisioned ‘Spartan lifestyle’ that Germans on the home 
front were to adopt comprised of little more than the token closure of cinemas and theatres, a 
measure that, given their sparse presence in East Prussia, had particularly little effect on its 
population.74 It took until July 1944, with the appointment of Joseph Goebbels as Reich 
Plenipotentiary for Total War, for far-reaching measures to be taken. The Allied bombing 
forced Goebbels to rethink the structure of armaments production, which he, in consultation 
with Armaments Minster Albert Speer, decided to organise on Gau level.75 This decision 
provided the Gauleiter with considerably more powers. As part of this Total War effort, 
Gauleiters were tasked to close down factories and shops, and they were also placed in charge 
of implementing decrees that sought to secure manpower for the armed forces.76 In her work 
on Total War, Eleanor Hancock stressed that although on a provincial level she found ‘no 
indication that these decrees were being circumvented or that the Gauleiters were reluctant to 
impose hardships on the people’, she also found that ‘firm leaders would decide how many 
workers were to be given up only when replacement workers actually arrived’, without being 
pressured by Gauleiters.77 Depending on the Gauleiter the scope of Total War could even be 
decided on a local level, and its driving forces were thus undeniably centrifugal in nature, and 
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even led, as Hans Mommsen found, to a ‘dissolution of coherent government’.78 The hardships 
imposed by the regime and the sacrifices it demanded differed from province to province. As 
such, Total War counteracted the egalitarian principles of the Volksgemeinschaft, making it 
difficult for Germans to adhere to its mission as the war continued. 
By early 1944 the possibility of an invasion of German territory became a pressing 
issue, and discussions of the topic could no longer merely be regarded as defeatist. From the 
first days of the war onwards, the organisation of domestic military affairs had been 
increasingly left to provincial authorities, with the final authority being placed at the province’s 
Gauleiter in his capacity as Reichsverteidigungskommissar (Reich Defence Commissioner, or 
RVK).  RVKs were to control the civil defence of the Reich and oversee all administrative 
branches within the Wehrkreis (military district) which they administered. The purpose of the 
RVK was to ‘align the measures concerning the civil defence and the concerns of the armed 
forces in closest possible cooperation with the appropriate army departments in the 
Wehrkreise.’79 Since all legislation the military wanted to implement at a provincial level had 
to be put in front of RVKs (and their staffs), so the Wehrmacht’s ability to interfere in internal 
politics was limited; something Hitler consistently sought to effect.80  
The Wehrmacht and Party thus had to work closely together, building on the framework 
that had been put in place, both on national level and by the RVK staffs. The first detailed 
circular concerning a combined agenda regarding Germany’s defence, dated 31 May 1944, was 
distributed by the Party Chancellery. It showed a constructive attitude towards the army and a 
seemingly sincere intention to cooperate: ‘In the smooth interaction of all German defensive 
forces lies the guarantee for quick and effective action and thus for success.’81 Two further 
decrees concerning the ‘cooperation between Party and army in an area of operations within 
the Reich’ were distributed on 13 July 1944, and 20 September 1944.82 The day after the 
September decree Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt distributed an upbeat memorandum to 
highlight the opportunities of collaboration, asking the Gauleiters ‘to act towards the population 
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in a way that makes them aware of the necessity of this struggle and every single budding 
consequence,’ and expressing his confidence in the cooperation, given that he already knew 
‘with what tireless devotion the Gauleiters and all of their subordinated Party departments 
commit themselves to Führer and Fatherland.’83 We should keep in mind that this language 
was meant as a way to reach out, and did not necessarily reveal any true sentiment on von 
Rundstedt’s behalf, especially as the relationship between the Party and the army at the time 
was particularly strained. That summer, on 20 July, Hitler barely survived a bomb placed by 
Oberst Claus von Stauffenberg, while the army’s simultaneous coup to take over the 
government, ‘Operation Valkyrie’, was only just thwarted.84 It meant that Hitler lost the last 
shred of trust in his generals.85 
Unsurprisingly, the decrees – which curtailed military operational freedom on German 
territory – have repeatedly been mentioned in the same breath as the assassination attempt, but 
looking at the dates of the two decrees we see that they hardly betray that the measures were 
implemented out of an irrational anger towards the military. The first of the two decrees was 
issued a week before the assassination attempt, the second decree a full two months afterwards, 
which left enough time for the ensuing storm to calm down before it was introduced. Moreover, 
in the case of an attack on home soil a country’s army and its civil bodies simply had to 
collaborate, making – in the case of Nazi-Germany – a Party involvement in defensive 
measures unavoidable. It is neither a hallmark of a totalitarian regime, nor a sign of 
brutalisation. When a German invasion of Britain beckoned in 1940, the British government 
assumed a martial role that was rather similar to Germany’s in 1944; it monitored civilians’ 
reactions to the war, established a Home Guard, organised evacuation, and built defences.86 
 The first effort in which the Party assumed a prominent role was the construction of the 
Ostwall (East-wall) defences along the eastern borders of Germany. Alastair Noble, the first 
historian to draw attention to this endeavour, rightly points out that the singular term ‘Ostwall’ 
is deceptive, since the Ostwall actually consisted of a series of defensive lines.87 He maintains 
that the construction of the defences was mainly organised by the Party without consulting the 
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army, a point of view adopted by Ian Kershaw as well.88 Yet, the idea of erecting defensive 
positions at the rear of the front was put forward by the army from the moment that the tide of 
the war turned against Germany. As early as January 1944 Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, who 
after the assassination attempt on Hitler was appointed Chief of Staff of the Oberkommando 
des Heeres (OKH), and as such was placed in charge of the defence of the Eastern Front, 
pushed for the creation of a defensive position along the older German and Russian frontier 
fortifications. In his memoirs, Guderian states that their main purpose was to assure ‘temporary 
inactivity’ in the east in order to evict the western Allies, who were expected to conduct a large 
scale cross-channel operation that spring.89 This was in line with the findings of the Karl-Heinz 
Frieser, who likened Germany’s broader European defensive strategy for 1944 to a room with 
two doors: the door to the east was to be barricaded, while the western door could be opened 
with the goal of throwing the invaders out.90 Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, shortly after 
his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army, told an audience of officers on 
25 July that ‘The time for intelligent operational methods is past. In the east, the enemy is on 
our borders. The only type of operation available here is to advance or to stand still.’91 Both 
Generaloberst Guderian and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel passed down orders to commence 
the construction of fortifications in Eastern-Germany.92 Meanwile, on 13 July, Gauleiter Koch 
had called up all German males between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five from the border 
districts of East Prussia, which was immediately followed by the assertion that ‘an impassioned 
appeal of the Führer to the idealism and patriotism of the entire people would be sufficient to 
call hundreds of thousands of volunteers to the colours within a few days so to erect a dam in 
the east.’93  
The construction of the Ostwall was accompanied by a massive propaganda campaign, 
which stressed the link between Front and Heimat. Although the regime left no doubt that 
participation in the construction was obligatory, it was widely portrayed as a popular 
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movement.94 There should be little doubt that a sincere sense of patriotism combined with a 
deep-seated fear for the Soviets was common among the workers (a theme to which we will 
return in Chapter 2), but far-reaching means of coercion were nevertheless used to assure 
participation as well. These measures included prison sentences and death penalties according 
to martial law, revealing the army’s impact on the province.95 Irrespective of its military use, 
the digging was a means of pacifying the province’s population, as media outlets diverted 
attention from the looming Soviet threat, transforming the construction of the Ostwall into an 
expected manifestation of the province’s resolve. No evidence suggests that the Wehrmacht 
opposed this ‘total mobilisation’ of civilian populations, as this practice had for years been 
common on the Eastern Front. During those years, the army had come to rely on the forced 
assistance of civilians in the construction of defensive works and many other auxiliary tasks.96 
Troops had grown desensitised to the vast use of slave labour, which had been explained as 
vital to the war effort, thereby directly linking the suppression of populations to traditional 
concepts of obedience, honour and patriotism.97 
Gauleiter Koch received repeated praise from different army commanders for his 
assistance.98 Noble asserts that they were ‘press-ganged’ into expressing their gratitude, but 
what Koch could achieve in East Prussia was exactly what the military could not: rallying large 
numbers of people and materials for the defence of the province.99 After the Soviet summer 
offensive of 1944, ‘Operation Bagration’, which had been disastrous for the Wehrmacht, it 
completely lacked the resources to oversee these efforts themselves. In his war diary, General 
Raus, the commander of the Third Panzer Army, noted that ‘everywhere people could be seen 
digging’, and extensively praised the resourcefulness of the workers.100 Over 300,000 East 
Prussians were called up in what Koch called a Levee en Masse. An additional 200,000 forced 
labourers, mainly from Lithuania and Poland, and 25,000 men of the Reichsarbeitsdienst 
(RAD) also took part in the construction.101 Meanwhile, Koch repeatedly played up his role, 
claiming that ‘without the Party there is no Frontgau East Prussia’, and maintained that ‘only 
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the Party can take up the responsibility to guide the masses.’102 Even though this bragging 
caused scorn among the ranks of the military, what the Party expected for what it brought to 
the table – recognition – was thus more than fair. 
Over the autumn, Soviet troops were halted at the borders of the province, so a period 
of calm set in during which the Wehrmacht assumed ultimate authority over the defensive 
efforts in the province. Oberstleutnant Karl Wilhelm Thilo, a seasoned and ruthless veteran 
staff officer, whom Guderian appointed to oversee the construction of the defences, even went 
as far as to refer to the positions as ‘OKH-Stellungen’, positions of the OKH. On 6 February 
1945, three weeks after the start of the Soviet winter offensive, he started his evaluation report 
on the Ostwall construction with the statement that ‘Under the long-term leadership of the 
General Staff, by the call up [and] use of a large number of people, a multi-layered defensive 
position system has emerged between August 1944 and the beginning of the Russian 
offensive.’103 Since the digging took place close behind the front line, army pioneers were often 
present to guide the efforts as well.104 Notwithstanding, the Party remained actively involved 
throughout the process. On 11 January 1945, the Party Chancellery reported to Oberstleutnant 
Thilo that 65,000 people were still involved in the digging of defensive positions in East 
Prussia, and over 700,000 in total throughout eastern Germany. The same report indicated that 
Gau East Prussia had agreed to transfer 15,000 civilians previously under its own supervision 
to Army Group Centre to assist in the construction of its positions.105 
Yet, there were conflicts between Gauleiter Koch and the OKH, most infamously 
regarding the construction of defences around Königsberg. Up to the Soviet offensive in mid-
January 1945, to the frustration of army commanders, Koch continued to divert manpower to 
build the 190 kilometres-long ‘Heilsberg-Deime-position’, even though in November 1944 the 
army had ordered the construction of the 87 kilometres-long ‘Frischung-Kanal-position’ as 
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there would be no troops available to defend the position that Koch favoured.106 The working 
relationship between the Party and army in East Prussia during this period was aptly described 
by Heinrich Lindner, a high-ranking official in Koch’s staff, as ‘bearable’.107 In addition, 
conflicts not only emerged between the Party and the army, but also among different 
commanders. Generaloberst Guderian had to interfere in a conflict between General Mikosch 
and the frustrated commander of the ‘Inster-Angerapp-position’, Generalmajor Kraeber, since 
Mikosch had passed down incorrect orders to prevent the strengthening of this position. 
Guderian sent a telegram to reverse Mikosch’s orders, stressing that they had been 
‘inaccurate’.108 Guderian’s interference does not, however, seem to have alleviated the conflict 
between the two men, since just over a week later Kraeber was transferred to Army Group 
South, where he was put in charge of the construction of similar positions.109  
By the beginning of the Soviet winter offensive the majority of the positions were not 
yet completed, which army commanders after the war repeatedly blamed on conflicts with the 
Party.110 However, there should be no doubt that the ‘Total command of operations’ was 
assumed by the Wehrmacht. Oberregierungsrat Wenzel, one of Gauleiter Koch’s advisors, 
recalled in that regard to the construction of the Ostwall, ‘The Wehrmacht basically both set 
out the greater lines as well as the wishes for its implementation.’111 The increased army 
influence is also indicated by two internal propaganda reports on the digging, both from early 
November 1944, which do not mention the Party at all, but simply refer to the ‘Schanzwerk der 
Bevölkerung’ (entrenchment work of the population), or as ‘Grenzbefestigungen’ (frontier 
fortifications).112 Countless army orders dating from the autumn still exist that talk in depth 
about the construction of defensive positions. Party orders are considerably more scarce.113 
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In the summer of 1944 East Prussia’s population got its first sense of what it was like 
to be part of a Total War, as large parts of the province were mobilised to assist in the 
construction of the Ostwall defences. Farmers lamented their deployment during the harvest 
time, while many positions were dug through fields, which significantly diminished the crop 
yields for the years ahead.114 Eventually, work on the Ostwall continued until the start of the 
Soviet offensive in January 1945. Extensive indoctrination through Party outlets assured that 
civilians interpreted the efforts as Party led, which, since the army’s involvement was 
simultaneously downplayed, cemented the Party’s status as the most prominent proponent of 
Total War. However, we should not confuse the Wehrmacht’s limited presence in the national 
media with an unwillingness on its part to deploy civilians. This preparedness becomes 
particularly clear when analysing the Volkssturm, whose establishment we will now examine. 
The Volkssturm, Nazi-Germany’s last-ditch militia, has been subjected to more 
comprehensive research than the Ostwall.115 We will therefore divide our examination of the 
Volkssturm into two parts: this section will examine the period from its establishment in late-
September 1944 until the initial defence of Festung Königsberg in late January 1945, in order 
to determine how the Party-Wehrmacht relations shaped the militia. In Chapter 4 we will return 
to the Volkssturm, and analyse its deployment during Königsberg’s siege (late January 1945 – 
early April 1945). As with the Ostwall, the Volkssturm is traditionally presented as a brainchild 
of the Party, although the research of David Yelton has shown that it was the Wehrmacht that 
spearheaded its creation, by measures to include elements of the German home front in the 
defence of Germany from 1941 onwards. By August 1943 all men born after 1884 (i.e. fifty-
nine years or younger at the time) were registered by orders of the Chief of the OKW, Field 
Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, although they were not yet to be called up.116 The Party, on the other 
hand, initially opposed the creation of a militia, mainly driven by the notion that its creation 
would negatively impact home front morale.117 However, while in August and early September 
1944 Guderian gave shape to the new militia, by mid-September the final responsibility was 
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definitively shifted to the Party. That it was thus the Party that came to oversee the Volkssturm 
was largely due to the lack of confidence Hitler had in the military after 20 July, as we have 
seen above.118 
On 25 September 1944 Hitler issued the ‘Führer decree concerning the formation of the 
German Volkssturm’ to his Gauleiters.119 The scope of the Volkssturm was to be all-
embracing: on 18 October a national call-up made clear that it was to include ‘all able-bodied 
men from 16 to 60 years.’120 The higher age groups, the East Prussian propaganda office 
maintained, would provide steel to the force: ‘The soldier of the First World War can weather 
a storm (‘ist Sturmerprobt’), is steadfast and he does not lose his nerves.’121 Nevertheless, the 
age of the recruits became the focal point of widespread scorn: ‘It is a stew, consisting of young 
vegetables and old bones!’122 Since participation was obligatory, mocking the Volkssturm was 
perhaps the most effective way to express disagreement with the course the regime was now 
taking, as well as a way to channel some of the anxieties that arose as a result of the call up. In 
East Prussia, where the Volkssturm was mustered with great zeal and almost immediately 
deployed, ridicule was rife, and, as a result, was closely monitored and reported on.123 
It was again the Party that took the initial lead in East Prussia. Gauleiter Koch even 
outdid his Führer and ordered the creation of the East Prussian Volkssturm two days before the 
rest of Germany.124 According to Wenzel the idea for the Volkssturm originated here from the 
experiences of the mobilisation for the Ostwall and it is not hard to see why he thought so.125 
While explaining the validity of the Party’s role in the establishment of the Volkssturm to his 
Kreisleiters in early October, Koch recalled ‘How in a few hours [after the call for the 
construction of the Ostwall] the first ground was moved, and how from these humble 
beginnings already in eighty-two days a gigantic defensive work has risen. At the time, I only 
relied on ourselves and on the force of our province.’126 Koch noted that the Ostwall had been 
dug in a National Socialist spirit; now it was time to man it as such. It was also apparent that 
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the raising of the Volkssturm again allowed him to take his spot in the limelight in the Party’s 
Total War efforts.127 
By the time the East Prussian Volkssturm was decreed, two Soviet Fronts (the 
equivalents of Army Groups) were already threatening East Prussia. One of them, the First 
Baltic Front headed by Army General Ivan Bagramyan, stood in central Lithuania, only 150 
kilometres from the East Prussian borders. On 5 October, it started its push to the Baltic with 
the port city of Memel, the northernmost East Prussian city, as its strategic goal. Already four 
days later, on 9 October, it had reached the Baltic at Heydekrug, south of Memel, thereby 
cutting the city off. Memel’s Volkssturm men – completely unprepared – were immediately 
deployed in its defence and suffered heavy casualties.128 The neighbouring Third Belorussian 
Front under Army General Ivan Chernyakhovsky launched an operation towards the heart of 
East Prussia on 16 October, known in German historiography as the ‘Gumbinnen Operation’.129 
Volkssturm units were again deployed and, together with the divisions of the Third Panzer 
Army, they halted the thrust before Gumbinnen, a city in the East of the province, after which 
the Soviet troops were pushed back. By the end of the month the offensive had been repelled 
and the Volkssturm, according to the East Prussian propaganda office, could proudly look back 
on its baptism of fire. Moreover, ‘except for isolated and unimportant misunderstandings the 
cooperation [with the Wehrmacht] is outstanding.’130 Privately, however, Gauleiter Koch took 
another line, and, on 25 October, he sent a telegram to Reichsleiter Martin Bormann to highlight 
the performance of the Volkssturm during the last days, while simultaneously accusing the 
army leadership of poor performance.131   
Notwithstanding, during the final months of 1944 the Party and the Wehrmacht in East 
Prussia established close liaisons to improve relations. Although Gauleiter Koch continued to 
oppose these efforts, most Kreisleiters, who in many cases headed the Volkssturm battalions, 
were open to a closer collaboration.132 Initially, the Wehrmacht used the Volkssturm to perform 
a string of semi-military tasks, such as organising the evacuation of goods and civilians, and 
digging defensive positions. Yet, by December army commanders treated the Volkssturm 
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virtually the same as other units. In the north of East Prussia, near Tilsit, for example, six 
Volkssturm battalions (mostly mustered in nearby Ragnit and Tilsit and numbering around 240 
on average; barely half of the regular battalion strength) were to man positions close behind 
the front line in anticipation of the Soviet offensive.133 By the end of 1944 Volkssturm units 
were fully incorporated into the military chain of command, and, as Yelton found, ‘army and 
corps commanders had full tactical and logistical control over every Volkssturm battalion 
engaged in Eastern security occupations.’134  
When the Soviet offensive into East Prussia finally commenced in January 1945, 
Volkssturm battalions were fully deployed in its defence, often with little regard to their 
fighting value. In some cases, such as during counterattacks on the town of Schlossberg, near 
the province’s eastern border, a Volkssturm battalion was wiped out due to a lack of 
cooperation with the nearby 1st infantry division.135 Yet, closer cooperation with the army did 
not necessarily lead to a better chance of survival for Volkssturm units. At the village Nautzken, 
near Königsberg, the commander of the 286th division dismissed the concerns of the 
commander of a Volkssturm ‘Standbattiallon’ (a type of unit meant for rear area work) that his 
men would be completely useless in battle. The battalion was ordered to defend positions 
against the mainstay of the Soviet Thirty-third Army, with predictably devastating results.136 It 
needs to be pointed out, however, that there were certainly instances when the Volkssturm 
performed well beyond expectation, and that they were not mere cannon fodder. Indeed, as 
Yelton found, ‘the army rated the Volkssturm units as adequate, despite its high casualties.’137 
Some 10,000 Volkssturm men defended Königsberg during the initial fighting for the city in 
late-January 1945, many of whom had earlier defended their own towns and villages closer to 
the East Prussian border, and in some cases had thus been fighting for over two weeks. 
Especially in the northern and eastern sectors of Königsberg they were able to fight off 
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sustained Soviet attacks, initially virtually on their own, later with the help of newly-arrived 
German units.138  
Germany’s geopolitical position by mid-1944, with the Allies poised to invade from 
both the east and the west, forced Party and Wehrmacht to work closely together. By analysing 
Total War on a provincial level, this section has managed to move away from the persistent 
focus on a select Nazi elite, and instead reconstructed its impact on the lives of civilians. In 
East Prussia, the construction of the Ostwall and the establishment of the Volkssturm involved 
a previously unknown, virtually ‘total’ scale of mobilisation. The two efforts share important 
similarities: they were openly championed by the Party, who took up the propagandist lead as 
well, even though it had been the army that initially conceived these measures and had pushed 
for them. German propaganda consistently highlighted the close cooperation between the army 
and the Party, particularly focusing on the latter’s role in these projects. This aimed to sustain 
morale, as too large an emphasis on the army would have increased the anxiety of the German 
population that the battle front was approaching their homes. The army nevertheless assumed 
‘total command of operations’ by organising the digging efforts and gradually taking control 
over the deployment of Volkssturm units. As historians have indicated, the resulting friction 
should largely be traced back to the unwillingness of men like Koch to relinquish power in 
their provinces to the army. Nevertheless, with the Wehrmacht on German territory these 
inroads were inevitable.  
 
III. Cities at Total War 
 
So far, we have discussed some of the conditions that need to be met to distinguish ‘limited’ 
war from ‘Total’ War, but civilians often simply interpreted Total War as a war that directly 
impacted their immediate environment. No comprehensive effort has been made to factor 
‘environment’ in to the debate, and although the battles in Germany were fought in an urbanised 
environment, in densely populated cities, the ‘metropolitan dimension of Total War’ has 
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largely been disregarded.139 Within the framework of Total War, the city is above all seen as a 
source of industrial labour, but this is only one of its elements.140 Cities housed Party 
headquarters, presses, recruitment offices, factories, governmental offices, and, eventually, 
also the fighting itself took place in cities. In other words, all of Förster’s aspects of Total War 
were present in cities, and Königsberg was no exception. This section establishes the state of 
thinking about cities among the different German actors by the time they organised their 
defence, which will help to explain the decisions that were made in Königsberg, and the friction 
that existed between the Party and the Wehrmacht. As the German troops who fought in 
Königsberg had all fought on the Eastern Front (as had the majority of German troops), and 
many of the Party members had been stationed in the occupation of Ukraine, this section will 
start on the Eastern Front before it discusses the cities in Germany. 
When German troops entered the Soviet Union in 1941, it was clear to all that they 
would not only have to fight the Red Army, but also the country’s challenging environment. It 
shaped the Wehrmacht’s ‘mindscape’, the ‘mental landscape conjured up by looking out over 
an area’.141 Until the winter of 1941, vast open plains equalled victory: it was on the plains of 
the Soviet Union, and earlier in France, that the Wehrmacht had conducted its most successful 
operations. In this mindscape, the city played a subordinate role and hardly weighed in the 
notions of manoeuvre. Cities, if anything, were perceived negatively. The capture of large cities 
cost high casualty numbers, slowed down the speed of a German offensive or even brought it 
to a halt, and, especially after Stalingrad, cities became synonymous with military defeat.142 
Antony Beevor best captures the link between the agony of fighting in close quarters and its 
deeper strategic implications:  
‘If you only understand what terror is,’ a German wrote in a letter captured by the Russians. ‘At the 
slightest rustle, I pull the trigger and fire off tracer bullets in bursts from the machine gun.’ The 
compulsion to shoot at anything that moved at night, often setting of fusillades from equally nervous 
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sentries down a whole sector, undoubtedly contributed to the German Sixth Army’s expenditure of 
over 25 million rounds during the month of September 1942 alone.143   
None of Germany’s great victories were achieved in cities, but the fear of city fighting was 
especially the result of Soviet operational choices. General Friedrich von Mellenthin, one of 
the first German commanders who sought to provide an insight in the fighting on the Eastern 
Front, recalled that ‘As every Russian attack was aimed at large towns (possibly with a view 
of attracting Stalin’s notice in a Special Order of the Day) these places were avoided like the 
plague.’144 This confirms the findings of the historical geographer, G.J. Ashworth, who, as a 
result of his research into the role of cities during times of conflict, rightly pointed out that 
during the Second World War, as during other conflicts of the twentieth century, ‘remarkably 
few examples of the deliberate choice of an urban battlefield’ could be found.145 
Once in German hands, the role that the Wehrmacht gave to the Soviet Union’s cities 
was a traditional one, that of a centre for the control of the surrounding areas and their 
resources. Such areas, those closest to the front line, remained permanently under army 
jurisdiction, ‘partly because of the shifting of the front line, partly because of the continued 
unrest in the area, and partly because (…) the military resisted all efforts to transfer additional 
areas to civil government.’146 The military maintained that the main purpose was strictly 
utilitarian, above all ‘the maintenance and protection of the logistics and communication 
networks that served the front lines.’147 Yet, although approval of, or ambivalence towards, 
Nazi policies is taking a political stance in itself, even if we disregard this, a certain political 
vision was needed to run the vast territory that came under military control. During the 
occupation of the Soviet Union, little effort was put into treating a city as a social responsibility 
beyond mere pragmatism, but army commanders nevertheless found that urbanised zones 
prompted civil and civic questions, such as the establishment of schools or the setting up of 
semi-autonomous local governments of ‘friendly peoples’.148   
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The cities further to the rear were governed by German civil authorities rather than by 
the Wehrmacht; in these cities, the Nazi occupation policy manifested itself much more clearly. 
Warsaw, for example, ‘was stripped of her role of capital’, and ‘was to have no political, social 
or economic significance for the Poles’.149 Famously, once captured, Leningrad and Moscow 
were to be completely erased from the map.150 Yet, the large administrative framework that 
was in place in such cities to enable the occupation makes it easier to trace back the 
Wehrmacht’s socio-political impact on them. These cities had a distinct military character, 
consisting of a large permanent contingent of Wehrmacht troops working in armaments, in 
signals, in repair- and construction units, in military hospitals, for the air force, at training 
courses, or for the military police.151 Members of the armed forces used these cities as rallying 
points, as part of the stopovers to the front. This assured that there was always a large military 
presence, which in turn meant that the army believed it also had a say in their daily governance, 
and thus sought to exact influence on local (German occupation) authorities. In his work on the 
occupation of Warsaw and Minsk, Stephan Lehnstaedt noted that the Wehrmacht, because of 
its large role in assuring order and safety in these cities, saw local German authorities not as 
equal partners, and, ‘given the large number of soldiers, it is hardly surprising that members of 
the Wehrmacht often felt themselves the real masters of the city’. As a result, as Lehnstaedt 
concluded, ‘despite numerous officially proclaimed appeals from both sides, a smooth, 
virtually seamless cooperation did not exist at all.’152 
The notion that potential riots and uprisings slumbered under the surface, and that the 
army would have to be called in to suppress them, diverting units from their core tasks, further 
increased the Wehrmacht’s (perceived) standing. For Army Group Centre and Army Group A, 
which would eventually defend eastern Germany in 1945, this was confirmed during the 
Warsaw uprising in the summer of 1944. As the uprising took place in their rear, thus also 
threatening their supply lines, and local German authorities could not quell it, they had to bring 
up their own troops during a period when the Soviet summer offensive, Operation Bagration, 
was at its height.153 These factors further contributed to the perception cities as a particular 
menace to the army. 
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But even though cities were perceived negatively, once the Wehrmacht returned to 
Germany, it had to re-evaluate their military value. Indeed, Germany was considerably more 
urbanised than the Soviet Union, which would inevitably shape the organisation of the defence. 
Orders regarding the Ostwall defences in East Prussia show that cities such as Königsberg and 
Lötzen were considered of vital importance within the overall defence scheme, but, at the same 
time, these orders reveal no deliberate effort to abandon the defence of field positions in favour 
of the defence of cities.154 Although, as we will see below, propagandists placed German cities 
at the centre of Germany’s defensive efforts, they were not considered as a self-contained 
system. Defensive lines were continued to be made across fields, and built-up areas were 
incorporated into that defence as ‘knots’ in those lines.  
Yet, especially in this latter phase of the war, defending cities rather than plains had 
some added value: Germany possessed a massive stockpile of captured guns, which were of 
less use in field operations, but which could be utilised from fixed positions. A rigid defence, 
moreover, meant less reliance on mobile warfare, which in time of fuel shortage was a 
particularly welcome added bonus.155  Also the Allies would not be able to fully exploit their 
preponderance in tanks in cities, as streets hampered their mobility.156 Moreover, if German 
commanders had learned anything from the attack on cities like Stalingrad, it was that their 
destruction through aerial bombardment was certainly not guaranteed to favour the attackers, 
and could just as well solidify a position’s defence. This learning curve was seen during the 
German defence of the Abbey and village of Monte Cassino, which had been completely 
flattened by Allied bombers. German troops held out against far superior Allied forces, and 
their tenacious defence soon became one of the favourite themes in German propaganda.157 
That ‘Hitler built walls around his Fortress Europe, but  he forgot to put a roof on it,’ as the 
American President Franklin D. Roosevelt told a reporter in the summer of 1943, did not have 
to be spelled out to Wehrmacht commanders, since by early 1944, when the fortress strategy 
was implemented, this had long been a given.158 In the West, Aachen, which was to be turned 
into a ‘German Stalingrad’, and in particular ‘Festung Metz’, became the embodiments of this 
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mind-set. In Eastern Germany, the Lower Silesian capital Breslau was used in a similar fashion 
before it fell.159   
That the defence was increasingly centred on urban areas was picked up by Germany’s 
adversaries as well. An article in the Soviet War News in December 1944 instructed the Red 
Army troops who entered Germany that ‘Generally there are five or six hamlets per square 
mile. The big township are no more than five or six miles apart. The enemy can therefore 
arrange mutual fire support.’160 Also the official American ‘Handbook on German Military 
Forces’ highlighted that ‘The Germans regard towns and villages as excellent strongpoints, 
particularly if the buildings are of masonry. Towns also are regarded as excellent antitank 
positions because of the considerable infantry-artillery effort necessary to neutralize them.’ But 
it noted that ‘this passive type of defence is only an expedient due to German shortages of 
mobile equipment and manpower.’161 This was an accurate observation, which fully 
appreciated the increased use of the city within the Total War, touching on aspects of ‘total 
command of the battlefield’, ‘total armament’ and ‘total mobilisation’.  
The decision to defend its cities might have been foisted on Germany, but it nevertheless 
represented a final step towards ‘Total War’. That the choice was made for a large part due to 
a lack of military alternatives was obscured by bullish language, which sought to present the 
cities’ defence as a deliberate choice. ‘Nothing can be defended so outstandingly as a major 
city or a field of rubble… Here we must defend…the country…’, Nicolas Stargardt recently 
quoted Himmler as proclaiming in November 1944.162 Given that virtually every German city 
by that time had been transformed into a field of rubble, such rhetoric was the only way to 
reformalise Germany’s options. But this language is insufficient to explain the radical actions 
of the troops, and therefore the next chapter will distinguish between the city as a propagandist 
symbol and the city within German late-war military strategy.  
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IV. Cities as ‘fortresses’: strategy and conjecture 
 
The above assessment offers a starting point for analysing the Wehrmacht’s appreciation of 
cities during the final fighting in Germany itself, showing that the army was ill-at-ease in cities. 
This section will analyse the changes in this perception as troops moved back into Germany, 
and examines what lay at the base of these changes, especially in regard to the concept of Total 
War. Important here is the implementation of the fortress strategy, which would come to shape 
the way German cities were defended.163 As such, it continues our examination of the 
‘metropolitan dimension of Total War’.  
Within German military history, the city had played a very limited role. Even as a 
defensive concept, the city was largely absent from military thought.164 The closest framework 
that existed for the defence of a city was the Clausewitzian notion of defending a Festung, 
‘fortress’, which dated from the 1830s: ‘Imagine a country where not only the large and 
prosperous towns, but every sizeable one is fortified and defended by its citizens and the 
farmers of the surrounding areas. The speed of military operations would be so reduced, and 
so much weight thrown into the scale by defending inhabitants, that the skill and determination 
of the enemy would dwindle almost to insignificance.’165 In Clausewitz’s theorization of a 
fortress, a city’s civilian population was treated as an integral part of its defence, as a resource, 
and as such it fitted particularly well within the notion of Total War a hundred years later. As 
the front line pushed towards the German borders in 1944, Clausewitz’s ideas about fortresses 
were elevated to a full-fledged strategy, which was introduced on 8 March 1944. The lack of 
innovation was not at all denied, but rather played up, as the first paragraph of Hitler’s War 
Directive 53, which established the strategy, shows: 
 
The fortified area will fulfil the same function of fortresses in former historical times. 
They will ensure that the enemy does not occupy these areas of decisive operational 
                                                          
163 The German fortress strategy was first implemented abroad, in France and the Soviet Union. See: 
Sönke Neitzel, “Der Kampf um die deutsche Atlantik- und Kanalfestungen und sein Einfluß auf den 
alliierten Nachschub während der Befreiung Frankreichs 1944/45,”  Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 55 
(1996) 381-430; Bastiaan Willems, “Defiant Breakwaters or Desperate Blunders? A Revision of the 
German Late-War Fortress Strategy,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 28, no. 2 (2015): 353-56; 
Frieser “Irrtümer und Illusionen”, 518-25; Gert Fricke, „Fester Platz“ Tarnopol 1944 (Freiburg: Verlag 
Rombach, 1986)  
164 Wettstein, Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf, 54-55, 63. 
165 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 395. 
59 
 
importance. They will allow themselves to be surrounded, thereby holding down the 
largest possible number of enemy forces and establishing conditions favourable for 
successful counter-attacks.166 
 
As an avid amateur historian, Hitler would have been able to name several sieges in 
comparatively recent history, which, due to a persistent defence, managed to turn the tide of a 
war, such as the siege of Sevastopol during the Crimean War, the siege of Port Arthur during 
the Russo-Japanese War, and the defence of Adrianople. The dogged resistance at Metz and 
Paris had significantly prolonged the Franco-Prussian war, and was acutely remembered by the 
German General Staff.167 
The implementation of the fortress strategy poses a number of historiographical 
problems, especially regarding the meaning and appreciation of the word ‘fortress’. The word 
‘fortress’ today conjures up images of a medieval walled city, but this is neither what 
Clausewitz had in mind, nor what the German High Command thought it should be. Although 
in 1944 a fortress indeed had a city as its core, its general idea was based on the ‘Prussian 
System’ of the late nineteenth century, that of a string of forts five to ten kilometres outside of 
a city that could cover each other by artillery. In Königsberg, a series of twelve forts had been 
completed in 1882, which had been incorporated into the Ostwall defences in late 1944.168 The 
city, like all other fortresses, received dozens of extra heavy artillery pieces out of the stockpiles 
of captured foreign guns to perform its role as such.169 Even the highly critical Major Kurt 
Dieckert, who in the standard work, ‘Der Kampf um Ostpreussen’, placed question marks over 
the city’s defensive value, privately admitted that ‘Despite defective and outdated 
fortifications, Königsberg could nevertheless be regarded as a fortress.’170 Like Königsberg, 
there were about twenty cities in eastern Germany that could be considered a ‘fortress’ along 
these lines, and eventually the strategy even yielded some limited results.171 
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Yet the fortress strategy as a whole was unsuccessful, and its feasibility was questioned 
from the moment it was implemented.172 None of the twenty-nine cities in the Soviet Union 
that were designated as fortresses in March 1944 held more than a few days after they were 
attacked during Operation Bagration in July and August of that year.173 We should also keep 
in mind that the fortress strategy in Germany also partly served to institutionalise Hitler’s 
militarily unsophisticated ‘fall-where-you-stand’-rhetoric, while the adherence to it simply 
came down to a lack of alternatives: between 1830 and 1940 Germany had become highly 
urbanised and conducting operations while ignoring the cities was simply impossible. 
Nevertheless, in September 1944 Hitler propagandistically declared all German cities to be 
fortresses: ‘Every bunker, every block of houses in a German city, and every German village 
has to become a fortress where the enemy either bleeds to death, or which buries those who 
occupy it in man-to-man battle.’174 Yet, without a set of orders attached to the proclamation, 
this remained mere rhetoric. 
It is at this point that we should pay attention to the use of the word Festung within the 
Lingua Tertii Imperii, the language of the Third Reich, as well as its reception. A fortress was 
closely connected to the safeguarding of a set of values and beliefs. These, in turn, would 
bolster the defence of that fortress, especially in times of setbacks. Already in January 1932, in 
a major policy speech held at the Industrieklub in Düsseldorf, Hitler elaborated on this 
interplay: 
In purely materiel terms a crisis would be felt a thousand times stronger when a people are not 
presented with any ideals.  (...) Take a fortress and bring down severe deprivation on it: as long as 
those in it see deliverance, believe in it, hope it will happen, they can endure the diminished rations. 
Take the last hope of a possible deliverance, of a better future, out of their hearts, and you will see 
how these people suddenly view the diminished rations as the most important of their lives.175  
A fortress was thus often used as a spiritual entity, or as a powerful metaphor, rather than as a 
physical location. Metaphysically, a fortress grew to be a set of values and beliefs in itself. 
Thus, even a single soldier could be a considered a ‘fortress’: the phrase ‘every man a fortress’ 
was said to have been coined by German troops encircled in Stalingrad, and found its way into 
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National Socialist newspapers.176 In his memoirs, Großdeutschland veteran Guy Sajer likened 
his attitude to a fortress, but attached negative connotations to it, writing about the battles of 
1944 that ‘although we were already beaten ten times over, our terror became a fortress of 
despair, which the Russians found difficult to breach.’177 The link between a fortress and 
National Socialist ideas was further strengthened by the presence of hundreds of castles that 
were dotted around Germany. These were readily used to romanticise warfare, connecting 
contemporary Germans to their ancient forefathers by underscoring the Volk’s martial 
traditions.178   
Meanwhile, late 1941 had seen the establishment of the concept of Festung Europa, 
which rested on two pillars. Not only was it the geographic location of Germany’s New Order, 
but the notion that Festung Europa was embattled, ‘threatened on all fronts (…) to be enslaved 
and dulled’, was immediately connected to it.179 By late-1944 ‘Festung Europa’ no longer 
existed. The western Allies had landed in Normandy and the Soviets were pushing through 
Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltics and the Balkan. Yet the propagandist concept of ‘Festung’ was 
still very much alive. On 1 September, 1944, State Secretary Dr. Naumann spoke in Danzig, to 
commemorate the fifth anniversary of the city’s return to the Greater German Reich. If 
Germany’s enemies ‘believe [themselves] to be at the eve of victory’, Naumann vowed, ‘they 
are mistaken. (…) Festung Germany will be defended like no fortress before has been defended 
– this is when our hour will come!’180  
The implementation of the fortress strategy reveals the extent of the radicalisation of 
the Wehrmacht and Party by 1944, and shows how interwoven their agendas had become. It 
was not merely a manifestation of the last convulsions of a dying regime, hell-bound to drag 
its citizens into a Total War. The desperate and disillusioned Wehrmacht, which, due to its 
close affiliations with the Nazis, only a few years earlier had ‘believed itself to live in an epoch 
of German military history which had not existed “since the Great Elector”,’ now adhered to a 
strategy for the defence of Germany that deliberately exposed the civilians it had vowed to 
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protect to deadly combat in the name of that same regime.181 The vast propaganda that 
accompanied the strategy had two purposes: on one hand it was the regime’s seal of approval, 
but at the same time it was meant to counter the reservations that many commanders expressed 
behind closed doors. Indeed, as we will see in the next section, the Party elite used the 
Wehrmacht’s critique of the strategy both as a way to point to defeatism, as well as proof that 
the Wehrmacht questioned the regime’s authority. 
 
V. The struggle for final authority in Germany’s defence 
 
The Wehrmacht’s increased presence in Germany kindled a number of fears within the ranks 
of the Party. As we have seen, during the war the Party had devised frameworks to prevent 
Wehrmacht influence in internal affairs, but, since the brunt of the army outside the borders 
over this period, there had been little need to review these systemic changes. But with millions 
of troops moving into Germany in the autumn of 1944, it should come as no surprise that the 
Party became more anxious about the role the Wehrmacht would assume. This section is 
divided into several parts. We will firstly examine the position from the Party point of view.182 
Since it was the Party that had managed to increase its power inside Germany most during 
wartime, it was the Party that had most to lose with any change of the status quo ante mid-
1944. The section will then address the Wehrmacht’s perception of the German home front, 
before examining the efforts to bridge the divide between the different actors. 
 There was little reason for the Party to see the Wehrmacht’s arrival in Germany as 
anything but a likely infringement of its autonomy over internal politics, since there had 
certainly been precedents in recent memory. Only twenty-five years earlier, as the Second 
Empire collapsed in the wake of the lost war, a disproportionately high number of demobilised 
German soldiers had joined the different right-wing Freikorps (Free Corps) paramilitary 
groups, which sprung up all over the country. These Freikorps played a vital role in the 
suppression of different communist uprisings in the newly-established Weimar Republic, most 
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famously the January 1919 Spartakist uprisings.183 In March 1920, in turn, the Freikorps-
backed Kapp Putsch tried to overthrow Reichspräsident Friedrich Ebert’s democratically-
elected government.184 Although these veterans evidently did not return from the war with a 
common agenda, the willingness to influence domestic policy – even after having fought 
abroad for years and having been largely detached from civilian life – was a purpose they 
shared. Also, the regular armed forces, the 100,000-man Reichswehr, had to be called in 
repeatedly to restore order during the fragile Weimar Republic, meanwhile, high-ranking 
officers continued to occupy important positions in the different Weimar governments.185 
During the early years of the Nazi dictatorship the army continued to maintain a significant 
influence over internal politics, until Hitler managed to diminish its power and subordinate it 
to the state.186 
The Second World War again saw the Wehrmacht in a political role, although not within 
Germany itself. During the occupation of the Soviet Union, it was allowed to adopt and 
implement its own political vision of the occupied territories.187 Not much imagination is 
needed to regard the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front an autonomous ‘state’, independent from 
the rest of Germany, possessing far-reaching powers over a large number of subjects, 
controlling a vast territory a thousand kilometres from Berlin, and, of course, holding a 
‘monopoly of legitimate and physical force.’188 Indeed, shortly before the war, in October 1937, 
Goebbels explicitly referred to the Wehrmacht as a ‘state within a state’, fearing that, since 
‘politically the generality had learned nothing’, it would present a dissonant voice within his 
propaganda.189 Certainly, the implications of the Wehrmacht as an independent pillar within 
the National Socialist society – a notion initially championed by Hitler himself – remained a 
constant worry throughout the war.190 Even as the tide of war turned against Germany, and the 
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Wehrmacht was pushed out of the Soviet Union, it maintained many of its ‘state-like’ qualities. 
It possessed a vast police apparatus, its own justice system (to which we will return in Chapter 
4), and its own press corps and presses (Chapter 2), meeting many of the requirements of ‘Total 
Control’. Moreover, the army possessed one of the most sophisticated communication 
networks, which not only served to pass down orders from unit to unit, but could also be used 
to communicate the military’s demands directly to the war economy, which could further aid 
‘Total Armament’.191 Furthermore, the Wehrmacht had an organisational structure in place 
specifically designed perform well under duress, and would therefore be well-suited to the 
challenges of ‘Total administration’ and ‘Total Mobilisation’. Underpinning all this, from 
divisional level downwards, army units consisted of men with all the civilian skills to operate 
independently from the state, such as butchers, cobblers, vets, doctors, and so on. Trying to fit 
this massive organisation into Party and state structures was therefore unfeasible, especially 
given that the military structure remained more or less intact, while the German civilian society 
itself was slowly crumbling. Moreover, as we will see in Chapter 2, the Party was well-aware 
of its waning popularity, and, in order to drum up popular support, had itself championed a 
Total War society that closely linked the Heimat to the Front, a ‘Kampfgemeinschaft’. As a 
result, the army still enjoyed a certain popularity among the German population that the Party 
had long not enjoyed.  
The main tool at the disposal of the Party to prevent the Wehrmacht from gaining undue 
influence in the political sphere was to accuse it of a lack of loyalty towards the 
Volksgemeinschaft. The Wehrmacht was portrayed as a milieu that the regime had failed to 
penetrate, a hotbed of what Martin Broszat has coined ‘Resistenz’ that allowed for an ‘inner 
emigration’ from the regime.192 The Party elite presented the failures on the Eastern Front as a 
form of betrayal and a failure of National Socialist spirit among the Wehrmacht’s ranks.193 
Indeed, Hitler, throughout his career, remained sceptical of the army’s willingness to fight for 
the regime, especially at times when commanders had been unwilling to follow his orders.194 
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Likewise, although after the assassination attempt of 20 July the plotters were presented as ‘a 
very small clique of (…) criminally stupid officers’, behind closed doors the matter was treated 
as an almost characteristic – to some extent anticipated – manifestation of a larger problem 
among the ranks of the military.195 Although the Wehrmacht’s lack of loyalty to the community 
was mainly used as a pretext to prevent it from assuming too much power, it was nevertheless 
a powerful accusation that brought about a reaction that was very real. An internal ‘clean-up’, 
nothing short of a minor purge, was requested by the army itself and followed shortly after the 
assassination attempt in an effort to restore its tainted honour.196 This autumn purge not only 
affected the General Staff and interior military positions, it placed field commanders under 
scrutiny as well. An elaborate British intelligence report of autumn 1944 read that in East 
Prussia ‘The political morale of all the personnel is being very carefully checked’. It further 
noted that ‘In addition to this, a drastic purge among all officers from the rank of major up is 
taking place in both [the Sixteenth and Eighteenth] Armies as a result of the belief at Hitler’s 
H.Q. that the officers were mainly to blame for the German collapse in the Baltic States. Courts 
of enquiry are conducting a detailed investigation into the activities of all officers, from 
battalion commander inclusive, upwards.’197 Moreover, the sight of the chaotic army pouring 
into East Prussia (which will be examined in chapter 3) did little to strengthen its role in the 
province’s hierarchy, and served as further ‘proof’ of the Wehrmacht’s unreliability.198 
Yet, Hitler’s unwillingness to trust the Wehrmacht’s political reliability was largely 
unfounded. Felix Römer has established that, despite the personal reservations that some of the 
commanders felt towards the regime, virtually none of them considered renouncing their oath 
to the Führer.199 This is in line with the British intelligence report, which concluded that ‘There 
are no indications in East Prussia of any desire, either on the part of the personnel of the armed 
forces or of the civilian population, to overthrow the Nazi regime, although Hitler personally, 
and the Nazi Party as a whole, are universally unpopular.’200 The conclusion in the last clause 
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might have been somewhat overstated, but the middle-ranking and lower-ranking Party 
officials, ‘Bonzen’, were indeed largely despised among the troops.201 In particular, there was 
resentment over the role of these men in the defence, many of whom were considered to be 
bragging dilettantes. After the war, Eberhard Knieper, a former fortress staff officer, reflected 
that one of the main frustrations among the top ranks of the army was that they felt that the 
Party undeservedly sought to lay sole claim on the right to rally the population for the city’s 
defence.202 One of the main fears of the Wehrmacht was to appear ‘soft’, and understandably 
it saw these kind of calls as ‘warning shots’, since they implied that the Party was trying to 
assume even more powers at the army’s expense.203 For the discredited army, addressing the 
potential weaknesses of a too large role of the Party thus not only served to organise the defence 
of Germany, it was also a way to show its teeth and hold its own against its major rival.   
Two issues stand out in the way the Wehrmacht sought to prevent further inroads from 
the Party while on German territory. Firstly, as we have seen, the Wehrmacht had always been 
in charge of the so-called ‘area of operations’ close behind the frontline, whereas the Party 
possessed no expertise whatsoever in this respect.204 It was entirely plausible that this lack of 
experience would hasten a quick collapse of an area’s defences when under attack, since 
inexperienced Party officials were likely to lose their heads. In this respect, the Wehrmacht 
possessed a mighty tool: especially up to mid-February 1945, it possessed virtually sole 
authority over summary courts-martial, which meant that they could round up everyone – 
including Party officials – who they felt had ‘totally failed’ to do their duty during critical 
moments. The presence of two independent justice systems operating alongside each other was 
indeed considered a dangerous precedent, and in early February 1945, Gauleiter Joachim 
Eggeling of Halle-Merseburg advised Reichsleiter Bormann to address the matter. The sight of 
Wehrmacht officers sitting in judgement over wavering Party officials threatened to undermine 
the Party’s standing, and Eggeling believed that this practice should be avoided.205 
Secondly, generals were quick to stress that there was no war-weariness among troops, 
and there had been no ‘revolutionary manifestations’ among the troops in 1945 as there had 
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been in 1918.206 Military morale among troops was said to be consistently higher than that of 
German workers.207 Although this was not the same as possessing a National Socialist spirit, 
‘assuring victory’ was the Wehrmacht’s core task within Germany’s Weltanssschauungskrieg 
(war of world views), and one that from late 1944 gained in importance given that the other 
aims of the war (annihilation, exploitation and domination of the east) could not be achieved 
during the defence of Germany.208 Moreover, the generals, who had all experienced the First 
World War and its aftermath, still felt a sense of guardianship over Germany, and the idea that 
during the previous war army had not been defeated on the battle field, but as a result of a stab 
in the back by a war-weary and traitorous home front, was deeply embedded in the 
Wehrmacht.209 Meanwhile, war-weariness was increasingly observed on the home front, and 
the Party was seen giving in to the demands of the population, for example by postponing cuts 
in rations. Party elites were unwilling to subordinate everything to the demands of the military, 
so the Wehrmacht could reasonably argue that it was once again being held back.210  
These conflicts were not unwelcome to the Wehrmacht. In the words of Ian Kershaw, 
Hitler ‘was generally unwilling to resolve disputes by coming down on one side or the other, 
much preferring parties to a dispute to sort it out themselves’, after which he could support the 
side that had managed to come out on top.211 The Wehrmacht had most to gain by stirring up 
the current state of affairs, and thus had a vested interest in creating a conflict, in order to 
enhance its position within the state. At the same time, we should be careful not to read more 
into this conflict than might have been the case. Scholars have recently started to challenge the 
models introduced in the 1980s, which, broadly speaking, placed behaviour in Nazi Germany 
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in a paradigm of ‘resistance/collaboration’ which, according to some, ‘perpetuates a 
fundamental misreading of motivation, behaviour and impact.’212 Although it would be naïve 
(or better: deliberately negligent, echoing the line of historians like Golo Mann) to disregard 
(dis)agreement with the regime as a factor to explain behaviour, we will see throughout the 
course of this thesis that there are indeed limitations to adhering to this paradigm.213 Instead, 
much more attention will be paid to actions that were motivated by the circumstances, 
opportunities and limitations that presented themselves.  
It is here that we turn to the legislation concerning fortress cities, as they offer the 
clearest example of bridging this divide at a local level: the level at which the interaction 
between most Party officials and Wehrmacht officers actually took place. In late 1944, a fair 
number of Eastern Germany’s larger cities were declared fortresses, among them Danzig, 
Königsberg, Lötzen, Gotenhafen, Thorn, Graudenz, Oppeln, Breslau, Glogau, Posen, 
Schneidemühl and Pressburg. More would be later added to the list, such as Frankfurt am Oder 
and Berlin. The measures taken for the fortress cities offer us the clearest indication of the 
interaction between Wehrmacht and Party in Germany’s cities. In particular, the problem of 
ultimate authority needed to be solved. The most comprehensive attempts to tackle this came 
from the Oberkommando des Heeres, led by Generaloberst Heinz Guderian. In mid-December 
1944 Guderian proposed the establishment of a Gemeinsamer Arbeitsstab in every fortress.214 
Under this system, Gauleiters would designate a Festungsbeauftragte der NSDAP (Fortress-
commissioner of the NSDAP) for every fortress, who would be responsible for its political 
matters, as well as the care of civilians:  
In case of an encirclement this commissioner stays in the fortress and is subordinate to the fortress 
commander. From then on, he will be particularly tasked to do everything to strengthen the 
indomitable will to resist of the troops (in cooperation with the NSFO) and to deploy the Volkssturm 
units present in the fortress.215  
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The RVK, at the same time, would appoint a Referent (consultant) for ‘all civilian Reich 
defence measures, particularly supply and ARLZ-measures’.216 The Leiter der 
Gemeindeverwaltung (head of local government, normally the Oberbürgemeister – mayor) was 
also to find a place on the combined staff, but all the civilian officials were to be subordinated 
to the fortress commander.217 The proposal fitted into Guderian’s belief that a fortress 
commander should be ‘master over life and death of all persons present in the fortress.’218 
However, the Party disagreed with this scheme, arguing that in Germany fortress commanders 
should merely have ‘the right to give instructions, but no subordination structure which grants 
the rights to judge about life and death of all persons in the fortress. That was true for fortresses 
abroad, but not for Germany.’219 What the army demanded was thus a much greater degree of 
autonomy than the Party was willing to allow.  
The Party’s foot-dragging was closely connected to the authority it claimed the 
Wehrmacht lacked in regard to governing a city’s population. But at the end of the day much 
would come to depend on local ‘moral authority’. This meant that moral authority could only 
be asserted during the defence of the city in question. How this transpired in Festung 
Königsberg will be examined in the next section.   
 
VI. Towards a new community 
 
With the conscious decision to defend Germany’s cities, war reached the pinnacle of totality 
for much of the German population. Never had so many Germans been so close to warring 
belligerents. In an examination of late-war violence, understanding the dynamics of a city is 
therefore of key importance. Cities were environments where people of different social strata 
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and beliefs could easily gather together, and friction was never far away. Nowhere is this better 
conveyed than in an alarming report, written by a certain Leutnant Haussleiter, a National-
Socialist Leadership Officer of the Fifteenth Army, which fought in Western Germany. His 
report reached Guderian (who as ‘Chef der OKH’ was mainly concerned with the Eastern 
Front) via the Oberbefehlshaber West, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. Guderian had 
immediately sent the report to Bormann, who in turn passed it on to Himmler.220 The findings 
can rightly be considered as broadly accepted among those men within the Party and 
Wehrmacht that were willing to fight to the end. 
The decent soldier remains at the front. Nobodies and shirkers, however, leave their lines. They 
already form a dangerous mass in the large cities, and, upon the dissolution of order, immediately 
turn into agents of sinister movements. These masses at the same time spread rumours and all 
negative attitudes. They obviously represent the scum of the nation. 
These men, who ‘loaf around for weeks’ on stations throughout the country, were defeatists 
whose message, Haussleiter observed, found large audiences in ‘every jam-packed waggon or 
hairdresser’. They could easily disappear into these crowds when they were called out, 
something Haussleiter found when he tried to catch one of these men. Some of the workers that 
listened to the stories, in turn, told troops that their factories had ceased to work, while women 
openly discussed hiding them.221 In his report, Haussleiter repeatedly expressed the need to set 
examples to counter the behaviour, clearly adhering to the notion of ‘violence as a means of 
communication’.222 Although Haussleiter’s report is almost grotesque in its analysis and 
proposals, it demonstrates why cities and their immediate environment serve as the best-
possible framework to examine the wave of violence that swept over Germany. The urban 
presence of dissenters with a wildly different outlook to the official discourse made German 
cities into pressure cookers, in which the use of violence became a readily accepted valve. 
Building on the findings of the previous section, we will now turn to Königsberg. As 
we will see throughout this dissertation, the dynamics described above were also present there. 
Traditionally, it is the Nazi ideology that is used to explain these hard-line sentiments. But what 
immediately stands out in the assessment of the city’s siege is that the Wehrmacht vastly 
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outnumbered Party officials. Our first question should therefore be to what extent the arrival 
of the Wehrmacht shaped behaviour in Königsberg. How would its members use their authority 
vis-à-vis the Party to impact life in the city? We will shortly address the main actors that arrived 
in the city in late-January 1945, as well as those who were already there but subsequently 
assumed a different role. Establishing the working relationship between the main actors will 
eventually allow us to determine the grounds on which they based the decisions they took 
during the two-month siege.  
On 28 January, 1945 General der Infanterie Otto Lasch, the former Wehrkreis 
commander of East Prussia, was appointed as fortress commander of Königsberg.223 The 
minutes of the military conference at Hitler’s headquarters on 27 January 1945 show that 
Generaloberst Guderian, who knew General Lasch from earlier military conferences, 
personally recommended him to Hitler, referring to Lasch as ‘the most notable personality we 
have up there.’224 The appointment took place during an unfolding crisis, which arose on 23 
January 1945, when Soviet troops of the Third Belorussian Front crossed the river Deime, the 
last natural barrier before Königsberg. They had started their offensive into East Prussia a 
hundred kilometres further to the east only ten days earlier.225 Although the appointment was 
an army matter, Gauleiter Koch immediately sought to enhance his role. In the late hours of 27 
January, he summoned Lasch and told him about a phone call he just had with Hitler. Stressing 
that Hitler had asked the Gauleiter about Lasch’s ‘qualification and reliability’, Koch implied 
that his approval was needed in the process.226 But in his memoirs, Lasch claims that when he 
was summoned by Koch, he told him that ‘There would, in my opinion, be only one use [for 
me], which is as fortress commander.’227 This implies both that Lasch was preparaed to stand 
up to the Party, and that he had already given sustained thought as to what was expected of him 
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as a soldier. Indeed, a fortress commander was expected to be a ‘specially selected, hardened 
soldier, preferably of General’s rank.’228 Prior to and during a siege his task was to ensure 
‘ruthless exploitation of all options’ and oversee the ‘extensive use’ of the population. Whereas 
in Russia fortresses were considered to contain mainly fighting troops, in Germany civilians 
were bound to be present in larger numbers.229 
On the first evening of his appointment Lasch called several Party members and army 
commanders to his headquarters for a meeting. The General, according to Dr. Eugen Sauvant, 
one of the officials present, spoke in a serious tone of the ‘Führerbefehl’ to hold the city ‘until 
the last bullet’, thus stressing the gravity of the situation and, in turn, implying the existence of 
a direct link between Hitler and himself.230 By doing so, he further diminished Gauleiter Koch’s 
role in the fortress, but it was above all Koch’s own behaviour that undercut his authority. By 
the time that Lasch held the meeting, Koch had already made a number of decisions that were 
not only frowned upon by the army, but by Party members as well. Since the Party was 
responsible for the population’s evacuation, its actions were closely observed. When on 21 
January Koch ordered the families of Gauleitung employees to be evacuated by a special train, 
panic struck among the population.231 It was a decision that alarmed some of the more 
committed Party members. It seemed to confirm the pessimist prediction of Propaganda 
Ministry officials, who, according to Eleanor Hancock, ‘judged some 80 per cent of the 7 to 8 
million Party members to be “driftwood”, awaiting defeat.’232 To add to this, on 27 January 
Koch suddenly announced the general evacuation of Königsberg, preparing neither the 
population nor the Party for it. Not only were Soviet troops already within striking distance by 
then, the temperature at the time was well below -20º. 233 Meanwhile, Koch was absent from 
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Lasch’s meeting, since he had ‘relocated’ to Pillau.234 This behaviour damaged his reputation 
among three of his closest remaining subordinates, Waldemar Magunia, Kreisleiter Ernst 
Wagner and Deputy Gauleiter Ferdinand Grossherr.235 Koch’s thinly-veiled flight corroded his 
authority, as well as that of the Party officials who ‘relocated’ with him.  
A comparison with Gauleiter Karl Hanke of Lower Silesia immediately shows the close 
link between authority and the decision to stay put. Hanke did not leave his besieged capital of 
Breslau, earning him numerous accolades. His ability to hold sway over, and even to dismiss, 
the fortress commander of Breslau was in sharp contrast with Gauleiter Koch’s attempts to do 
the same.236 It had long been common within Party circles that the Party’s ‘spirit’ rested on the 
willingness of its committed members to take things into their own hands, which had proven 
of vital importance in the early days of its existence, known as the Kampfzeit. As Hans 
Mommsen has pointed out, from 1943 onwards ‘Party propaganda spoke relentlessly of the 
crucial experience of the Kampfzeit, through which obstacles should be overcome.’237 Thus, 
although Koch had boasted that Königsberg was to be held to the last man, he now appeared 
insincere, cowardly, and irresponsible.238 The remaining Party members realised that it was the 
army, headed by Lasch, which actually followed up on the promises.239 Privately Lasch had 
his doubts about holding the city, but he did not share these with Party members. According to 
Dr. Sauvant, the general told him that ‘We know what awaits us. We can probably hold the city 
for some time, but Germany is lost. We can no longer hope for the city to be relieved in the 
current war situation. What happens next, the gods know.’240 This uncertainty was omnipresent 
in all branches of the Wehrmacht during these days in Königsberg. 
 Gauleiter Koch’s move to Pillau effectively cut East Prussia’s Party elite in two, as it 
created a clear dividing line between those who left and those who stayed behind. The 
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remaining Party members now had more in common with the army commanders in 
Königsberg, and this notion shaped their perception of the unfolding events. Yet these Party 
members saw that, besides the Party, army units also abandoned Königsberg, and had already 
noticed similar behaviour before, notably in Ukraine and on the borders of East Prussia the 
previous summers.241 Luftwaffe men were seen retreating through Volkssturm lines, and blew 
up their canons before having fired a single shot.242 The navy had a number of warships sail to 
the western Baltic, near Denmark, while orders were passed down to destroy docks and other 
harbour installations.243 Most of the army’s staffs left Königsberg as well.244 
Although it is clear that the remaining Party members condemned the departure of their 
colleagues, the sources are inconclusive as to why they appeared more forgiving in their 
assessment of the Wehrmacht. They seemed relatively unconcerned by the Wehrmacht’s 
behaviour and focused on those who remained in Königsberg instead. To explain this 
behaviour, a few general observations might be made. By and large, in Party circles personal 
loyalty trumped any reliance on institutional patterns.245 Gauleiter Koch’s move west was 
undoubtedly considered disloyal by those – and to those – who stayed behind. Furthermore, it 
was evident to even the staunchest National Socialist that, once a Soviet offensive was set in 
motion, the German army could not easily halt it. The army was above all responsible for the 
protection of Reich territory, and the Wehrmacht’s departure from the city might thus be a 
bitter necessity, while the Parteiflucht inherently meant self-preservation at the expense of the 
civilian population they left behind.246 On 18 January 1945, an editorial in the Königsberger 
Allgemeine Zeitung stressed that ‘The strength of a people never solely lies in its weapons. 
Wars are always and only decided by the inner strength and the will of a people.’247 Whereas 
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the army showed a willingness to defend the city, most Party members did not express this at 
all. Moreover, the fact that from the first moment Lasch actively involved Königsberg’s Party 
members in the city’s defence not only insured that they believed they were taken seriously, it 
also placed them against the Party members who had fled.248 
Shortly after his appointment as fortress commander, Lasch moved to the 
Oberpostdirektion, the regional post administration, at the Hansaring in the north-west of the 
city. Although Gauleiter Koch still disagreed with the Party’s subordinate role in Königsberg, 
he nevertheless appointed Kreisleiter Ernst Wagner as Festungsbeauftragte der NSDAP among 
the lines of Guderian’s scheme. Wagner almost immediately reached out to Lasch: although 
the Kreisleiter could have chosen to move into the Gauhaus on the Große Schloßteichstraße, 
he instead set up his ‘post’ in the Rundfunkhaus, across the street from Lasch.249 Wagner 
became Lasch’s point man for civilian matters and, twelve years after the fact, the general noted 
that Wagner ‘did his duty in every respect’.250 Königsberg’s Oberbürgermeister, Helmuth Will, 
stayed behind in the city too. He received widespread praise, but his presence was above all 
symbolical, as the city’s administration was left to Rechtsanwald Dr. Kurt Eske.251  
The Wehrmacht, for its part, reached out as well. After hearing that the cooperation 
between the Wehrmacht and the Party was poor, ‘especially in East Prussia’ (a clear reference 
to Gauleiter Koch), the Party Chancellery asked for the appointment of ‘a Verbindungsoffizier 
[Liaison officer] between the Army Group and the Gauleiter und RV-Kommissaren.’ It would 
be his task to keep the Gauleiter informed on the military situation, and generally to liaise with 
the Party.252 On his first day as fortress commander Lasch appointed o this role the highly 
respected Major der Reserve Gunter Ipsen, who, during peace time, had been a Sociology 
Professor at the Albertina University in Königsberg. During the war he had proved to be an 
outstanding soldier, receiving the Close combat clasp and the German Cross in Gold.253 
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Although friction continued to exist throughout the siege between the Party and the 
Wehrmacht, we will see that the two sides tried to reach something of a ‘civil truce’ in order to 
mobilise the local population.254 Despite their hopeless situation, the Party-state-Wehrmacht 
collaboration in besieged Königsberg continued to be characterised by a willingness to 
continue to function as before (‘Weiterfunktionieren’), even though the insistence on the 
continuation of the city’s governmental machinery could not really be rationalised, nor its use 
easily explained.255  
This section has examined the interactions between the Party and Wehrmacht elite 
during the first days of Königsberg’s siege. Rather than examining their relationship with the 
regime through the prism of ‘Resistenz’ or ‘loyal reluctance’ to explain the establishment of 
the local balance of power, a more pragmatic assessment of the situation ‘on the ground’ 
seemed to have laid at its foundation. In this rapidly changing environment Berlin was far away, 
and the different actors seem not have been too troubled by any ideological commitment. In 
this sense, their behaviour was reminiscent of the Kampfzeit, during which one’s initiative was 
of key importance to overcome challenges. The process was not sophisticated: Gauleiter Koch 
and General Lasch played a local power game. But this nevertheless had important stakes: the 
moral authority over the city. The flight of the Party provided Lasch with enough leverage to 
assume authority. After the war, he would define Königsberg’s community as ‘one big family 
that worked together for better and for worse’ (within the German martial tradition, rooted in 
patriarchy, this made him the ‘father’ of this community).256 Kreisleiter Wagner saw it as a 
‘clean and tough community of hardship’257 Both descriptions – but especially Lasch’s – are 
self-serving, but nevertheless show that the Total War experience of the civilians in Festung 
Königsberg was defined by those present in the city itself, rather than by distant Party officials 
and Wehrmacht commanders. It is also evident that the Wehrmacht and the Party did not 
necessarily have different agendas for the period that lay ahead. The cooperation between the 
two actors show that the dynamics in Festung Königsberg should not be framed as ‘fanatical 
Party versus an unwilling Wehrmacht’. Although the two actors might have had different 
                                                          
3: Dr. Victor Werbke, Stabsoffizier beim Festungskommandanten von Königsberg - Aufstellung neuer 
Truppenteile in Königsberg, Verhältnis zwischen Stab Lasch (General d. Inf. Und Kommandant der 
Festung Königsberg) und Parteidienststelle  (4.6.1953); Christian Tillitzki, “Wie ein versunkenes Vineta, 
Albertina 1944-1945,” Ostpreussenblatt, September 25, 1999, 12. 
254 Broszat, The Hitler State, 22.  
255 Wolfgang Franz Werner, »Bleib übrig!« Deutsche Arbeiter in der nationalsozialistischen Kriegswirtschaft 
(Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1983), 350-52.  
256 Lasch, So fiel Königberg, 64. 




motivations to keep fighting as the city was being encircled by late-January 1945, that 
willingness in itself was strongly present among both Königsberg’s Party elite, as well as the 




The defence of Germany in 1945 was built around its cities, and local dynamics would 
determine how its population would experience the final months of the war. During the 
previous years of Total War, Germany had already had increasingly centrifugal tendencies that 
assured that the Volksgemeinschaft came to be defined on a local level, while wartime 
circumstances themselves – notably the availability of food and the frequency of bombing raids 
– contributed to the further retreat of local populations from the German community at large. 
For East Prussians, the impact of Total War was only really felt when they were called up to 
construct the Ostwall during the summer of 1944. The army, which had taken up positions 
around the East Prussian border, oversaw most of the efforts, showing that despite the 
constraints that were imposed at a national level, it still managed to exert significant influence 
at a local level. A similar tendency was seen with the East Prussian Volkssturm. By the end of 
1944 Army and Corps commanders had gained full control over the militia’s deployment, even 
though the Party was technically in charge. Meanwhile, up to the autumn of 1944, the 
Wehrmacht had largely been absent from Germans’ Total War experience, yet as the number 
of troops that moved into Germany increased, so did the Wehrmacht’s influence over everyday 
life. 
The clearest harbingers that Total War was about to impact on the population’s 
immediate environment were the efforts to bring cities and their urban areas into the defensive 
schemes. Urban areas were incorporated into larger defensive systems, with key cities being 
designated ‘fortresses’. The defence of cities themselves was new in modern German history, 
but as the country was highly urbanised there were no other valid options. Moreover, since 
both the General Staff and the members of Hitler’s intimate circle ruled in favour of an active 
involvement of civilians in the defence of their Heimat, they pushed forward with the strategy. 
The decision to defend German cities was almost universally negatively received further down 
the chain of command. Troops had long dreaded fighting in cities and equated them with 
military setbacks, with Stalingrad as the most obvious example, a notion that was only 
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confirmed during Operation Bagration in the summer of 1944. Local Party elites, in turn, saw 
their authority being challenged by the increasing powers the military was granted to organise 
the defence of cities. To prevent further inroads into their power, Party members repeatedly 
questioned the Wehrmacht’s loyalty to the Volksgemeinschaft. This constant hammering of 
reliability linked actual authority over cities to the issue of ‘moral authority’. Yet when in 
January 1945 the fighting for ‘fortress Königsberg’ was about to commence, numerous 
Wehrmacht staffs and significant elements of the Party elite, including Gauleiter Koch, left the 
city. Those who remained only concerned themselves with immediate civic problems, and 
sought to find common ground in the mutual determination to keep the city out of Soviet hands. 
The next chapter will examine the language that was used in the fortress, to determine the 
extent to which Königsberg’s garrison broke with the Volksgemeinschaft, and what 








By late January 1945 the Soviet offensive into East Prussia had successfully managed to cut 
off Königsberg and its wider environs from the rest of Germany. As noted above, this caused 
a brief power vacuum, but governance soon returned. After these turbulent days, the local 
administration resumed and would remain firmly in place until Festung Königsberg fell on 10 
April.1 This chapter seeks to answer how and why those in charge during this period sought to 
define their community. Whereas military and Party authorities in some areas surrendered 
without a single shot, others, like in Königsberg, decided to fight to the last bullet. This cannot 
be solely explained by an assessment of the opposing forces involved and concerns about the 
post-war era; self-image, as we will see, was of decisive importance.  
 Significant energy was expended to propagate the ‘new’ values of Festung Königsberg. 
On 31 January 1945, within a few days of Königsberg’s encirclement, Die Festung Königsberg, 
the ‘battle-paper for labourers, soldiers and men of the Volkssturm’, was published for the first 
time.2 That tagline hinted a search for identity. Indeed, a week later this message had been 
altered, while the official Party newspaper of East Prussia’s NSDAP branch, the Preußische 
Zeitung presented itself as a ‘Paper for the entire Volksgemeinschaft’, which was explained as 
‘Wehrmacht, Volkssturm and population’. 3 Königsberg would be defined by a set of values on 
which those in the city could agree, rather than by values imposed on them by Berlin.  
The need to define a communal ‘fortress-identity’ had emerged in late 1944, when 
military and Party authorities discerned a drop in morale and a lack of discipline among both 
population and troops. It will be argued here that this negative mood (Stimmung) surfaced 
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because the racially-fuelled Weltanschauungskrieg, the ‘war of world views’, had lost its 
appeal as a propagandist tool, prompting a search for an alternative. Among the general 
populace, the authorities estimated, a deep-routed attitude persisted that the defensive war 
fought on home soil lacked favourable prospects or a deeper purpose. To counter these 
sentiments, and to cement its rule, Königsberg’s fortress command tapped into a traditional 
discourse of ‘banal nationalism’, thereby allowing the army to once again perceive itself as the 
guarantor of the country’s historical continuity.4 Yet, in order to eventually link the new state 
of affairs in Königsberg to the violence it engendered, this chapter goes beyond an analysis of 
the new propagandist course. For the people trapped in Königsberg, the siege saw the 
transformation of their society from a Volksgemeinschaft to a Kampfgemeinschaft, with 
‘Kampf’, in turn, changing from a conceptual ‘struggle’ to an actual ‘battle’ (i.e. from a 
‘community of struggle’ to a ‘battle-community’). Whether they agreed with the new course 
or could identify with this newly-imposed identity is less known. This chapter will examine 
whether the parameters of the new Kampfgemeinschaft indeed represented Königsberg’s 
community.  
 
I. Visions of the East Prussian community in late 1944 
 
By the summer of 1944, the East Prussians were slowly turning away from the National 
Socialist regime, which, up to that point, had been beneficial to East Prussians. Propaganda 
had long cemented the relationship between East Prussians and the regime, but as the tide of 
war turned proved able to detach themselves from some of the regime’s core messages. It 
would, however, be a simplification to merely portray this as opportunism. From its conception, 
the NSDAP had put itself forward as the ‘Guardian of the Volksgemeinschaft’, but by mid-
1944 – with even troops themselves increasingly fearing that they ‘could not do justice to the 
traditional role as protector of wife and child’ – the population now believed that it had to look 
after – and even defend – itself.5 This, in turn, would have far-reaching consequences. National 
Socialist propaganda had always presented the German people as the ‘victims of the tide of 
                                                          
4 Siniša Malešević, Identity as Ideology, Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism (Houndmills: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2006), 146-50, 204-06.  On the connection between ‘Stimmung’ (mood) and ‘Haltung’ 
(attitude) during wartime, see: Steinert, Hitler’s War and the Germans, 5.   
5 Library of Congress: Die NSDAP sichert die Volksgemeinschaft - Volksgenossen braucht Ihr Rat und Hilfe 
so wendet Euch an die Ortsgruppe  http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004680176/ Accessed 25 
November 2016; Echternkamp, Soldaten im Nachkrieg, 71. 
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events’ that transpired from 1914 onwards, which had been a powerful narrative to explain 
Germany’s path to war, since war was championed as the only way to undo this injustice.6 A 
victim narrative was now likely to re-emerge, but with the glaring difference that Germans 
could present themselves as victims of the National Socialist regime, since it was the Nazis that 
had exposed them to the dangers of war. How this shift in attitude resonated in East Prussia 
will be discussed in this section. 
For East Prussians August 1944 became the watershed month of the war, a month in 
which East Prussia turned from a province where ‘the plight of the time could be forgotten’ 
into a war-zone.7 The month started festively with a four-day-long string of recitals, concerts 
and torchlight processions, as the Albertus University celebrated its four-hundred-year 
anniversary.8 Rectors from across the country were invited to attend the festivities, a 
commemorative stamp was presented and the university inaugurated no less than eight new 
chairs. It could all be mistaken, a doctor noted, for a peace-time event.9 During the summer the 
weather had been particularly agreeable, adding to a false sense of safety.10  
Yet, anxiety was already creeping up on the East Prussian population. Throughout the 
summer the Soviet offensive, ‘Operation Bagration’, pushed westwards and by late July the 
frontline crossed the extended border of East Prussia near Bialystok.11 Two weeks earlier an 
East Prussian official had bluntly written to his colleague that ‘these days our people look with 
concern to the Eastern Front. The breakthrough of the Bolsheviks near Wilna (Vilnius) is 
gradually recognized in all its severity by the entire German people.’12 The biggest blow to the 
morale of East Prussians came in the last week of August, when two RAF bomber raids 
destroyed much of the city centre of Königsberg, turning it into a flaming inferno that left 4,200 
dead and 150,000 people homeless.13 Nevertheless, already by mid-July orders were passed 
                                                          
6 Wirsching, “Volksgemeinschaft and the Illusion of ‘Normality’ from the 1920s to the 1940s,” 151.  
7 Karl Springenschmid, Raus aus Königsberg! Wie 420 ostpreußische Jungen 1945 aus Kampf und Einsatz 
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8 IfZArch MA 736/ NSDAP Hauptarchiv Gau Ostpreussen: Semesterbericht der Studentenführung 
Ostpreußen für die Monate Juli, August und September 
9 Gause, Die Geschichte der Stadt Königsberg, 158; Hans Graf von Lehndorff, Ostpreußisches Tagebuch. 
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10 Hans-Werner Rautenberg, “Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Stellung im Osten und das Ende 
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Schnittpunkt deutscher Geschichte und in seinen europäische Bezügen, ed. Bernhart Jähnig and Silke Spieler 
(Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen, 1993), 115. 
11 Osvoboshdenie gorodov, s.v. “БЕЛОСТОК.” 
12 BArch R55/616, 105: Betrifft: Errichtung eines Grenzschutzes im Osten, 13 July 1944.  
13 Noble, Nazi Rule and the Soviet Offensive, 165-69.  
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down to prevent people from leaving the province.14 To add to their concerns, East Prussians 
increasingly came into contact with German troops, which entered the province in large 
numbers. If the bombing had not already roughly rid them of the illusion that their province 
was out of reach of the war’s horrors, the arrival of these soldiers left no doubt that war was, 
in fact, very close by.  
In late July, the front line came to a standstill along the borders of East Prussia, and 
stayed there until mid-October. As discussed earlier, during this period large parts of the 
population were actively involved in digging defensive positions, both close behind the front 
line and deeper into East Prussia. Meanwhile, a quarter of the East Prussian population was 
evacuated from vulnerable areas.15 Yet, criticism of evacuation measures increased in the wake 
of the so-called ‘Gumbinnen Operation’ of October 1944. On 16 October, Soviet troops started 
this offensive and within a few days overran most of the evacuated areas, after which areas had 
yet to be evacuated were captured as well. In his diary, even Goebbels expressed criticism 
towards Gauleiter Koch’s evacuation measures, as he felt that Koch had overestimated the 
strength of the Wehrmacht and had relied on it too much in his decision to only evacuate the 
far east of East Prussia.16 
Public anxieties were further stoked up by the events n and around Nemmersdorf, an 
East Prussian village that was captured by Soviet troops in the morning of 21 October 1944. 
Two days later, in the early morning of 23 October 1944, it was recaptured by German troops. 
At least twenty-six German civilians, most of them women, children, and elderly, were found 
killed in Nemmersdorf, and by 26 October this information had reached Goebbels.17 ‘These 
atrocities are terrible indeed,’ he wrote in his journal. ‘I will use them as an opportunity for a 
big press release, so that among the German people even the last guileless waverers will be 
clear about what awaits the German people if Bolshevism actually takes hold of the Reich.’18 
Goebbels’ thinking was influenced by what he called a ‘strength-through-fear’ approach. Its 
main aim was for the German people to ‘remain convinced – as indeed the facts warrant – that 
this war strikes at their very lives and their national possibilities of development, and they must 
                                                          
14 BArch R55/616, 59, pm 9.7.44 15.45 an das rpa ostpreussen z.hd.d.Leiter koenigsberg; BArch R55/616, 
86-9, Betrifft: Einführung von Reisebeschränkungen auf Grund der militärisch-politischen Lage, July 10, 
1944; BArch R55/616, 93: kbg. 10.7.44. 18.35 uhr nr.3014 an pm abteilung pro. z.hd. herrn sondermann 
15 See Chapter 3. Schieder, Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa I, 65, 15E.  
16 Elke Fröhlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Teil II Diktate 1941-1945, Band 14: Oktober bis 
Dezember 1944 (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1996), 100. (entry of 25 October 1944). 
17 Berhard Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944: Was in Ostpreußen tatsächlich geschah (Berlin: edition 
ost, 1997), 9, 119-20, 146-47. 
18 Frohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Band 14, 110. (entry of 26 October) 
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fight it with their entire strength.’19  On 27 October the Völkischer Beobachter opened with a 
massive front-page article: ‘Terrible crimes in Nemmersdorf’ and in the following days the 
coverage continued, with the casualty number being inflated to sixty-one.20 The campaign, 
however, backfired. Not only were East Prussians surprised to find out that Nemmersdorf had 
not been evacuated, but the reported atrocities only intensified the fear of the Soviets.21 Indeed 
East Prussian propaganda officials were now reluctant to publicise such Soviet actions: ‘The 
question of the atrocities committed by the Bolshevists in the areas of East Prussia occupied 
by them is not to be gone into at present, so as to avoid any atmosphere of panic among the 
population.’22 Yet ‘after “Nemmersdorf” nothing was the same again,’ the German historian 
Andreas Kossert concluded about the state of mind of the East Prussian population.23  
In the meantime, the military presence in the province was growing. The attitude among 
these troops varied. On one hand, there were formations such as the 1st (Ostpreussische) 
infantry division, one of Germany’s elite units, whose men were fiercely determined to keep 
the Soviets away from their homes.24 In early October, a call to all branches of the Wehrmacht 
to defend East Prussia resulted in an additional 10,000 volunteers for the province.25 At the 
other end of the spectrum were the four Volksgrenadier divisions that were raised in the 
province during these months. The quality of these troops was much lower and political 
education was considered required to motivate them for the coming battle. Some of the stresses 
and strains within the army were illustrated by one soldier, Herbart Nerger. The regime-loyal 
Nerger had volunteered for the front, and was appalled by what he heard during a stopover in 
Königsberg during the last days of October 1944. ‘The words skedaddle and vamoose (‘stiften 
und türmen gehen’) are commonplace’, he wrote to a comrade of his former SA-Standarte. 
When he tried to greet his bunk-mates with ‘Heil Hitler’, it resulted in astonishment and 
                                                          
19 Leonard Doob, “Goebbels‘ Principles of Propaganda,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 14, no.3 (1950): 433, 
438-39. 
20 Furchtbare Verbechen in Nemmersdorf, Völkischer Beobachter, 27 October, 1944; Fisch, Nemmersdorf, 
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21 B. Fisch “Nemmersdorf 1944 – ein bisher unbekanntes zeitnahes Zeugnis,” Zeitschrift für 
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Bodley Head, 2015), 660-61. 
22 TNA HW 1/3301A/ West Europe, 31 October 1944. General: Time of dispatch: 1pm 26.10.44, Directive, 
No. 22 of 26/10, From SS Main Office, Signed Unterstuf Holst.  
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Krieges: Zwei Beispiele,” in Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland, ed. Jörg Hillmann and John Zimmermann 
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hostility. ‘The leading sentiment is to call it quits just as soon as possible. (…) My hope is that 
it is different with the troops at the front, and that a healthier spirit prevails there.’26 These 
tensions were further reflected in the behaviour of two company commanders of a Volkssturm 
battalion in late October: while one of them was brought up before a court martial on a charge 
of ‘cowardice in face of the enemy’, the other remained confident in, yet critical of, the strength 
of the defence.27  
Higher up the chain of command, the staffs of the different Armies in East Prussia were 
in sombre mood. They had seen how numbers had dwindled since the start of Operation 
Bagration, and by November 1944 knew that a next Soviet offensive was only a matter of time. 
In December 1944, the war correspondent Günther Heysing spoke with General Gerhard 
Matzky, who commanded the corps that defended the Gumbinnen area. Matzky’s assessment 
of the coming fighting was grim. ‘The first line of trenches is churned up so much [by the 
Soviet artillery] that hardly a man survives. When after hours of destructive fire, the tank-
squadrons and the swarms of infantry attack, they can march on right away.’28 Nevertheless, 
the military authorities used Christmas to try and boost the morale of the troops, providing 
cigarettes, books, food, and, above all, a generous amount of liquor. News about the Ardennes 
Offensive, the ‘Führer’s Christmas present’ further raised the mood, as did Hitler’s New Year’s 
speech.29 Yet, it escaped few commanders that at the turn of 1945 the mood in East Prussia, 
both among troops and civilians was clearly fragile. For the period that lay ahead, a new 
mentality would have to be created among the defenders. This will be discussed in the next 
section.   
 
II. Towards a closer collaboration  
 
On 12 and 13 January 1945, the Second and Third Belorussian Fronts started their final 
offensive into East Prussia. The artillerist Kurt Orgel, who after being wounded awaited 
transport from the port of Pillau, initially misjudged it as a ‘small, local counter-attack’, 
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showing the success of the propagandist efforts at downplaying the threat.30 On 16 January, the 
Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung on 16 January described the ‘German soldiers as a wall 
around East Prussia’, promising that the attackers would ‘bleed to death’ on the positions that 
had earlier been dug.31 Two days later, as the offensive showed no signs of slowing down, the 
newspaper adopted a more cautious tone, and steeped its lead article in military jargon. It was 
claimed that, due to the sheer mass of forces, the offensive was bound to gain some initial 
ground, but, ‘the defence needs to set aside a certain amount of time to deploy its operational 
and tactical reserves.’32 The Soviets, however, kept pushing, even after the reserves had been 
deployed: the Third Belorussian Front captured Tilsit on 20 January and Gumbinnen on 21 
January, while on 23 January troops of the Second Belorussian Front reached the Frisches Haff 
lagoon east of Elbing, cutting off the troops north-east of it from the brunt of the German 
forces.33 On 29 January Soviet troops completed the encirclement of Königsberg. This had a 
big impact on morale.34 ‘The awareness of being trapped severely affected the mood’, a 
company commander later noted about the atmosphere in his unit.35 The remaining civilians 
were even more affected by the new circumstances. Suicide was openly discussed, making it 
abundantly clear how little trust the population had in the defenders.36 Indeed, in the first two 
weeks of the encirclement about 120 people committed suicide, largely out of fear for their 
imminent future at the hands of the Soviets.37 
In turn, the presence of large numbers of soldiers who were often openly hostile to Party 
members emboldened many civilians to express their aversion, something that until a few 
weeks earlier had only been possible in private.38 Growing numbers lost trust in the sincerity 
of official propaganda, eroding the fundaments of the National Socialist system. Furthermore, 
not only were local Party members seen to be dodging military service, but it was evident that 
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Gauleiter Koch and his Kreisleiters had been shamelessly enriching themselves.39 All this 
added to stresses within the fortress. 
There was also a growing external threat. With the front pressed against Königsberg, 
the Soviets made sustained attempts to influence its garrison and population.40 The lead role in 
this effort was reserved to the NKFD, the Nationalkomittee Freies Deutschland, an anti-Fascist 
movement consisting of former German prisoners of war and left-wing German émigrés. The 
main task of the NKFD in East Prussia was to convince its population to turn their backs on 
the Nazi regime, a course it had pursued since early 1944.41 Throughout 1944 their means had 
been too limited to make any impact, while Goebbels’ atrocity propaganda had undermined 
their credibility: they were no longer merely seen as consorting with Germany’s enemies, but 
rather as facilitators of their bestial behaviour. ‘Russian propaganda in East Prussia,’ a British 
intelligence report noted in November 1944, ‘is now a complete failure. Nobody pays the 
slightest attention to it.’42 But during the two-month siege of Königsberg the NKFD became 
more threatening. Loudspeaker cars were used on a large scale to stress the hopelessness of 
Königsberg’s garrison, interspersed with tempting promises to those who were willing to give 
up the fight. On other occasions reports of the Soviet Information Bureau were read out, 
describing the Soviet advance or the conclusions reached at the Yalta Conference.43 The 
artillery spotter Wolfgang Eisenblätter was repeatedly exposed to this propaganda, and after 
the war acknowledged that ‘the arguments were indeed plausible to us’, although, at the same 
time, he stressed that ‘they did not have the intended motivational effect.’44  
The failure of the appeal of German propaganda, and to a lesser extent, given their 
treaterous reputation, the need to counter the propaganda of the NKFD, forced the fortress 
command to shape its own message. The Party and the Wehrmacht thus needed to collaborate 
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together to create a new sense of local identity. The new course did not represent a deliberate 
break with the earlier Nazi propaganda, it merely placed different emphases on topics than the 
earlier propaganda, while other topics were downplayed or disregarded. The course they chose 
can best be described as the adoption of ‘banal nationalism’, a locally-oriented 
Kampfgemeinschaft which harked back to Königsberg’s past. Michael Billig, the social 
psychologist who coined the term, drew on Hannah Arendt’s analysis of Adolf Eichmann to 
stress that banality should not be confused with harmlessness. ‘Banal nationalism can hardly 
be innocent: it is reproducing institutions which possess vast armaments,’ which, he argued, 
‘can be mobilised without lengthy campaigns of political preparation.’45 During the siege of 
Königsberg this nationalism was used to search for ‘continuity’ in German history by 
increasing the impact historical feats had on its garrison and the population, while also 
downplaying the influence of National Socialism.   
The last chapter showed that by late January 1945 the balance of power in the fortress 
had tipped in favour of the Wehrmacht. That two army propaganda companies 
(Propagandakompanie 689 and Heereskriegsberichterzug Mitte) arrived with the retreating 
troops further increased the army’s influence.46 Yet, it was the Party that presided over 
Königsberg’s press and radio. According to the war correspondent Günther Heysing, the 
Reichssender Königsberg (where Kreisleiter Wagner had set up his command post) remained 
the ‘voice of the fortress’ throughout Königsberg’s siege.47 As a timely evacuation of the staff 
and the printing presses of the Preußische Zeitung to Fischhausen (a village that fell under 
Koch’s authority) had failed, they also remained available to the fortress.48 Thus the army had 
to work with the Party in this task. The new collaboration could best be observed at the 
Ostpreußische Druckerei. Not only did it print the official Party newspapers and provide the 
administrational documents (such as ration cards), it also started printing divisional newspapers 
and military pamphlets. When the power supply in the fortress became unreliable, the army in 
turn supplied the press with one of its own generators to keep it going.49 As a result, from the 
beginning of the siege, sustained efforts were made to convey a message on which both the 
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Wehrmacht and the Party could agree. The next sections will examine what this message 
entailed.  
 
III. Abandoning the greater good  
 
For many of those trapped in Königsberg, the Soviet offensive into East Prussia confirmed the 
negative image of the regime that had matured during 1944. It lay bare the regime’s limitations, 
above all showing that its role as the ‘Guardian of the Volksgemeinschaft’ was, by 1945, 
grossly misplaced. This should be seen as the main reason why local propagandists opted to 
embrace the idea of a locally-oriented Kampfgemeinschaft. As the war progressed, German 
propagandists had presented Germany as an embattled Kampfgemeinschaft, and within this, 
Kampf was interpreted as a metaphysical struggle to secure the country’s world views.50 As we 
will see, propagandists in Königsberg definitively broke with this broad interpretation, 
redefining both the meaning of Kampf and the scope of the community. 
Within this new identity, geopolitics were less important. The most striking political 
event that took place during Königsberg’s fortress era, the Yalta Conference, was largely 
ignored by Königsberg’s press. On 18 February, the ‘Nachrichten des Oberkommandos der 
Wehrmacht’, a newsletter for high-ranking commanders, reported on the conference’s 
outcome, but its details were ‘not meant for publication, but only meant to inform the higher 
[military] departments.’51 Elsewhere, Yalta was trivialised and mainly used to ‘uncover’ the 
growing tensions between the Allies, rather than as ammunition to keep on fighting.52 
According to the Preußische Zeitung, the conference merely proved ‘that England had 
completely got stuck between the two millstones of the plutocratic imperialism of the USA and 
the Bolshevik imperialism of Moscow.’ In turn, attention was drawn to the ‘adventure-politics’ 
of the United States, which was ‘indifferent to the fate of Europe.’53 It was reported that 
millions of German slave labourers were to be sent to Soviet Union to repay the war-depth, 
while Germany would be occupied until the year 2000.54 Yet, these stories were merely 
consigned to the paper’s back pages. 
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The new line instead focused on a simple message: fight for the survival of the city. 
This was in itself all not an easy ‘sell’. Königsberg had suffered heavily from two Allied 
bombardments in late August 1944, which destroyed fifty-three per cent of the built-up areas, 
especially the city centre.55 Soviet artillery further reduced much of the city to ruins during the 
two-month siege. ‘There was a dull atmosphere of the downfall of the world’, the writer Rudolf 
Naujok recalled over a decade later. ‘The feeling of walking through a mortuary was impossible 
to get rid of.’56 Nevertheless, the approach local propagandists took from the very beginning 
was to emphasize that everyone in the city was in the same boat. The fact that the city was 
surrounded and constantly shelled from late January onwards was presented as a test. Posters 
distributed throughout the city, co-signed by General Lasch and Kreisleiter Wagner, read that: 
‘In the thunder of guns, the stout hearts prove themselves. There is no going back here.’ The 
encirclement would give birth to an ‘unconditional battle-community’ consisting of ‘soldiers, 
men and women’, which would be invincible. These posters also linked the anticipated 
steadfast behaviour in Königsberg directly to the preservation of the rest of Germany: ‘That’s 
how we will do it. All of us together will hold Königsberg until the time that the Reich achieves 
victory over our mortal enemies.’57 A similar message could be found on specially designed 
Volkssturm posters. In Königsberg, these posters featured two men holding weapons, while 
the silhouette of Königsberg’s castle could be seen in the background.58 These messages were 
consolidated by defiant speeches. On 5 February Kreisleiter Wagner highlighted that for ‘better 
or for worse we are connected to the fate of fortress Königsberg.’ On 1 March, he focused on 
‘the fate of our city and the freedom of our East Prussian Heimat.59 By rallying people to the 
defence of their Heimat, an almost tangible, emotionally-laden concept, they were contributing 
to the more indefinable ‘Reich’ as well. 
Alongside this, there was to be an illusion of normality. Large swaths of the Preußische 
Zeitung were reserved for seemingly mundane everyday matters. Thus, Wagner himself would 
often provide short articles about how to run a household (‘Residues of dry bread can be used 
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to make tasty bread soups’).60 Meanwhile, it was reported that at least three cinemas remained 
open during the siege, showing films on a daily basis, of which one of these was a special 
Soldatinenkino.61 At Reichssender Königsberg, which kept broadcasting until 7 April, 
significant effort was put into the rearrangement of the record collection. To supplement these 
musical offerings, a seventy-strong symphony orchestra was formed, consisting partly of 
foreign labourers and prisoners of war.62 But despite these initiatives, the Party continued to be 
looked upon with suspicion within the Königsberg fortress. Party speakers were treated with 
hostility, and in the areas that housed large numbers of refugees they were hardly given the 
chance to speak. In the working-class neighbourhood Liep, a former stronghold of the 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (KPD) they were booed and laughed at, while dogs were 
encouraged to bark whilst they talked.63 Clearly, more space needed to be put between the old 
message of the regime and the new local realities.   
 
IV. The search for continuity 
 
On 15 February 1945, the former Berlin correspondent, Alfred T. Brattel, wrote an 
inflammatory article about Königsberg in the Aberdeen-based Press and journal. ‘Königsberg, 
not Berlin, is the real and spiritual capital of Prussia and all that it stands for,’ Brattel believed, 
continuing that ‘To Prussians, it is what Mecca is for the Arabs and what Reims means to the 
French.’ The article went on to list every negative cliché about the city, which explained the 
article’s sub-heading: ‘Königsberg, Mecca of Prussians, Deserves What She’ll get.’64 By 
choosing this wording, Brattel attributed guilt to Königsberg itself, raising the premise that the 
city had ‘provoked’ certain treatment throughout its history, and still did so. What Brattel 
omitted – and every Allied journalist or Nazi propagandist those days with him – was that 
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Königsberg was also known as Immanuel Kant’s ‘city of pure reason’, and as a bridge between 
Europe and the East.65 That the city’s martial heritage was emphasised within the fortress in 
1945 was perhaps predictable, but it is interesting to reflect on the impact of this on the 
garrison’s behaviour. Since ‘war altered the physical city, often at a stroke, and, at the same 
time, opened up new spaces of thinking about the metropolis’, connecting the material ‘Festung 
Königsberg’ to the perception and interpretation of it helps us to further the examination of the 
‘metropolitan dimension of Total War’.66 Therefore, what follows is an assessment of the 
manner in which Königsberg’s history was framed and conveyed, since, according to the 
German historian, Sven Oliver Müller, ‘Propaganda was most successful there where it was 
not used to sway people, but rather where it could build from a traditional nationalist 
knowledge base.’67  
That traditional knowledge base of Königsberg was that it was the alte Krönungsstadt, 
the coronation city of Prussian monarchs, and the city of Immanuel Kant, to which we will 
return shortly. Days after the encirclement, a fanatical Obergefreiter, Herbert Schnellhammer, 
wrote the article ‘Our Duty!’ for the Festung Königsberg, in which he spurred on his comrades 
by tapping into the city’s history. ‘Königsberg! City of Prussian military tradition, centre of 
Prussian duty and Kantian philosophy - Königsberg! The city that during unfortunate times 
brought Prussia together against the Napoleonic enemy: the proud history of Prussia will these 
days be tested through deep inner commitment.’68 The Prussian military heritage was 
omnipresent in Königsberg. The fourteen forts of Königsberg’s fortress belt read as a who’s 
who of the Wars of Liberation and the defiance against the French in the early 1800s, with 
names such as ‘Gneisenau’, ‘Friedrich Wilhelm III’, ‘Stein’, and so on, while the inner city 
was protected by ‘Der Wrangel’ and ‘Der Dohna’.69 The 1st (Ostpreussische) Infanterie 
division was even mustered in East Prussia, Königsberg having been the garrison city of one 
                                                          
65 Hans-Werner Rautenberg, “Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Stellung im Osten und das Ende 
Königsbergs. Flucht und Vertreibung als europäisches Problem,” in Das Königsberger Gebiet im 
Schnittpunkt deutscher Geschichte und in seinen europäischen Bezügen, ed. Bernhart Jähnig und Silke 
Spieler (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen 1993), 115-16. 
66 Goebel and Keene, “Towards a Metropolitan History of Total War”, 2. The intention to examine the 
‘constantly shifting and changing milieu of ideas, events, appearances and meanings’ is captured in the 
term ‘Thirdspace’. See: Edward Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined 
Places (Cambridge (Ma.): Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 2.  
67 Sven Oliver Müller, Deutsche Soldaten und ihre Feinde, : Nationalismus an Front und Heimatfront im 
Zweiten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer Verlag, 2007), 91. 
68 Herbert Schellhammer, “Unsere Verpflichtung!,” Festung Königsberg, February 2, 1945.  
69 Hannsjoachim Koch, A History of Prussia, (London: Longman, 1978), 160, 188-92; Lasch, So fiel 
Königsberg, 15.  
92 
 
the division’s regiments since 1716.70 The vast majority of the divisional general staff officers 
that entered Königsberg in January came from noble Prussian backgrounds.71 
The uniquely Prussian character of the city was even considered by some to pose some 
challenges to the Nazi regime. ‘Prussian’ Königsberg lent itself to serve as a counter weight to 
‘National Socialist’ Berlin, and Hitler himself was thoroughly aware of that. In late January 
1945, as Generaloberst Rendulic recalled in his memoirs, ‘Hitler conveyed his concern to me, 
that in case of a loss of Königsberg the so-called Seydlitz group would establish a rival-
government in the old Prussian coronation city under Russian patronage.’72 In Berlin the 
rumour also circulated that a rival government would be established in Königsberg, although 
in reality Stalin by 1945 had long given up on the idea.73 The Soviets also sought to appeal to 
the garrison’s sense of Prussian history. According to the Soviet Colonel-General Nikolai 
Khlebnikov, leaflets were shot into the city, urging ‘the enemy soldiers and officers to lay down 
their arms and surrender in order to avoid vain bloodshed, as the same already happened with 
Königsberg on January 22, 1758 when Russian troops entered the city.’74 Indeed, during most 
of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), Königsberg had been occupied in an orderly fashion by 
Russian troops, after the city submitted to Empress Elisabeth I of Russia.75 However, such 
capitulation was strongly opposed by the army and, while Deputy Gauleiter Grossherr might 
have entertained the idea, General Lasch distanced himself from any such surrender.76 
The Prussian military heritage – stripped from any Nazi connotation – indeed became 
one of the pillars of the fortress’s propaganda.77 Königsberg, many officers felt, had not been 
tainted by Nazism in the same way as in Potsdam and Berlin, and the departure of many Party 
activistst only strengthened this notion: Königsberg became even more pure in its 
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Prussianism.78 Therefore, when Königsberg’s propagandists used the concept of Kampfzeit 
they did not invoke political parallels of ‘struggle’. Instead, Kampfzeit referred to the fighting 
for the city itself as part of the Prussian virtues of obedience and determination, and was not 
linked to the ‘battle of the streets’ of the 1920s and early 1930s. Although street fighting 
seemed inevitable in the near future, and Nazis had regularly and violently clashed with 
Communists during the Kampfzeit, this parallel was not explored.79 Rather, ‘Prussian 
anecdotes’ were printed in the Preußische Zeitung, further underlining Prussian military 
values.80  
The change to a Prussian military-dominated propaganda had advantages for the Party 
as well. Nazi Party officials seemed to have been aware of the limits of their power and 
popularity, to a greater extent than is often acknowledged. The overt Nazi propaganda angered 
large parts of the population, and was widely scorned. Since Stalingrad, the official explanation 
of Nazi propaganda for the mounting losses had been that a near defeat always preceded 
eventual victory.81 The infamous radio-speech of Goebbels, ‘Hannibal ante portas!’, which 
drew a historical parallel with Hannibal’s advance on Rome, and the subsequent Roman 
victories which led to the eventual destruction of Carthage, was considered as shameless by 
some of the more critical listeners.82 Also Veit Harlan’s (grossly historically inaccurate) epic 
‘Kolberg’, which focused on the town’s siege by French troops in 1807, was shown in 
Königsberg. The movie was flown into the city to bolster the garrison’s fighting spirit, but was 
received with mixed feelings. ‘Kolberg’ showed the city’s defence as organised by the steadfast 
mayor, Joachim Nettelbeck, and the energetic major (later field marshal) August Neidhardt von 
Gneisenau, who prevailed due to their willingness to make deep sacrifices for the greater 
good.83 Again, the historical parallels were so obvious that a doctor who viewed it considered 
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it as a ‘weird imposition’, asking himself: ‘Are we supposed to look upon our Kreisleiter as a 
Nettelbeck?’84 The answer to that question came on 3 March, when the article ‘The spirit of 
Königsberg: fortress of weapons and hearts’ opened with the lines: ‘Nobody here thinks about 
softening up. A Kolberg-mood prevails.’85 This official Party propaganda was never 
abandoned, but was pursued less rigorously. A parallel propaganda, subtler in its National 
Socialist wording, was adopted instead. A more martial tone was adopted, and as such the Party 
was once again able to validate its role in Menschenführung.  
In the meantime, the army’s increasing influence over the fortress’ line of propaganda 
at the expense of the Party, akin to a miniature Gleichschaltung, worried Gauleiter Koch. His 
view of Königsberg as a kind of ‘military dictatorship’ in the midst of his province – exactly 
what the increasing powers of the Reichsverteidigungskommissar had sought to counter – 
explains his sustained efforts to undermine the new state of affairs.86 These efforts increased 
after the recapture of the area between Königsberg and Pillau in late February 1945. Shortly 
afterwards, during one of Koch’s rare visits to Königsberg, he pointed out to Magunia that, had 
the army not abandoned the trenches he had dug, the situation would have been considerably 
better.87 To further his influence, Koch dispatched twelve Kreisleiters to Königsberg. They 
took over some of the tasks the military had previously overseen, but also spread a joke to 
discredit the army: ‘Es steht schlecht um die Festung. Der Kommandant ist lasch und sein 
Stabschef ein Süsskind.’ (It is looking bad for the fortress. The commandant is lasch and his 
chief of staff a Süsskind). Lasch here refers to General Lasch, but at the same time the word 
translates as ‘feeble’ or ‘lax’, whereas Süsskind refers to Hugo Freiherr von Süsskind-
Schwendi, the chief of staff of the fortress, but also translates as ‘sweet child’, as such 
portraying him as helpless and inadequate.88 In Berlin, Koch continued to discredit Lasch and 
passed on the joke to Goebbels, who must have taken it on board, noting in his diary on 25 
March 1945 that ‘he [Lasch] does justice to his name’89 In turn, among the ranks of the army, 
Koch was referred to as the ‘Satrap of Neutief’, thus underlining his continued absence from 
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Königsberg.90 Even the Soviets picked up on this feud, shooting pamphlets into the city which 
informed the population that Gauleiter Koch was the ‘first Volkssturm man’ who left 
Königsberg, an example they should follow.91 It is therefore perhaps less of a surprise that, in 
his post-war analysis of the fortress era, Oberbürgermeister Will claimed to have felt that the 
resistance of the fortess was more diminished by political intrigue than by military decisions.92  
 
V. Losing faith in the Führer, gaining local heroes 
 
By 1945, not only had faith in the Nazi Party largely crumbled, ever larger parts of the 
population openly ventilated criticism of Hitler as well. Germans felt abandoned by the Nazi 
leadership, which, in case of East Prussians, was even literally so. According to Field Marshal 
Wilhelm Keitel, Hitler’s presence in his military headquarters in Rastenburg had always had 
‘a very soothing effect on the population’ of East Prussia, but after Hitler’s departure in 
November 1944 this illusion of safety also fell away.93 As a result, as Goebbels noted in his 
diary, ‘neither the Führer in person, nor the National Socialist concept, nor the National 
Socialist movement are immune from criticism’, a development referred to by the historian 
Stephen Fritz as ‘a wholesale rejection of the social-revolutionary promise at the heart of the 
Nazi idea.’94 As a result of his declining appearance in the press Hitler became, in the words 
of Ian Kershaw, ‘a distant, shadowy figure’ to more and more Germans.95 In East Prussia this 
was no different, with rumours circulating in late 1944 that Hitler was sick, or possibly even 
dead. His New Year’s speech in 1945 at least soothed some of these sentiments, but did little 
to restore his ‘charismatic leadership’.96 Among the troops, in particular, his ‘strategic genius’ 
was being questioned, even though he remained closely involved in the developments 
concerning Königsberg. As several reports of staff meetings show, Hitler repeatedly 
highlighted the city’s importance and ensured that weapons and ammunition would arrive in 
the city, but none of this was used to encourage a renewed respect for their Führer.97 
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During Königsberg’s siege, Hitler featured prominently in the newspapers only on three 
occasions. The first time was on 31 January, when large parts of his speech, commemorating 
the seizure of power in 1933, were published. The second time was on 25 February, a day after 
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the proclamation of the Party Programme, when his speech 
(which was read out by Secretary of Propaganda Hermann Esser, rather than by Hitler himself), 
and a telegram to Gauleiter Koch, were printed in the Preußische Zeitung. Hitler’s final 
appearance in the newspapers came on 20 March, when he was reported to have received Hitler 
Youth boys at the Reich Chancellery.98 The demise of the ‘Hitler-myth’ has been studied in 
depth by Ian Kershaw, whose conclusions still hold up today, thirty years later. Yet how the 
hole caused by the departure of Hitler’s personality cult was filled has received less attention. 
The need to redefine role models (perhaps precisely because the Hitler-myth had been so all-
embracing) was clearly visible in Königsberg. The short history of unified Germany had left 
the country with few worth-while heroes (with Immanuel Kant himself already in the late 
eighteenth century stating that the Germans did not possess national pride).99 Therefore, the 
role models that the fortress’ propagandists chose were local ones.  
In the first and only divisional newspaper of the 561st Volksgrenadier Division, ‘Die 
Sturmglocke’, an entire article was devoted to General Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg, the 
Prussian hero of the wars of liberation of 1813, including his picture and some quotations that 
were as appropriate in 1813 as they were in 1945. The impact of his (distilled) legacy is not to 
be underestimated, as in Königsberg military decisions were sometimes even judged through 
the eyes of Yorck, even when the resulting actions were contradictory to Hitler’s view. To East 
Prussians, Yorck’s claim to fame was his decision to declare himself neutral at the Battle of 
Tauroggen north of their province, in 1812, while he was supposed to fight alongside the 
French. By doing so, he went against the wishes of his King, Frederick William III, effectively 
changing sides. Königsberg played an important role in these events: five days after his deed, 
Yorck entered Königsberg, and urged the members of the Ostpreußische Landtag, which had 
gathered without the King’s permission, to arm the people, triggering the Wars of Liberation 
that ended the loathed French rule. When Kreisleiter Wagner was sounded out about his 
                                                          
98 BArch Ost-Dok. 10/890: 176-177; „Ich prophezeie den Sieg des deutschen Reiches!“, Preußische 
Zeitung, 25 February, 1945 20 tapfere Hitlerjungen vor dem Führer, Preußische Zeitung, 20 March, 1945. 
99 Fritz, Endkampf, 63. 
97 
 
willingness to overthrow Gauleiter Koch, he was asked to consider a ‘Yorckish deed’ by 
imprisoning Koch and declaring Königsberg an open city.100  
Another local role model, by far the most famous son of the city, was the philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, whose legacy was reinterpreted to fit the propagandist aims of 1945. In 1941 
S.D. Stirk, a German graduate from both Oxford and Breslau universities who had migrated to 
Britain before the war, wrote a ‘war-book’, seeking to explain some of the uses of Prussianism 
in National Socialist thought. He summed up how Kant’s notion of ‘duty’, which in his eyes 
was meant as an ‘integral part of a noble conception of man as an independent and autonomous 
being’, had been hollowed out: ‘It has really been emptied of its ethical content and has come 
to mean blind obedience to the letter of the laws and to the command issued by the state and 
those in authority.’101 The propagandists of the Third Reich did indeed not venture beyond 
Stirk’s observation, with the Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung already stating before the siege 
that ‘Kant’s notion of duty is embedded in each and every German soldier and German worker, 
even if he has never read a single line of Kant.’102 Along similar lines, Professor Baumgarten, 
dean of the philosophic faculty of the Königsberg’s Albertus University, broadcast a message 
from the fortress ‘in the memory of Kant’, condemning Churchill’s post-war ideas and rallying 
people to fight.103  
More contemporary local role models were used as well. The recipients of the Knight’s 
Cross, Germany’s highest award for valour, were announced in the Preußische Zeitung, with 
East Prussian recipients receiving special attention.104 Best-known in Königsberg was Ernst 
Tiburzy, one of only four Volkssturm members ever to receive the Knight’s Cross. During a 
Soviet attack on the city on 2 February, Tiburzy knocked out a tank with a Panzerfaust, 
although the Soviet advance towards the city continued. When one of his subordinates intended 
to retreat, Tiburzy shot him. Staying put, despite being wounded, he knocked out four more 
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tanks, after which the attack was called off. This limping man with one eye remaining, but still 
in action, was the epitome of a fight until the end: this was exactly the kind of tangible heroism 
propagandists were looking for.105 Indeed, on 5 February Kreisleiter Wagner devoted a large 
part of a speech to him, while in that same speech Hitler was mentioned only once in passing.106 
A few days later the Preußische Zeitung opened with the celebration of Tiburzy’s feat and 
reported his divisional commander’s speech, which tied the soldier’s bravery into the ‘greater-
German’ context: ‘As first Gau of Greater Germany East Prussia has, as a result of true popular 
support [and] due to the leadership of its Gauleiter, not only preceded all other Gaue in the 
construction of positions and the raising of the Volkssturm, it now also has an East Prussian 
Volkssturm leader that is the first to be awarded this distinction of bravery.’ Wagner’s rather 
brief supplement, ‘Gauleiter Koch is proud of you, and sends his regards!’, reveals that the 
Party was taking its lead from the army.107 
 The ‘Volkssturm-man’ in himself was another propaganda tool. All necessary virtues 
could be allocated to him, including steadfastness, discipline, and courage. The values of the 
East Prussian Volkssturm were presented as a continuation of Prussianism, rather than as 
National Socialist traits, with Waldemar Magunia claiming that ‘The East Prussian Volkssturm 
man had the discipline of this ancient Prussian Soldatenland in his bones.’108 Addressing the 
different local Volkssturm units, Wagner – himself a native East Prussian – avoided speaking 
about Germany, but focused exclusively on the people of Königsberg. When he spoke to the 
units he often spoke of ‘us’ or ‘we’ to indicate the local collective identity.109  
Interestingly, General Lasch kept a low profile locally in the propaganda effort. 
Although he was featured prominently in Die Deutsche Wochenschau in the last week of March 
1945, side by side with Gauleiter Koch, no ‘forced-upbeat’ interview with Lasch appeared in 
local newspapers, no propaganda pamphlets bearing his name were distributed. With limited 
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personal links to the city, he seems to have restricted himself to one appeal to the troops, which 
mainly seemed to have served to convey his appointment as fortress commander.110 Local 
personalities were thus placed at the forefront of Königsberg’s propaganda. This both 
manifested itself in Party outlets, such as the Preußische Zeitung, and in military newspapers. 
To establish to what extent Königsberg was unique in pursuing this approach, the next section 
will continue to examine this theme by addressing more directly the role of the spoken word 
within late-war propaganda.  
 
VI. The NSFO and the Mundpropaganda in Königsberg 
 
In order to bolster the army’s fighting spirit during times of defeat, 1943 had seen the 
introduction of the NSFO, the ‘Nationalsozialistischer Führungsoffizier’, or National Socialist 
Leadership Officer, whose task it was to transfer the National Socialist world view to the 
troops. During the fighting in Germany, Hitler stated that ‘the National Socialist world view 
and political attitude must be used as the strongest weaponry.’111 According to the research of 
Waldemar Besson, Bormann put Hitler’s order into practice by dispatching groups of NSFOs 
to hard-pressed areas of the front.112 Although these men were presented as a vital link between 
the regime and the army, and as support for the notion that the army was willing to embrace 
National Socialist principles, it is hard to define an archetypical NSFO. Some officers in 
Königsberg took their appointment as NSFOs very seriously, while others, such as Leutnant 
Bodo Kleine, only took up the function after being ordered to do so. Kleine subsequently 
questioned whether his talks had any effect on the troops at all.113  
These men were at the forefront of one of the most important dilemmas of those days: 
was the defence of Germany of overriding importance, or were National Socialist teachings to 
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be upheld during Germany’s gravest hour, no matter the cost?114 Many commanders in 
Königsberg decided – or were forced to decide due to circumstances – on the former. For 
example, even though the Volkssturm was initially a Party-led organisation, its East Prussian 
units had received little political education. The overriding need to halt the Soviet offensive 
into East Prussia in October 1944 meant that its men received weapons training only.115 That 
in hard-pressed fortresses even fewer soldiers were interested in politics seemed to have 
dawned on some of the more realistic members of the Wehrmacht. It is worth quoting at length 
an instruction, dated 15 February 1945, to NSFOs who were serving inside a fortress.   
 
At least once a week, troops are to be given a political address, during which it should be made 
clear to them that Fortress Garrisons are not forgotten, but that in most cases the Homeland is much 
harder hit than the Fortresses. It should be impressed upon the troops that further reserves are to be 
expected, but that these will have no softening effect on the Homeland. Commissars are to stick to 
the truth, and they are told that it is better to appear ignorant on certain points rather than to tell lies. 
There is to be no instruction of the troops on political themes. National Socialist Leadership is what 
counts, not National Socialist education. The object is not to know, but to will. Appeal is to be made 
to the troops’ emotional and traditional values. Soldiers are never concerned with theories, but only 
with immediate problems. The superiority of National Socialism to reactionary plutocracy and 
destructive Bolshevism is to be stressed. The final objective of such talks must be to produce 
confidence that the Germans can still win and that the will to see it through is thoroughly 
inculcated.116 
 
Different NSFOs, however, gave different emphases to their roles. The NSFO who contributed 
to the newspaper of the XXVIII. Korps, Die Samlandfront did not sseek to pursue a political 
line with his readers. He merely painted a picture of the recent recapture of the Samland 
peninsula, Operation ‘Westwind’ (which we will discuss in Chapter 3), and stuck to military 
events and statistics. On the back of the same pamphlet General Hans Gollnick, the corps 
commander who had led the operation, praised his troops by focusing on their diverse German 
origins and their combined mission of evicting the Soviet troops, who were – somewhat 
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surprisingly – not portrayed as Germany’s mortal enemies, but rather as a ‘dogged’ 
(‘verbissen’), and indeed rather human, opponents.117  
The course that the NSFOs in Königsberg took can also be distinguished by their 
implementation of Mundpropaganda, ‘mouth-’ or ‘whisper-propaganda’, in the city. With the 
decreasing availability of news through ordinary channels, the German population increasingly 
dared to – but at the same time had to – rely on rumours and hear-say.118 This had not gone 
unnoticed by propagandists, and in late 1944 they adopted the rumour as an official propaganda 
tool. Special Wehrmacht-Propaganda officers (WPrO) were appointed at Wehrkreis-level, 
whose task it was ‘to strengthen public confidence in the leadership, and to substantiate the 
public’s belief that this war must be won at all costs, and can only be ended with our victory.’119 
In Königsberg the Wehrmacht introduced a set of rumours in late February - early March 1945 
as part of the Mundpropaganda efforts. Some civilians and some soldiers saw through them, 
but many of these rumours were taken seriously.120 The rumours focused exclusively on local 
matters that preoccupied the people in Königsberg. A post-war evaluation of the mood in the 
city, written by Walter Kemsies, an intelligence officer who was present at the time, speaks 
about the introduction of a rumour indicating that the Russian troops had become demoralised, 
having underestimated the strength of the garrison of Königsberg. Instead, the Russian troops 
in East Prussia had gathered for an attack on the German troops surrounded in Courland, further 
to the north, and therefore would have no troops left to attack Königsberg. Apparently, the fact 
that other parts of the German army were now threatened was of little consideration for the 
propagandists, as long as the situation in the city was eased. A similar pattern can be detected 
in other rumours spread: encircled German troops in Insterburg and Tilsit were said to have 
linked up and were marching towards Königsberg while some 500,000 men of the Wlassow 
Army had broken out from an area near Warsaw and were also heading to the city. Himmler 
was also claimed to be gathering his Army, and approached the city via Danzig. According to 
an SS intelligence report, this rumour resonated particularly well among the troops. On top of 
that, it was rumoured that 500 Tiger tanks had been offloaded in the port of Pillau, and were 
shortly to be made available to bolster the city’s defence.121 The ‘Mundpropaganda’ and the 
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activity of the NSFOs thus reflected the tendency to focus on local threats, and as such reveal 
that enough institutional flexibility existed to allow for this. The next section will examine the 
most infamous sub-genre within Nazi propaganda, atrocity propaganda, to determine whether 
these findings can be extended into this field as well. 
 
VII. Atrocity propaganda 
 
For better or for worse, Nazi propagandists had committed themselves to bringing Soviet 
atrocities to the attention of the German public. By early 1945, however, there were ever louder 
voices, also coming from the Party elite, that urged that they be presented in a more nuanced 
light.122 The representation of atrocities formed a key element in the German propaganda 
during the last year of the war. East Prussians held a special place in this propaganda, being 
the first to experience the rage of ‘Moscow’s hangmen’.123 Yet, the backlash caused by the 
‘Nemmersdorf’ campaign showed that the German Volksgemeinschaft did not wholeheartedly 
embrace this course. Moreover, at times the propaganda contributed to a further corrosion of 
German society, with people in Western Germany being unmoved by the death of ‘a couple of 
people in East Prussia.’124 
Initially, in late January – early February 1945, the fortress command too seemed to 
have failed to grasp that the basic emotional response to atrocity propaganda by those 
remaining in Königsberg was fear, rather than steadfastness. A general feeling of 
defencelessness prevailed among the civilians in the city: two-thirds of them were refugees, of 
which the vast majority were women, children and elderly.125 The first pamphlet that General 
Lasch and Kreisleiter Wagner drafted, however, did not address their fears and insecurities, but 
simply attacked the ‘Bolshevik hordes’ instead. Addressed to ‘soldiers, men and women of 
Festung Königsberg’, it told that ‘Courage and steadfastness are our honour, hate and revenge 
the watchwords!’126 This wording had long been commonplace among the ‘barbarised’ German 
Eastern front soldiers, and for most of them the tone of the pamphlet was justified: some of the 
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soldiers who retreated into Königsberg had also seen action around Nemmersdorf. General 
Lasch himself had at the time just been appointed commander of Wehrkreis I, making it one of 
his first experiences in the province.127 Civilians, on the other hand, were thoroughly upset by 
the pamphlet. ‘Herr General, what do you hope to obtain by the appeal we have found posted 
up everywhere, with your signature appended?’, Hans Graf von Lehndorff protested in a letter 
about the pamphlet: ‘You are not going to bamboozle anybody with “Heil Hitler” anymore.’128 
Although von Lehndorff cherished little hope that his letter would have any impact, newspapers 
show that in the weeks that followed the topic of atrocities was pushed more into the 
background.  
This approach towards atrocities changed in late February, in the wake of ‘Operation 
Westwind’, during which German troops recaptured large areas between Königsberg and 
Pillau. The first village that was recaptured was Metgethen, just west of Königsberg, where a 
large number corpses were discovered that showed signs of mutilation and rape.129 This did not 
mean, however, that propagandists immediately sought to exploit the ‘opportunity’ they were 
presented with. During the first days after the recapture of the Samland area the topic was 
ignored, for which there was an obvious reason. A sense of euphoria dominated among the 
civilians in Königsberg, the soldier Heinz Stendtke remembered about those days.130 This was 
confirmed by two SS reports, describing the mood of the population as ‘confident’ on 21 
February, and still a week later, on 26 February, noting that ‘due to the successes on the 
Samland the mood of the people is good.’131  
However, General Lasch ordered an investigation into Metgethen, probably with the 
purpose of handing over the findings to the Wehrmacht Bureau on War Crimes, as had 
happened in Nemmersdorf.132 The local Sicherheitsdienst prepared a ‘photo report of the 
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murdered and desecrated Germans by the Bolsheviks in Metgethen.’133 One source indicates 
that ‘Gaupropagandaleiter W. followed the advancing German troops, made pictures on the 
spot and interrogated liberated civilians. Two days later he wrote the memorandum “Revenge 
for Metgethen!”.’134 The first article on the subject ‘Metgethen…! Metgethen…!’, written by 
the war correspondent Günther Heysing, appeared on 25 February on the second page of the 
Preußische Zeitung, a week after the area had been recaptured.135 
 Over the following days, a two-stage process can clearly be distinguished: soldiers 
knew much earlier than civilians about the events at Metgethen. Walter Kemsies noted that 
‘What the advancing soldiers saw, surpassed by far the propaganda up till now.’136 Anton 
Detlef von Plato, a former general staff officer of the 5th Panzer division, wrote in the post-
war divisional history that as their tanks passed through the village, soldiers immediately wrote 
‘Revenge for Metgethen’ on their vehicles. Testimonies about the number and state of the 
people the soldiers found vary widely. Numbers were inflated as high as 3,000 victims, 
although no wartime source has survivved with a figure that comes even close to this. The SS 
report mentions that 91 bodies were found by the Sicherheitsdienst.137 But even if the real 
number was lower, the shock that was caused as a result of it bolstered the fighting spirit in the 
entire region, with the same report mentioning a ‘boundless rage’ among the troops, assuring 
that ‘virtually no’ Soviet prisoners were made.138 
The next step was to present the atrocity to the local population, but the information 
they would receive about Metgethen was extremely limited. The Preußische Zeitung provided 
no detailed account of the massacre itself, and, looking at the available sources, it appears that 
civilians were kept away from the village in the days that followed its recapture. ‘Metgethen’ 
was kept in the realm between myth and reality. Banners that read ‘revenge for Metgethen’ 
were hung throughout the city, while posters appeared with ‘METGETHEN RACHE’ 
(Metgethen revenge), which depicted a Soviet skeleton, clinching a knife between his teeth, 
holding a barely dressed and emaciated woman, which he obviously had killed. Like before, 
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the sight of these posters caused a backlash, and many of them were removed by the population, 
fearing that upon entering the city, the Soviets would in their turn be enraged by them.139  
For the civilian population of Konigsberg, Metgethen became the embodiment of doom 
and immediately replaced Nemmersdorf as such.140 It was a final pillar of Königsberg’s 
embattled Kampfgemeinschaft. The brutality of the Soviets that was observed by German 
troops meant that the nation-wide notion of Kampfgemeinschaft was stripped of any deeper 
meaning: it was insufficient to represent ‘Kampf’ as ‘struggle’: the events at Metgethen showed 
that Kampf could only mean ‘battle’. Whereas the proverbial ‘struggle’ lacked urgency (as we 
saw, the ‘struggle with the east’ had been going on for centuries and had most of the time not 
been a struggle at all), the immediate need to ‘battle’ against an enemy that stood within ten 




During the two months of Königsberg’s siege, army commanders and Party officials decided 
on a communal message that was centred on the willingness to fight for Königsberg, rather 
than for Germany as a whole. They realised that few civilians in the city believed that the 
promise of the Volksgemeinschaft could be achieved in the foreseeable future and were well 
aware that people’s concerns did not venture beyond their immediate environment. The result 
of these realisations was that they embraced the notion of a locally-oriented 
Kampfgemeinschaft. 
The course that was decided on was a product of trial and error, but eventually broke 
with some of the accepted themes of Nazi propaganda. Overall, propaganda in Königsberg 
became more locally focused, and appealed to the population’s sense of ‘banal nationalism’. A 
distinct effort was made to closely connect the Festung Königsberg to the traditional martial 
perception of the city. The concept of final victory, Endsieg, was pushed to the background, 
and perseverance, Durchhalten, was linked to the city itself, rather than to Germany as a whole. 
With the Führer-myth undermined, the remaining civilians were asked to look to their ‘own’ 
history, from where Kant and Yorck were encouraging them to assist in the defence of 
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Königsberg. Meanwhile, in regard to the issue of atrocities, the message of hate and revenge 
was not haphazardly repeated, as propagandists gave much thought to how and to whom to 
present it. Only when proof of atrocities was found in nearby Metgethen did they evoke the 
hate and revenge rhetoric, but still only after a week-long embargo on the news. 
The fortress’ propagandists created an easy-to-follow idea: everyone in Königsberg was 
expected to persevere in the city in order to prevent the city from falling into enemy hands. The 
way this new line was supposed to be interpreted was unsophisticated but effective: soldiers 
understood this as defending the population of the city, while the population of the city 
understood this as aiding soldiers. Rather than defending some greater German ideals until final 
victory, the simple fact that one could look others directly in the eye created an acute sense of 
personal responsibility. Certainly, not all German cities could be turned into such a community. 
Königsberg’s strong regional pedigree and its designation as a fortress enabled this, while the 
‘willingness’ to become part of this new society also arose due to lack of other options. The 
relative ease with which the National Socialist world view was reshaped to fit a mould of 
traditional nationalism thus means that the maltreatment of the civilian population – the central 
issue of the following two chapters – did not necessarily have to be rooted in Nazi fanaticism. 
The next chapter will therefore seek to answer the following question: if Gemeinschaftsfremd 
(community alien) meant being excluded from the Volksgemeinschaft, what did it mean in 








In his memoirs, the Großdeutschland veteran Guy Sajer painted a depressing picture of the 
refugees he encountered in the port of Pillau. While waiting to be transported in March 1945, 
Sajer, who had taken part in some of the most intense fighting on the Eastern Front, was upset 
by the ‘heart-wringing’ plight of the children he saw there. ‘Many were lost. When they tired 
of calling their mothers, they collapsed into floods of tears which nothing and no one could 
console. These were the smallest ones, too young to grasp any explanations. Their faces dabbed 
with tears, which instantly froze, remain one of the most pathetic images of that time.’1 Tragic 
stories like these are abundant: tens of thousands of refugees were waiting to be evacuated from 
Pillau between January and April 1945. Both at the time, and particularly in the early post-war 
era, Wehrmacht commanders, civilians, and scholars alike pinned the misery of Eastern 
Germany’s population on the poor organisation of the Party, a view that has persisted.2  
What these contemporaries failed to grasp was the impact the Wehrmacht itself had on 
the decisions that were taken in the province. The Eastern Front had been a ‘school for 
violence’, whose lessons, as we shall see, defined the way both rank-and-file troops and the 
officer corps regarded the evacuation of their own population.3 The German army even 
provided material that precisely laid out what could be learned from the enemy, which, for 
example, was the case with a pamphlet entitled ‘The Soviet measures for the successful defence 
of Leningrad’. Stripped of any racial preconception, its authors stated that prior to and during 
the siege of Leningrad ‘the evacuation was ruthlessly carried out. Only those qualified for the 
defence were allowed to remain in the city.’4  Many parents, for example, did not know where 
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their children were evacuated to, the pamphlet went on, which added to the general confusion, 
but this was considered inevitable. The pamphlet not only reveals the intention of the army to 
take an active part in the evacuation, it also makes clear that the care for the civilian population 
was of secondary importance. Using the war diaries of the German high command, war-time 
reports and newspapers, supplemented by the early post-war questionnaires of prominent East 
Prussians, this chapter restores agency to the Wehrmacht in the organisation of the evacuation. 
It will show that from the moment the German troops entered East Prussia in mid-1944, the 
evacuation of civilians was fully subordinated to the demands of the Wehrmacht, and, since 
evacuation required military materiel, was actively obstructed by them.   
In the current historiography, the analysis of the Wehrmacht’s role in the evacuation of 
Eastern Germany’s population begins with the final Soviet offensive in January 1945. In recent 
years, the German historian, Heinrich Schwendemann, in answer to the question about which 
role the Wehrmacht played in the plight of those it claimed to protect, has convincingly argued 
that German warfare in 1945 was not at all geared towards ensuing the safety of German 
citizens.5 But despite his in-depth research, his works have two shortcomings. By focusing a 
large part of his attention on the first weeks of the Soviet offensive, Schwendemann 
(unconsciously) presents the military as suffering a momentary lapse of judgement during a 
chaotic situation. Secondly, by restricting the analysis to the military, thereby excluding its 
interaction with other actors, his research lacks a wider context. By not only reconstructing the 
motivations of the different actors, but also the environment in which they operated, we can 
trace how the evacuation of East Prussia’s population fitted into the traumatic events of 1945.  
 
I. Wehrmacht treatment of property in evacuated areas 
 
When in August 1944 the front reached East Prussia, the German soldiers had just been 
engaged in heavy fighting in Belarus and the Baltics. It had been a chaotic retreat, as Army 
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Group Centre had been mauled during the Soviet summer offensive, ‘Operation Bagration’.6 
Many of the troops who retreated into East Prussia had lost their confidence in final victory, 
and, as East Prussia’s propaganda office in mid-July complained, their subsequent mood 
‘severely distressed the population’ as well.7 As more and more Wehrmacht units moved into 
the province, the complaints intensified. Although optimistic in public after the war, Major 
Dieckert privately noted that it had been ‘a gypsy-like sight when support units arrived, and 
one believed to be in the Thirty-Year-War, rather than a modern one, fought with tanks and 
planes.’8 This demodernisation has long been linked to the army’s increasingly barbarous 
behaviour, especially on the Eastern Front, and changed little as it crossed the borders of 
Germany.9 German civilians learnt that their army barely consisted of purely German troops 
anymore, but were assisted by a massive number of Soviet helpers, Hilfswillige or Hiwis.10 The 
Trosse, according to an order of the Third Panzer Army, were ‘to be combed out to the extreme 
for German soldiers’, and replaced by Hiwis.11 For many German civilians it was hard to 
comprehend that the army had made the effort to to bring these Soviet helpers to East Prussia, 
and Gauleiter Koch soon reported to Berlin that appalled locals had seen army trucks filled 
with ‘Hiwis and whores’.12  
However, it was, above all, the army itself, already poorly regarded due to its failure to 
fend off the Soviet offensive, which drew negative attention. A lower-ranking Party official 
was so confounded that he wrote a six-page report on the troops, and labelled what he saw as 
‘sabotage’: ‘On the vehicles, one can find mostly chickens, ducks, geese, pigs, cows, sofas, 
armchairs, mattresses, bed frames and so on, but little place is reserved for equipment that is 
necessary to fight a war.’ On these cars, he noted, only few officers could be found. They could 
be found in bars.13 In early August, Koch wrote to Reichsleiter Bormann that ‘As a result of 
the contact with the people from the east, the troops apparently seem to have forgotten that they 
are no longer in the occupied eastern areas, but in the Reich.’14  
                                                          
6 John Erickson, The Road to Berlin, (London: Cassell, 2008), 200-30; 411-30.  
7 Römer, Kameraden, 16-18, 205-16; BArch R55/ 616, 107: Kbg. Nr. 3004 14.7.44. an pm, abteilung pro 
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8 BArch Ost-Dok. 8/510: Kurt Dieckert, Verbindungsoffizier zwischen Zivilverwaltung und 3. Pz. Armee, 
Kampf um Ostpreußen 1944-1945, 4.  
9 Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 12-28.  
10 BArch RH 10/144, 57: Personelle Lage am Stichtag der Meldung 1.1.1945. Even the elite 5th Panzer 
Division consisted of 826 Hiwis, 5,3% of the total manpower.  
11 BArch RH 24-9/ 137, 28 FS an Pz. AOK 3 Bezug: Pz. AOK 3 – Ia Nr.10451/44 geh. v. 26.10.44 
12 Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern: Legenden, Mythos, Geschichte 
(Paderborn: Ferdinant Schöningh, 2010), 263.  
13 BArch NS 19/2606, Abschrift Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei Kreisleitung 
Scharfenwieze, Scharfenwieze, den 12.7.1944, 6-11. 
14 Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern, 263. 
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Koch’s observation, although undoubtedly meant to discredit the army, cannot simply 
be dismissed as such, as there are certainly grounds for this observation. For well over a year 
the army had been forced to yield ground to the advancing Red Army, and it had received 
comprehensive orders on how to treat their immediate environment during times of retreat. 
These orders included the destruction of property and the forced evacuation of populations and 
goods.15 Throughout 1943-1944, ‘destruction’ and ‘evacuation’ became two sides of the same 
coin: what could not be evacuated, was to be destroyed. ‘Evacuation’ became an umbrella term 
for increasingly radical measures: millions of Soviets were expelled from their homes, while 
German troops prevented spring sowing and destroyed crops, turning much of Belorussia into 
a ‘desert zone’. Rather than this destructive behaviour being punished, it was actively 
encouraged.16 By mid-1944, the concept of evacuation had been largely detached from its 
traditional meaning, the safeguarding of populations.17  
Wishing to avoid being caught between fleeing civilians and the advancing Red Army, 
the generals pushed for the evacuation of the East Prussian border districts.18 In August 1944 
the areas north of the river Memel, as well as the north-eastern border districts Tilsit, Ragnit, 
Pillkallen, Stallupönen and Goldap were evacuated, with few exceptions. In mid-October 1944, 
German troops of the Third Panzer Army repelled the first major attack of the Third 
Belorussian Front on East Prussian territory. The front line then stabilised along the northern 
border of East Prussia, although Soviet troops did manage to capture a strip of land thirty miles 
into the East of the province.19 This led to a second evacuation drive, which took place in late 
October. A further strip of twenty miles in depth, which included the eastern half of the 
                                                          
15 Dieter Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in 
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16 Alexander Werth: Russia at war (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1964), 773, 863.  
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19 Dieckert and Grossmann, Der Kampf um Ostpreussen, 60-61. 
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Allenstein district and most of the Gumbinnen district, was evacuated, uprooting over 600,000 
people, or one fourth of the East Prussian population.20 
 The evacuees had to leave behind the majority of their enterprises, as most of them 
could not be dismantled and transported away. As the Soviet attack was expected, in July 1944 
Field Marshal Keitel had ordered preparations for the so-called ‘ARLZ-measures’ on German 
territory, which concerned the breaking-down, evacuation, paralysing and the destruction of 
military and civilian materiel that was threatened by the Allied advance.21 The measures, which 
were fully implemented in September 1944, were modelled after earlier legislation that had 
been set out by the Wirtschaftsstab Ost (Economic Staff East) in February 1943 in anticipation 
of a German retreat from Ukraine. The purpose of these measures was ‘the furthest-possible 
preservation of economic goods and man power for the German war economy, and the 
weakening of the enemy’s war potential through the paralysis and destruction of production 
facilities and their products, as well as the transporting off of man power.’22 By presenting the 
destruction of property during times of retreat as a way to assure an effective German war 
economy, the measure was posed as a pragmatic act. Its devastating effects for the remaining 
population were of secondary importance.  
In Königsberg, the German defenders deliberately flooded parts of the Nasser Garten 
suburb to prevent Soviet troops from advancing too rapidly.23 In March 1945 engineers blew 
up the façade of the university since the statues on it posed a safety concern in case of Soviet 
shelling, and during the final storming the railway bridge was detonated as well.24 These 
actions make it hard to maintain that the infamous ‘Nero order’ of 19 March 1945, which 
concerned the ‘Demolition measures on Reich territory’, was circumvented on any moral 
grounds, a view that after the war was championed by Albert Speer.25 The language of this 
order was similar to that of the earlier ARLZ measures, and served little purpose beyond 
                                                          
20 Schieder (ed.), Die Vertreibung der deutsche Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neiße, Band I, 
15E 
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23 Lasch, So fiel Königsberg, 60.   
24 Gause, Die Geschichte der Stadt Königsberg, 167. Sumowski, “Jetzt war ich ganz allein auf der Welt”, 67-
68. 
25 Albert Speer, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1969), 450-55.  
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rubber-stamping a practice that was already commonplace throughout the country.26 Certainly, 
army commanders presented their ‘unwillingness’ to fully embrace the order as an act of 
defiance against Hitler. The fortress’ Oberstabsintendant, Friedrich Dorfmüller, for example, 
claims to have discussed the order with the fortress’ chief of staff, Süsskind-Schwendi, who, 
as a dramatic gesture, threw the order in a kiln. The points that were earmarked for destruction, 
the waterworks at Peyse and the city’s mills, were guarded from then on to discourage 
overzealous Party fanatics from attempting to put them out of action.27 Nevertheless, it was 
clear that Wehrmacht commanders would destroy German property as they saw fit.  
Even more ambiguity existed over the evacuation of goods. The different divisions of 
the IX. Armeekorps, which defended the northern part of East Prussia, were ordered by its 
commander, General Rolf Wuthmann, to build ‘Erfassungskommandos’ (appropriation 
commandos). Wuthmann instructed that ‘every house and every barn is to be searched. All 
kinds of stocks, equipment, finished goods, raw materials, machinery, whose return is 
worthwhile, are to be collected at stations in nearby places…’ 28 As long as it benefited the 
‘Kampfführung’ (conduct of battle) appropriation was permitted. Yet, too much was 
appropriated, or ‘salvaged’ under the rubric of Kampfführung, something that was quickly 
picked up on by Wuthmann.29 Not only were troops careless and disrespectful towards German 
property, searching houses led to plunder: ‘Those who appropriate objects that are not directly 
needed for the conduct of battle or the preservation of the troops’ effectiveness, such as 
jewellery and furniture will be punished for looting.’30 Looting, however, simply increased 
after it became apparent that only a small fraction of the goods could be evacuated.31 The notion 
that ‘everything will fall into the hands of Ivan anyway’, as a soldier told an evacuee from 
Tilsit, removed many of the soldiers’ reservations.32 This behaviour worried army 
commanders, and in a lecture one of the staff officers of the IX. Armeekorps stressed that ‘the 
continuation of the fight on German soil means protection of German property. Unfortunately, 
                                                          
26 Moll, Führer-Erlasse, 486-87. Moll, Führer-Erlasse 1939-1945, 486-87. Doc. 394: Zerstörungsmaßnahme 
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27 ASK 22034-4: Friedrich Dorfmüller,Vernichtung des Führerbefehls „Verbrannte Erde“ (undated), ASK 
22034-4: Hauptmann Banneitz, Ic der Festung: Erlebnisbericht über meine Tage in der Festung 
Koenigsberg  (undated)  
28 BArch RH 24/9 /293, 27: Generalkommando IX. Armeekorps Qu./IVa/VII K.H.Qu., den 5.11.44. Anlage 
13 
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many soldiers are still not yet clear about this.’33 Civilians, governmental and Party bodies all 
expressed concern, frustration and outrage. In the Volksgemeinschaft plunder during times of 
war ranked among the most despised acts. The punishments for those caught, (considered 
Volksschädlinge, or ‘Public Vermin’), were notoriously high.34 Soldiers, on the other hand, 
normally got away with it and often ‘covered up’ for each other (a practise known as 
‘Deckungskameradschaft’). They allowed each other to ‘organise’ – steal – food and goods, 
not only abroad, but in East Prussia as well.35 
The young house wife, Charlotte Gottschalk, experienced this injustice at first hand. 
‘We noted one Sunday morning that our stables had been cleared out, rabbits and poultry were 
gone. The police could – or would – do nothing, because the trail led to the nearby railway 
tracks, where until earlier in the morning a military train had stood. “German soldiers do not 
steal,” was the comment! Well, that was the end of it.’36 Visiting the evacuated town of 
Ostenburg in mid-October, the president of Königsberg’s Higher Regional Court, Dr. Max 
Draeger, was appalled to see that in its courthouse German troops had plundered most of the 
furniture and furnishings.37 Just over a month later, on 24 November, Draeger visited the towns 
of Tilsit and Ragnit, where he found that ‘Most houses, even the courts, have been looted 
terribly, allegedly by soldiers and Volkssturm men. All doors and cabinets are broken, drawers 
are pulled out, everything lies on the floor like a deserted mess; a horrible sight’38 A scathing 
report sent to SS-Standartenführer Dr. Brandt, who was part of the personal staff of 
Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, concerned the observations of another official who visited 
the evacuated areas as well. It described how houses were being stripped by German troops ‘to 
build bunkers or make fire’, while the nearby forest was ignored. Their behaviour was closely 
linked to the radicalisation on the Eastern Front: ‘The troops, who for many years have been 
deployed in the non-German Eastern territories, seem not at all clear about the fact that they 
are once again on German soil and that they are to defend German values.’39  
In the Soviet Union, plunder had become completely accepted. Predating ‘Operation 
Barbarossa’ German officials had pushed for the implementation of the ‘Hunger Plan’, which 
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was a double-edged sword. By seizing food from the Soviet countryside, millions of racially 
inferior Slavs were expected to perish, while this ‘living off the land’ also meant that the 
Wehrmacht’s stay in the Soviet Union would have less impact on the food situation back in 
Germany. Plunder was presented as a natural part of the soldiers’ everyday life, and the 
behaviour could not be shaken off easily once back in Germany.40 It is therefore of little 
surprise that General Wuthmann feared that the scale of plunder of his Korps’ troops in East 
Prussia would ‘damage the reputation and standing of the German soldier’.41 In a circular, 
Wuthmann called for luggage checks of soldiers on leave prior to their departure, as well as for 
more thorough checks of the Feldpost, since cases had already been discovered where German 
soldiers had mailed German property to their relatives.42 In fact, NSFOs were to instruct their 
men on the treatment of German property near the front: ‘The property of each evacuated 
Volksgenosse is sacred, and every soldier has to treat and protect the possessions of each 
Volksgenosse as if it were his own.’43 Plunder was also witnessed in Königsberg. In late 
January, for example, soldiers were seen kicking in doors searching for alcohol and tobacco 
upon returning from the front.44 Indeed, Walter Kemsies reported that some troops appeared to 
have no respect for private property in the city: 
 
Unclean elements were still trying exploit the plight and predicament of the poorest, stole and 
plundered, lied to, and mocked them. Regrettably, most of them were German soldiers – thankfully 
the majority of them were the scum of the Wehrmacht, deserters and cowards – who laid hands on 
the refugees or on their paltry possessions, who confused the poor refugee woman who had lost her 
nerves, who unhitched the refugees’ horses, took their vehicles, [and] stole their last jewellery.45 
 
Plunder would remain an unresolved issue until the end of the war, and reports about the army’s 
behaviour remained commonplace.46 The belief of many troops that defeat (either of Germany 
or of their own unit) was imminent only seems to have encouraged them to continue 
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plundering; of those who plundered, the notion that they were looting German goods hardly 
seemed to have mattered. In the Soviet Union, troops had been taught to appropriate property 
as they saw fit, with little regard to the human consequences of their behaviour. This behaviour 
clearly continued once back in Germany. In comparison to the Soviet Union the scale was more 
limited, but we should not merely presume that this can only be traced back to a respect for 
their own Volksgenossen. For Wehrmacht troops, the main difference between the two 
countries was that in the Soviet Union they had operated in an environment that – especially 
when it concerned the treatment of civilians – had been effectively lawless from the very start, 
whereas in Germany they were expected to adhere to a set of laws.47 The next section will 
therefore dissect the legislative framework in Germany, and determine what leeway troops had 
and where their behaviour was curtailed.   
 
II. Evacuation measures between the Party and the Army 
 
Up to the summer of 1944, when German troops reached the borders of their country, the 
Wehrmacht had overseen a series of mass evacuation efforts. During the retreat from the Soviet 
Union it had forcibly expelled millions of Soviet citizens, along the lines of the previously 
discussed ARLZ measures. Many of these civilians were brought to Germany in a deliberate 
effort to rob the Red Army of potential manpower, and to increase manpower in Germany’s 
factories. Furthermore, to allow unrestricted movement in the area of operations, and to quell 
partisan activity in their rear, most larger military units cleared areas up to twelve miles behind 
the front. Horrible scenes unfolded. German troops regularly burned down entire villages to 
force civilians out. As potential workers were of most use, mothers were separated from their 
children, while men who refused to leave were often shot on the spot. Civilians were ordered 
to walk 15 miles a day, often with little to no food and drink, and mostly without shelter.48 At 
the same time, the evacuations caused a strain on the already overburdened army and were a 
clear sign that the tide of war had turned. Meanwhile, organising these evacuations diverted 
the Wehrmacht from its core tasks. Having to take care of these people and decide their fate 
took both a mental and physical toll, as it was near-impossible for German troops not to be 
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confronted with the moral decline of their army.49 In this light it is perhaps more understandable 
that after the war army commanders stressed that the evacuation of German civilians in late 
1944 was organised by the Party, and that they themselves only played an advisory role once 
back in Germany, a view that persists today.50 This needs to be reviewed. 
 On paper, the evacuation measures in Germany were clearly delineated: RVKs bore the 
final responsibility for the evacuation of civilians, while the army was tasked with the 
evacuation of goods.51 Yet, this division of responsibilities was not as strict as it appears: 
according to East Prussia’s Regierungspräsident, Dr. Paul Hoffmann, an evacuation plan had 
been drawn up in late 1943, and evacuation routes had been ‘coordinated with the Armed 
Forces in order to avoid congestion of roads.’52 In addition, for Königsberg and other 
Festungen, Wehrkreis commanders, well before any Soviet offensive, were to inform local 
Gauleiters ‘how many and what civil population is required in the fortresses to achieve the 
objects of the fortress commander, which population is allowed to stay, or is yet to be taken 
in.’53 Thus, in East Prussia the military had a clear say in the organisation of the evacuation of 
German civilians.       
In late 1944, military intelligence increasingly showed the might of the Soviet 
opponent, and there was little doubt that in case of a main attack German forces had to yield 
ground. Commanders anticipated that East Prussia might be cut off, and that they eventually 
would have to fall back on the defences that shielded the Samland, which, due to its large 
hinterland, lend itself perfectly for a prolonged defence. This was conveyed to Gauleiter Koch, 
and as inter-Gau evacuation was deemed unfeasible in case of a main attack, the Party preferred 
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an evacuation within the province itself.54 This led to a series of inadequate evacuations.55 
During the evacuation most attention was paid to the rural population, which was ‘taken in’ 
together with its cattle on the Samland, while other vulnerable people, consisting mainly 
women, children and the disabled, was evacuated to Saxony, Silesia or Brandenburg.56  
 Yet, despite the role of the Gauleiters in the evacuation, documents of the IX. 
Armeekorps show that the Party’s evacuation measures were clearly communicated to the army 
on a regular basis. Some information between the Gauleiter and the Kreisleiters was even 
forwarded to the different divisions of the Korps, in order to keep them up to speed on the 
movement of the East Prussian population in and near evacuated areas.57 Much of this 
communication dealt with the matter of reluctant evacuees, since many East Prussians were 
long-established (‘sehr bodenständig’) in the province and reluctant to leave their homes.58 
Over 1,700 families stayed behind in and around the city of Memel alone. The historian Ruth 
Kibelka found that the willingness of the rural population to remain in East Prussia was 
influenced by their possession of a horse-drawn cart, which they felt allowed them to evacuate 
themselves at short notice.59 Indeed, many either ignored the evacuation orders, or returned as 
quickly as possible. Oberst Schaefer, who oversaw many of the evacuation measures, noted 
shortly after the war that   
 
As the front continued to hold more and more people trickled back into the evacuated border areas, 
to complete the autumn harvest. Whereas these were initially only men with horses and farm 
implements, eventually entire families returned, which, even after completion of their work in the 
fields, remained on their farms, so that the evacuation of the border districts had to be ordered again 
once the Russian winter offensive commenced.60 
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Inevitably, the army had to deal with these matters near the front. On 5 November 1944, the 
staff of the IX. Armeekorps received instructions concerning Koch’s evacuation orders. The 
divisions stationed in the area were tasked with the evacuation of the population immediately 
behind the front, while the evacuation of areas further to the rear was to remain the task of the 
civil administration, although the local Kreisleiters bore the final responsibility in both cases.61 
To ensure that civilians actually stayed away from the evacuated areas, troops were now 
ordered to report everyone they encountered without valid papers, after which these people 
were transported to the nearest Kreisleitung, escorted by a non-commissioned officer.62 
Yet, perhaps most striking is that the orders to the army leave no doubt that the 
evacuation drive should first seek to get the cattle to safety before it concerned itself for the 
civilian population. Assuring that cattle were brought out of harms way was considered a 
priority, unworthy of any explanation.63 Indeed, the minutes of a meeting on 6 January 1945 
between the OKW and high-ranking officials of the Party further illustrated that civilians were 
considered expendable:  
 
For both housing and supply the limits of capacity are almost reached, substantial further evacuation 
measures within the Reich territory are not possible anymore. On this point the Party chancellery 
has the same view as the OKW, [namely] that a too extensive evacuation will put the people who 
are to be evacuated, and eventually also the remaining Volksgenossen, in a difficult position (…) If 
necessary, leaving behind the civilian population in territory to be occupied by the enemy must be 
accepted.64 
 
This section has shown that in the run up to the final Soviet offensives both the higher Party 
officials, and the higher echelons of the Wehrmacht, were acquainted with, and agreed upon, 
the domestic evacuation procedures, and subsequently executed them. In the Soviet Union, the 
overriding importance for army commanders was the clearance of their area of operations. Yet, 
unlike in the Soviet Union, these evacuations were not marked by racially-motivated mass-
violence; this agenda fell away as German troops crossed back into East Prussia. Now 
                                                          
61 BArch RH 24-9/ 293, 27: Generalkommando IX. Armeekorps Qu./Iva/VII K.H.Qu., den 5.11.44. Anlage 
13 
62 Ibid.  For similar orders in Western Germany, See: Schumann (ed.) Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 
Teil 6, 245.  
63 BArch 24-9/ 137, 27: Generalkommando IX. Armeekorps Qu./Iva/VII K.H.Qu., den 5.11.44. Anlage 13; 
BArch RH2/316, 118: Op Abt (IH) 11. November 1944, Evakuierung Ostpreussen.   
64 BArch RW 4/ 704, 7,8: WFSt/ Qu 2 (Ost) Nr. 0150/45 geh. F.H.Qu., den 6.1.1945. Betr. Rücksprache mit 
dem Sachbearbeiter der Parteikanzlei für Evakuierungsfragen. 
119 
 
concerned with their own Volksgenossen, the concept of evacuation regained some of its 
‘human aspects’ for the different army commanders. But at the same time, this section reveals 
that commanders were complicit in leaving civilians to their fate. The next two sections will 
further address such moral judgements, and examine how the military procedures impacted 
their own population. 
 
III. The question of German refugees within German strategy  
 
After a year of fighting a series of defensive operations without a coherent strategy, the German 
high command, perhaps against its better judgement, managed to regroup and implemented the 
highly-unpopular fortress strategy.65 An entry in the war diary of the Ninth Army, dated 22 
June 1944, when the front still stood deep in the Soviet Union, read that ‘The Army considers 
the orders concerning the establishment of fortified areas as particularly dangerous. It is 
therefore looking with bitter feelings towards the upcoming battles, knowing that it is bound 
by orders which, according to its conscience, it cannot accept as correct.’66 The strategy, 
moreover, was introduced at a time when many German generals already considered the war 
as good as lost.67 To keep commanders in line, a stream of directives that merely ‘derived from 
impressions or necessities of the moment’ poured out of the Führer Headquarters, which, as 
the deputy chief in the OKW, Walter Warlimont, pointed out, meant that these directives lost 
their authority.68 As a result, more and more generals sought ways to ‘reinterpret’ the orders 
and directives they received, a development that was not lost on Hitler. On 19 January 1945, 
he ordered that every intended operational movement down to divisional level had to be put 
before him, and that he expected to read nothing but the ‘unvarnished truth’.69 The order shows 
the widespread distrust that was mutually felt between field commanders and the OKW and 
the OKH, directed by Hitler. Moreover, the OKH also seemed to be losing its grip. Speer noted 
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‘that the [OKH] had definitively given up informing Hitler correctly and instead occupied itself 
with war games.’70 Guderian remembered meetings at which the entire OKH staff was drunk, 
so much so that they were even standing on the tables.71 The unwillingness to adhere to a 
strategy, however, did not mean that German troops intended to give up the fight. Heinrich 
Schwendemann has put forward the idea that German generals continued to fight long after 
they knew the war was lost, in what he calls the ‘strategy of self-destruction,’ because, until 
the very end, ‘the Wehrmacht leadership loyally implemented the guiding principles of the 
Führer,’ if only because by then they did not know otherwise.72 To assess what German strategy 
comprised of by 1945, this section will examine both Schwendemanns’s notion, as well as the 
extent that commanders sought to reinterpret the orders they received, since these two notions 
were seemingly contradictory. 
Those commanders who after the war sought to champion themselves as defenders of 
refugees had little choice but claim that they had turned their backs on the OKW and OKH, 
since the orders these bodies passed down in late 1944 and early 1945 left little doubt that the 
refugee question was little more than a side issue. The OKW, which during a main attack took 
over control over the railway, ranked the refugee matter as fifth and final in importance, which, 
as its war diary noted, ‘practically meant that all refugee trains were cancelled.’73 Behind this 
lay a grim reality. At least six East Prussian military hospitals were evacuated in orderly fashion 
after the Soviet offensive had commenced, and arrived by train in Königsberg without 
significant delays along the way.74 Yet, at the same time, many civilian refugees desperately 
tried to head west as well, but found that for them transportation by rail was extremely limited. 
Indeed, in Königsberg, armed soldiers blocked the access to the station for refugees, and those 
trains that were eventually destined for refugee transport were often shunted into sidings for 
days to allow for unhindered military movement.75 People were desperate to get to Pillau, on 
the westernmost tip of the Samland, from where ships were said to be leaving to safety.76 In 
despair, parents who were denied access to the trains pushed their children through the 
windows, while fights on the train erupted in the search for a place. The trains were packed so 
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tight that many people lost consciousness.77 The conditions in the trains heading south-west – 
via Elbing to the Reich – were even worse. Unaware that Elbing had been captured on 23 
January, they kept heading in that direction. As a result, some trains halted for days in the 
blistering cold. Many suffered from hypothermia, and several even died inside the trains.78  
Fleeing via road was even harder. During the operations in East Prussia German army 
officers increasingly complained about carts of refugees hindering military traffic. For 
example, along the streets south of the river Pregel, an officer of the 5th Panzer division wrote 
of endless lines of refugees, heading west, congesting the roads to Königsberg, and, as the fuel 
had to come from that direction, only limited amounts of  the badly needed supplies reached 
the troops.79 Sometimes the troops on the spot took the law into their own hands. Heinz Simat, 
a veteran of the 349th Volksgrenadier division, recalled the behaviour of his unit at the small 
town of Norkitten, where congested  lines of refugees tried to cross the Pregel: ‘Often the 
military vehicles rigorously drove the refugee carts off the road, and the largest vehicles time 
and again ignored their right of way.’80 Thus, a few days after  the offensive had commenced, 
civilians were forbidden to use the province’s main roads, Reichsstrasse 1 and Reichsstrasse 
138.81 Also the roads in the area between the river Deime and the road between Königsberg 
and Cranz were put off limits for civilians. When the fighting neared Königsberg, even its 
Ringchaussee was closed off for civilians.82 A dramatic account of a female refugee appears in 
one of the standard works on the flight of the German population: 
Miss G.K. hastens through the no man’s land between the fronts. She reaches Konigsberg, together 
with her neighbour, his wife, and their ten children. German soldiers close off the entrance streets. 
“Königsberg is a fortress. No civilians are allowed to enter.” Miss G.K. pleads, begs, cries. In vain. 
She, too, must join the refugee stream that continues westwards.83 
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On 23 January, at the height of the flight of East Prussia’s inhabitants, even the road between 
Königsberg and Pillau, the main artery used by these refugees, was closed to civilians.84 The 
refugees were therefore forced to use byways, or, even had to go through fields.85 In effect, it 
meant that their trecks did not even reach walking speed, and many were unable to reach the 
shelter of a town or village by the end of a day. During the last two weeks of January, when 
the temperature almost constantly fell below minus twenty or even minus thirty degrees, many 
refugees froze to death.  
On 23 January Soviet troops reached the Frische Haff near Elbing, which meant that all 
Germans east of it were cut off.  From then on, the seemingly most straight-forward way to 
escape East Prussia was by boarding a ship from the port town of Pillau, on the westernmost 
tip of the Samland, to the Danzig – Gotenhafen area, or directly to reception areas in northern 
Germany and Denmark.86 The research of Schwendemann, however, has found that in the 
period between late January and late April 1945, when East Prussia was eventually overrun by 
Soviet troops, the transport of refugees was only of minor importance to the Kriegsmarine.87 
Many documents show that during these months the army had absolute priority.88 For example, 
on 22 January Großadmiral Dönitz informed Hitler that ‘since the transportation of divisions 
and the supply of Army Group Courland, which without replenishment would come to a 
standstill in no time, must necessarily take precedence, nothing remains but to dispense with 
the evacuation of refugees.’89 On 28 January he reiterated that ‘the refugee transports by sea 
can be carried out only as far as they do not hamper the transportation of combat troops to and 
from Kurland and Norway, two areas that were still occupied by German forces.’90 Not only 
did the evacuation of civilians receive the least priority, which meant that hardly any resources 
were allocated to it, but also from the moment the Soviet offensive commenced the army 
repeatedly pushed for a Führer-order to forbid the ‘manifold hectic evacuations’, which, in 
their eyes, only ‘jeopardised military operations’.91   
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This meant that most of the refugees from Königsberg were stranded in Pillau. After 
the departure of the Party leadership from Konigsberg, Pillau had become the domain of the 
Party.  The town, with a pre-war population of 10,000 could not cope with the tens of thousands 
of refugees who arrived there and steadily swelled to 50,000 by mid-February.92 In this period, 
Gauleiter Koch organised a ‘Gauleiteraktion zur Erhöhung der Lebensbilanz’ (Gauleiter 
campaign for the increase of living standards) in Pillau, although the results were limited.93 
When asked by his long-standing subordinate, Waldemar Magunia, why he had chosen to stay 
behind in Pillau, rather than to return to Königsberg, Koch explained that his presence at the 
port town allowed him to more effectively oversee the evacuation of East Prussia’s 
population.94 Although this conveniently meant that he was kept away from the front line, 
during the last months of Koch’s rule, his focus would indeed remain on the evacuation 
question, rather than on the defence of East Prussia. In Berlin, he started lobbying – without 
success – for additional shipping space for refugees.95 Karl Friedrich, a representative of 
Gauleiter Koch later wrote that ‘The disastrous situation around Danzig and Gotenhafen meant 
that for weeks no ship even came to Pillau. Even the few ships that brought cargo (war materiel 
and food) to Pillau, were not allowed to take any refugees on board and had to leave Pillau 
empty.’96 In the light of the armed forces’ priorities, all Koch’s efforts to secure additional 
cargo space for refugees were thus doomed to fail from the start.  
It is here that one of the key concepts of the National Socialist regime manifests itself: 
its ‘cumulative radicalisation’, a term coined by Hans Mommsen. ‘Cumulative radicalisation’ 
emerged as the most convincing answer to the intentionalist-functionalist debate about the 
origins and implementation of the Holocaust. The initial intentionalist approach to the 
Holocaust suggested that a masterplan for the destruction of the European Jewry was already 
in place in the 1920s, and could be executed from the moment Nazi-Germany had taken control 
of Europe. Functionalists considered this approach too linear, and instead interpreted the 
Holocaust as a series of initiatives emerging from different organisations, who, encouraged by 
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the Nazi elite, set out policies depending on the arising opportunities. The theory of cumulative 
radicalisation sought to bring the two theories together by restoring agency to a multitude of 
actors, proposing that ‘the outwardly conjured unity to strengthen the political will nurtured 
the rivalry of those officials seeking expansion of their competencies and extension of their 
power.’97 In 2004, Donald Bloxham and Tony Kushner argued that ‘cumulative radicalisation’ 
should be viewed as a ‘momentum built up in a partly self-selecting, partly self-driven Jewish 
policy underpinned by a general racist consensus’, and the former would later expand on this 
by applying it to the Armenian Genocide as well.98 Judging by the way emerging issues were 
approached over refugees in East Prussia, it appears that the momentum Bloxham and Kushner 
recognised within ‘cumulative radicalisation’ could outgrow its Holocaust setting, as Party and 
Wehrmacht resorted to similar interactions to those earlier employed. In 1945, this meant that 
if the Party wanted to maintain its influence over issues concerning domestic defence, it would 
have to follow the hard line that the Wehrmacht was taking. As the Wehrmacht pushed even 
further, the Party emphasised the regime’s teachings as a ‘defence mechanism’ to validate its 
position. We will firstly examine how this way of thinking manifested itself on national level, 
before we turn to East Prussia. 
In mid-February, Reichsleiter Bormann passed a circular to the Gauleiters, showing his 
agreement with the measures that had so far been taken by the military in Eastern Germany. If 
anything, he implied that the measures to limit evacuation were not far-reaching enough. Large-
scale evacuation as a result of the Allied offensive in the west, he foresaw, ‘would meet in the 
Reich interior the stream of fugitives from the East, thus hampering military and civilian 
movements.’ Therefore ‘even women and children [are] to remain, but noboday capable of 
working for the Allies [is] to be left. Elements of the population remaining behind [are] no 
longer to be regarded as traitors.’99 As a result of these measures, by February 1945, 80,000 
East Prussian civilians were already in Soviet hands, according to estimates of Königsberg’s 
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fortress command.100 Meanwhile, in early March, when the refugee crisis in East Prussia was 
at its height, Dönitz once again stressed that ‘Assuring the control of [sea] ways, maintaining 
maritime transports, and the support of land fronts by naval artillery remain our most important 
tasks in the Baltic Sea, the fulfilment of which must be striven for with all available means.’101   
The effects of these decisions can clearly be seen in Pillau. The man responsible for the 
evacuation of the port was Deputy RVK Dr. Bruno Dzubba, who, despite his earlier role in the 
evacuations of Memel, Tilsit and Zichenau, was poorly regarded, but whose views seemed to 
correspond much closer to those of the army than to his immediate superior, Gauleiter Koch.102 
Louis Clappier, a former French prisoner of war, in an authoritative novel that he based on his 
personal experiences and recollections of others, typified Dzubba’s attitude towards refugees 
as follows: ‘Refugees are people, who don’t want to fight (…) Refugees are people that want 
to flee at all costs, because they fear cannons or Russians. For this kind of people there is no 
urgent interest. They are to be got rid of, so that the battle area does not clog because of an 
unnecessary accumulation of civilians.’103 Throughout February, March and April, the care for 
the refugees in Pillau thus remained poor, even though the refugee crisis grew ever more 
pressing. Here were see evidence of the sort of ‘cumulative radicalisation’ Mommsen referred 
to as Party interests converged with those of the military. 
This section’s focus on how the refugees became victims of military strategy seems to 
imply that there was a general mind set among the top ranks of the Wehrmacht to conduct, 
what Schwendemann calls, a ‘war against its own population’ in order to continue the fight.104 
Viewing these orders as part of a war against their own population, however, risks distracting 
attention from those who they had actually waged a war against: the populations of occupied 
Europe, especially the Soviet Union. What can be established, however, is that commanders 
used the concept of strategy in a strictly utilitarian fashion. For all intents and purposes these 
men were morally numbed, and ‘sound’ operational conduct trumped humanitarian 
considerations. The behaviour of commanders was not rooted in resigned ‘self-
destructiveness’, as Schwendemann proposes, but appears as a navigation between their 
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allegiance to Germany and their oath to Hitler on one the hand, and the need for self-
preservation and their loyalty to their troops on the other hand. These considerations were 
unconcerned with civilians. This section also reveals that the behaviour of Party members in 
Germany in 1945 might partly be explained by the fact that many of them felt that they had to 
come into line with military necessities. The solutions that were favoured became increasingly 
radical in nature, which ended in a deliberate choice to rank the needs of civilians ever lower. 
To explore these considerations further, the next section will therefore examine how the 
evacuation in Königsberg was organised, and which considerations lay it its core.   
 
IV. Evacuation policy in Königsberg  
 
Examining the way that the evacuation from Festung Königsberg was carried out can teach us 
a lot about what transpired in 1945. Firstly, with the Wehrmacht and Party both assuming 
prominent roles in the city (with the Wehrmacht taking over control of parts of local 
government and the Party adopting more military tasks), we can measure the effects of 
‘cumulative radicalisation’ in Königsberg’s evacuation measures. Secondly, a study of the 
city’s evacuation can help us to understand the military imperatives that drove General Lasch 
as well as the relationship between the wider fortress authorities and the local population. 
The evacuation process under examination here needs some brief clarification. During 
the January offensive, the different Soviet armies had lost a significant part of their manpower 
and materiel, and in early February their commanders convinced the Front command of the 
immediate importance of regrouping and replenishing their exhausted units.105 They therefore 
strengthened their positions around the city and held a tight grip on it, but, on the other hand, 
did not launch any sustained attacks on German positions. Since Königsberg was virtually 
completely encircled during this period, evacuation could only take place by ship, using the 
sea lane between Königsberg and Pillau. Soviet artillery was positioned on the coast and could 
target these ships, which meant that they could only sail at night, so the number of evacuees 
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during this period was low.106 It is thus more worth-while to examine the period when the 
fortress command had the means at its disposal to organise a more effective the evacuation. 
Therefore, the starting point of this section is ‘Opertion Westwind’, the German military 
operation that would come to define Königsberg’s fortress era. The aim of the operation was 
to restore the lost link between Königsberg and Pillau. The operation had been planned from 
the moment the link was lost in late January, was supported by the Kriegsmarine, and 
commenced on 19 February, when three divisions attacked from the area around Pillau 
eastwards, while three divisions attacked westwards from Königsberg. 107 A day later the units 
linked up, and on 25 February the area was secure enough to restart the rail link between 
Königsberg and Pillau.108 In his memoirs, General Lasch claimed that Operation Westwind 
sought ‘to create the opportunity to transport away large parts of the clustered civilian 
population,’ and get new supplies in, although an extensive report on the goals of Army Group 
North, sent one week after the start of Operation Westwind, does not refer to the care for 
civilians.109 We will therefore examine to what extent the operation benefited the civilian 
population, and how, in the period that followed, the authorities used the opportunities created 
by the operation to ensure the civilians’ evacuation from the area. 
On 17 February 1945, General Hans Gollnick, the commander of the ‘Samland Group’ 
(under which Festung Königsberg fell at the time) ordered Lasch to assign the 1st infantry 
division and parts of the 5th Panzer division to Operation Westwind.110 Lasch, however, 
decided to commit significantly more troops to the operation. He would deploy the entire 1st 
infantry division, the entire 5th Panzer division, as well as the 561st Volksgrenadier division, 
leaving only two divisions, the 367th and 69th infantry division, to defend the city. This 
decision met with opposition from his superiors, as it left the fortress dangerously exposed, but 
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the General willingly accepted responsibility in case of failure.111 His initiative was criticised 
by his army colleagues, even though it would contribute significantly to the eventual success 
of the operation.112 
What factors determined Lasch’s decision to commit three divisions and, as such, 
disregard the wishes of his superior? Most likely, a commander’s concern for the welfare of 
his troops would have weighed heavily on his mind. Lasch, in particular, was a deeply 
paternalistic officer. Generaloberst Erhard Raus, under whom Lasch served half a year earlier, 
wrote in an assessment that Lasch was a ‘very good officer who knew how to quickly transform 
his newly established division into a solid unit. However, [Lasch] sometimes puts the interests 
of his troops too much in the foreground.’113 Moreover, Lasch, like most commanders, felt that 
the defence of Königsberg could only end in the garrison’s capture by Soviet troops. He, on 
the other hand, was one of the Wehrmacht’s experts with regard to the break-out out from 
pockets. A year earlier, he had broken out of the Brody pocket in western Ukraine, bringing 
his troops back to a safe line.114 What was more, something similar had been undertaken in late 
January 1945, three weeks before Operation Westwind, by the commander of the Fourth Army, 
General Friedrich Hoßbach. On 23 January Soviet troops reached the Frische Haff near Elbing, 
which meant that the German troops east of it were cut off. Hoßbach knew that being encircled 
made supplying his Army a considerably harder challenge, and therefore wanted to restore a 
connection with the main German lines. Without consulting the OKH, the General thus started 
to prepare a break-out westwards, but when the news of his attempted break-out came out, the 
commander was sacked.115 Lasch thus knew that he could not abandon the city, but he was 
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keen to open a route to Pillau. But such an operation risked leaving Königsberg’s entire 
population exposed.116  
 To understand the enormous danger Lasch put Königsberg’s population in, we should 
address the city’s topography. Königsberg was cut into a northern and a southern half by the 
river Pregel. The southern half was almost completely encircled by Soviet troops, so German 
units there had considerably less opportunity to retreat, since they would have to cross the 
Pregel to get to safety. Lasch left the defence of southern Königsberg to the battle-worn 69th 
infantry division, which he ‘bolstered’ with inferior Volkssturm and police units. The north 
connected to the Samland, and it was from there that the operation was launched westwards. It 
was also there that Lasch placed the 367th infantry division, the strongest remaining formation 
in the city. Had Königsberg been attacked by Soviet forces in response to Operation Westwind, 
it is likely to have fallen almost immediately, given the limited forces left to defend it.117 As 
General Lasch was fully aware of the danger he put the city in, he clearly did not have the 
safety of the population as uppermost in his mind.118 Indeed, his depiction of Operation 
Westwind as a conscious attempt to secure the safety of civilians trapped in the city is a 
travesty. 
What, then, transpired between 25 February and early April, when Königsberg was 
eventually stormed by Soviet forces? What first needs to be stressed is that in their treatment 
of civilians Königsberg’s fortress command and East Prussia’s Party elite should not be seen 
as isolated actors, since the OKW was well-aware of the situation in the province. Officials in 
East Prussia did not operate in a vacuum, and were dependent on decisions taken higher up the 
chain of command, as we saw in the previous section. Around 20 February 1945, a report was 
discussed at the OKW, which addressed East Prussia’s refugee crisis. Some 2.3 million 
inhabitants were said to have been living in the province when the Soviet invasion commenced, 
many of whom were displaced by the time the report was compiled. Estimates of their 
whereabouts showed the following numbers: 320,000 in the Danzig area; 500,000 in 
Pomerania; 200,000 in Saxony; 140,000 in Mecklenburg; 100,000 in Schleswig-Holstein; and 
100,000 in other parts of the Reich. This totalled approximately 1,400,000 inhabitants. The 
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report stated that ‘of the residual 900,000, around 500,000 serve in the Wehrmacht, 
Volkssturm, and so on. The final 400,000 inhabitants still have to be evacuated from East 
Prussia. 135,000 of them are in Königsberg, 200,000 in the Heiligenbeil Pocket, 40,000 on the 
Samland peninsula.’119 The OKW estimated that the evacuation of these 400,000 people would 
take fourteen days.  
Days after the recapture of the southern Samland, Gauleiter Koch dispatched ten 
Kreisleiters to the city to once again take over the civilian administration, much to the 
frustration of the Wehrmacht commanders.120 The Party started pushing for evacuation, but 
with little means at its disposal it would require the help of the Wehrmacht.121 Although the 
army eventually took the credit, there is little evidence to suggest that the fortress command 
devoted sustained attention to the evacuation of Königsberg’s civilian population.122 
Theoretically, Königsberg’s evacuees were to be brought to the port of Pillau, from where they 
could be transported to the west. Indeed, on 26 February, shortly after Operation Westwind, 
the evacuation of Königsberg began with the evacuation of 14,000 inhabitants, and the 
following day another 17,000 were evacuated from the city, which highlights that the means – 
most importantly ships’ cargo space – were made available to the fortress command.123 In 
Pillau, however, there was insufficient space to house the refugees. To accommodate them, 
four transit camps were set up on the western Samland, in the villages of Peyse, Fischhausen, 
Neuhäuser and Rauschen. In practice, this meant that, rather than leaving the province, 
evacuees were unceremoniously dumped into an administrative no-man’s land between Pillau 
and Königsberg. The camps soon started to become overcrowded since they could not absorb 
the massive number of refugees, not only from Königsberg, but also from the Heiligenbeil 
Pocket. Hunger became rampant as a result of the complete neglect to organise the provision 
of food, and it did not take long for epidemics to break out. A medical commission despatched 
to the camps warned that if the hygiene did not improve immediately, the camps would see ‘a 
mass mortality of women and children.’124 Dysentery duly broke out, and caused many deaths, 
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and only the late arrival of doctors managed to contain the epidemic from spreading further.125 
Conditions grew so bad that several thousand refugees prepared to go on a ‘hunger march’ to 
Königsberg as a way of protest. Meanwhile, none of the prominent Party-members dared to 
visit the camps as they feared they could be attacked by an angry mob. Instead, lower-ranking 
Party officials were dispatched to talk to the evacuees.126 As these men were poorly informed 
about the situation at hand, they were of little use in aiding the refugees. 
According to Oberfeldarzt Dr. Paul Schroeder, a medical liaison officer to the fortress 
staff, many thousands actually flooded back from the camps to Königsberg when the situation 
became unbearable.127 General Lasch confirmed that ‘before long, the women that were 
accommodated there showed up to me with their children and prams and asked me, wringing 
their hands, to allow them back in their houses and lodgings, since they at least had something 
to eat there.’128 Lasch, reluctant to inform the returnees about the true state of the defence, but 
eager to point to the shortcomings of the Party, allowed most of them back in. Gerhardt 
Kretschmer described the atmosphere in the fortress command: ‘Everyone discreetly cursed 
the Gauleiter, who was supposedly somewhere in Pillau (…), not taking care [of the 
population] at all; yet no one stuck his hands out themselves even the slightest.’129 Yet the poor 
evacuation of civilians stood in stark contrast to that of wounded soldiers. Throughout late 
February, March, and early April, commanders in East Prussia would continue to put their men 
first. On the morning of 6 April, just hours before the anticipated final storming of Königsberg, 
Lasch ordered a train with 10,000 slightly wounded troops to leave the city.130 These troops 
were part of a contingent over 150,000 soldiers who, after being wounded, were evacuated out 
of East Prussia to the west by well-organised transports; a measure which, as Schwendemann 
found, served to maintain battle morale.131 Moreover, during the same period, Army Group 
North successfully pushed for the transfer of troops out of East Prussia.132 
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After the war, men like Lasch maintained that they could do little but follow orders.133 
However, the worsening military situation did not necessarily mean that the hands of army 
commanders were tied. As there was an appreciation of the situation on the ground at the OKH 
and OKW, commanders were given the flexibility to make decisions based on their own 
discretion. But they constantly subordinated civilian concerns to those of the military. Shortly 
after the conflict, Landrat Klaus von der Groeben remembered that ‘We negotiated with the 
various departments (…) for sufficient transport possibilities and the construction of a pontoon 
bridge over the Pillauer Tief. The commander of Pillau considered it important that some 
precaution was taken, but vigorously opposed the idea that Pillau could be used as a passage 
for refugees at all.’134 A 500-metre pontoon bridge from Pillau to the Frische Nehrung would 
have provided a road from Königsberg to Danzig that refugees could pass on foot. Yet, as it 
hampered the supply to the Heiligenbeil Pocket, the plan never materialised. Furthermore, 
although it is hard to quantify, the unwillingness of both Wehrmacht and Party to overcome 
petty quarrels also had a detrimental effect on the evacuation. On the Frische Nehrung, for 
example, where the command structure was unclear, the deployment of police units led to 
arguments as to who was accountable. Gauleiter Koch stressed that, since their job was to assist 
in the evacuation of civilians, these men should be subordinated to him. On the other hand, 
General von Natzmer, the commander of Army Group North, considered the deployment area 
to be the main factor in determining their place in the command structure, in which case they 
were under the authority of the army. The deputy Höhere SS und Polizeiführer Nordost, Otto 
Hellwig, eventually sided with the army, but not before voicing his discontent in two reports 
about the state of affairs, one of them to Himmler himself.135 Thus, the success of the combined 
effort did not merely rested on the availability of resources; their poor deployment, resulting 
from local feuds fought out over the heads of the civilian population, severely hampered both 
East Prussia’s evacuation and its defence. 
The poor attitude of commanders and Party officials in East Prussia towards evacuation 
determined the behaviour of Königsberg’s civilian population. Some twenty daily situational 
reports, written by officials of the Königsberg-based SS-Oberabschnitt Nordost to Reichsführer 
SS Himmler between 15 February and 23 March 1945, have survived and make it abundantly 
clear that the population widely opposed evacuation. On 21 February it was noted that ‘The 
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population generally refuses to be evacuated, because Konigsberg is considered as safe. 
Moreover, people believe that presently nothing can happen [to them], since many of those 
[officials] who left Königsberg during the critical days have returned.’136 Stories about the 
sinking of the liners Wilhelm Gustloff and Steuben, two of the biggest naval disasters in history, 
made people wary of travel by sea.137 ‘Meanwhile,’ Karl Friedrich remembered, ‘news about 
the conditions in Pillau had spread in Konigsberg, so several transports left Königsberg empty 
or only half full.’138 Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, the living conditions in 
Königsberg were considerably better than on the Samland. On 4 March, for example, only 
4,000 of the 16,000 people showed up to be evacuated.139 Also, as the war progressed, more 
and more reception areas were in immediate danger of being threatened by the western Allies, 
while in early March the Volksgruppenführer in Denmark, Jens Möller, advised against 
housing refugees in Denmark, since ‘for the German refugees a forced quarter at Danish 
families is significantly worse than the most primitive mass accommodation in collective 
accommodations.’140 
People who were earmarked for evacuation sometimes hid for days so as not to be 
evacuated. The pleas of Party officials fell to deaf ears. Evacuation staffs often faced heavy 
resistance and had to use force to get the people to move out of their lodgings, making the Party 
even more unpopular.141 Indeed, the reports suggest that the fortress command took only took 
evacuation seriously between 24 February and 10 March, after which it was ‘postponed until 
further notice’ due to ‘technical issues’.142 Meanwhile, the atmosphere at the Königsberg’s 
Party headquarters became increasingly isolated.143 The majority of the brought-in Party 
members, who had already cared little about evacuation in late January, resorted to an ostrich-
like policy and, according to Wegener, held feasts that included loose women and high-quality 
                                                          
136 BArch NS 19/2068, 19. An Reichsführer-SS Feldkommandostelle Betrifft: Meldungen aus dem 
Ostraum, Königsberg 21.2.45. 
137 Schön, Ostseehafen, 169-70; On the sinking of the Steuben, see: Schön, Ostsee ´45, 261-309. 
138 BArch Ost-Dok. 8/508: Karl Friedrich, Beauftragter des Reichsverteidigungskommissars Ostpreußen, 
7. 
139 BArch NS 19/2068, 47. An Reichsführer-SS Feldkommandostelle Betrifft: Meldungen aus dem 
Ostraum, Königsberg 4.3.45. 
140 BArch RW 4/705 – Osten Operationsgebiet Reich, allgem. Schriftverkehr Febr. April 1945 
Befehlsreglung im Osten des Reichsgebietes, Jan. 1945.  
141 BArch NS 19/2068, 47. An Reichsführer-SS Feldkommandostelle Betrifft: Meldungen aus dem 
Ostraum, Königsberg 4.3.45; Hensel, Medizin in und aus Ostpreußen, 72.  
142 BArch NS 19/2068, 60. An Reichsführer-SS Feldkommandostelle Betrifft: Meldungen aus dem 
Ostraum, Königsberg 10.3.45. 
143 Hensel, Medizin in und aus Ostpreußen, 72. 
134 
 
food, employing their own winemaker, chef and butlers.144 As March progressed, fewer and 
fewer Party officials bothered to devote any attention to Königsberg’s evacuation. The 
insouciance of Party officials, and the unwillingness of the Army to discuss the issue, reveals 
that no one in the fortress command felt the need to evacuate any further inhabitants. There 
was the belief that evacuees would be going from the ‘frying pan into the fire’, and there seems 
to have been no willingness to challenge this assumption. Moreover, as virtually all local men 
were ordered to assume defensive roles in Königsberg, most families had to make the decision 
whether or not to stay together.145 For example, the family of Irene Schumacher weighed up 
the options of staying behind against the possibility of being captured by the Soviets: ‘My 
father had never been in the Party. Through documents it could be proven that he had been 
dismissed in 1934 as a teacher, because he had turned against the Hitler regime. The Russians 
would also recognize this.’146 Such calculations fit into a largely forgotten undercurrent in 
wartime German society, namely that at the time there were Germans who believed ‘that the 
Russians are not that bad,’ and simply hoped the war to be over as soon as possible.147 Many 
families of Volkssturm men and regular troops decided to stay at the side of their husbands or 
fathers and take their chances.148  
This leaves the question of how many German civilians remained in Königsberg by the 
time of the final storming in early April. Some forty sources, compiled either during the siege 
or shortly after the war by prominent figures, indicate that by the end of January 1945 the 
number stood at 200,000, decreased during February and early March, but increased again in 
the latter half of March, so that directly prior to final assault some 100,000 civilians were left 
behind in the city.149 These civilians lived primarily in the neighbourhoods of Juditten, 
Amalienau, Speicherdorf, Balleith, Rosenau, Ponarth, Kalthof and Lauth, which were mostly 
Königsberg’s suburbs.150 There was also possibly a further hidden element. Oberfeldartzt Dr. 
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Paul Schroeder noted that many returning refugees from the Samland ‘did not seek to get ration 
cards, because they did not want to become registered, be it for digging trenches, for the 
Volkssturm, or other tasks.’ 151 He thus estimated that around a third of the remaining 
population (which he put at approximately 130,000) went into hiding until after the storming 
in early April.152 These people had to survive in conditions reminiscent to those of cave-
dwellers.153 
From a humanitarian standpoint, the evacuation of Königsberg can only be considered 
a failure. Many thousands of people remained in the besieged city, even though many of these 
people could have been evacuated during February and March 1945. However, viewing the 
evacuation measures purely through this lens misses the point, since for the fortress command 
this was not the main issue at all. In 1945 the chain of command rapidly eroded in the face of 
military events and prevented its effective control over its areas of operation - a process known 
as the ‘atomisation’ of warfare.154 This fractured state encouraged military commanders like 
Lasch increasingly to act according at their own discretion. Their loyalty seemed to have 
primarily remained with the troops they had commanded throughout the war. Indeed, assuring 
that his men would live to see the end of a war had always been part of the unwritten 
understanding between a general and his troops, and with the end of the war only weeks away 
there was little reason to divert from this ethos in the spring of 1945. The choices that Lasch 
made in preparation for Operation Westwind showed the danger he was willing to expose 
civilians to, but the priorities of the Wehrmacht and Party became even clearer in the six weeks 
that followed. There was little concrete action taken in regard to the evacuation question, and 
the refugee camps that were established on the Samland received only marginal attention. The 
‘cumulative radicalisation’ translated into a reluctance to allocate resources to the matter, 
which led to negligence and, eventually, to a resigned attitude among both parties. Can the 
stance of the fortress command be considered a continuation of the mentality created by the 
implementation of the different ‘criminal orders’ (‘verbrecherische Befehle’) on the Eastern 
Front? During the final storming of Königsberg civilians found themselves caught between 
belligerents in a heavily fought-over city war zone. The next section will examine up to what 
point the fortress command could have stepped in to assure the safety of the population, thereby 
                                                          
151 Starlinger, Grenzen der Sowjetmacht, 41.  
152 Ibid., 42. 
153 Rudolf Naujok “Das Mädchen von Königsberg,“, Ostpreußen-Warte, June 1958, 10. 
154 Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, 96.  
136 
 
probing commanders’ readiness to expose Königsberg’s civilians to the violence of the 
battlefield.  
 
VI. The inability to surrender 
 
By the beginning of April, the fortress command was well aware that the final storming was 
only days away.155 In his memoirs, Lasch stated that few officers, not even himself, cherished 
any hope that the assault could be fended off.156 The OKH, however, made it clear that 
Königsberg was to be held ‘under all circumstances’.157 For three days, from 3 April to 5 April, 
the Soviet artillery conducted a preliminary bombardment, and on 6 April the actual storming 
commenced. The Eleventh Guards Army attacked from the south, the Forty-third and Fiftieth 
Army attacked from the north and east. West of the city, the Thirty-ninth army cut the 
connection between Königsberg and the Samland. In the early afternoon of 8 April troops of 
the Forty-third and Eleventh Guards Army met in the Amalienau suburb west of the city centre, 
completing the encirclement. On the night of 9 to 10 April, General Lasch surrendered the 
fortress.158 On 10 April, the report of the OKH concluded that ‘the overall impression (final 
radio messages from the fortress, aerial reconnaissance, enemy reports) is that the garrison of 
Königsberg, after brave battles in the rubble of the burning city, has been defeated by the 
onslaught of three Armies.’159 Those last radio messages, some wired by Lasch himself, indeed 
tell a story of a ‘heroic defence’, but also tell another story: ‘Due to aerial bombardment and 
constant artillery shelling the entire city is as good as destroyed.  As a result of personnel and 
material losses the battle strength of the troops has been strongly reduced. High casualty 
numbers among the civilian population.’160 This section will focus on how these people died, 
and why their deaths should be seen as the result of the army’s preparedness to fight – quite 
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literally – to the last bullet. It will also assess if the Fortress Command was criminally 
negligent.161  
First, we will examine some of the alternatives, and establish whether these were 
executable, which we will do by comparing Königsberg to other fortresses. Peter Lieb has 
found that commanders of some of the encircled fortresses in France in 1944 established 
contact with their Allied besiegers to organise the evacuation of French civilians, which in 
some cases was successful. Although Lieb rightly questioned to what extent this was done on 
humanitarian grounds, it was already more than Königsberg’s fortress command was willing 
to consider.162 General Lasch – like every fortress commander in Eastern Germany – 
categorically refused to parley with the Soviets, as he fully expected Soviet troops to act 
barbarously. Moreover, as we have seen, he had actively sought to create a polarising 
atmosphere that ruled out any contact between the two belligerents. Also, a distrust in the 
population’s willingness to keep fighting, which will be discussed extensively in Chapter 4, 
certainly was a factor. In Aachen, for example, war-weary German civilians guided Allied 
forces to hide-outs and had betrayed the location of German positions, much to the dismay of 
the city’s commander.163  Closer to Königsberg, in mid-January, Soviet forces had shelled 
positions on the Deime river at Labiau after these had been disclosed by civilians.164 As 
civilians were closely involved in the defence of Königsberg, there was no doubt that, were 
they to fall in Soviet hands, Soviet intelligence would be able to extract information from them, 
which would have impeded the city’s defensibility.  
 Another option was surrender. Contrary to what is often thought, it was Königsberg’s 
Party elite that was the first to a call for a cessation of the fighting. As soon as the fighting had 
begun on 6 April, Deputy Gauleiter Großherr proposed to Gauleiter Koch that Königsberg 
should be declared an open city, and that a new front be established to the north.165 A day later, 
on 7 April, Kreisleiter Wagner also called on Koch to demand that the fighting cease in 
Königsberg. This conversation was overheard by Oberstabsinterdant Friedrich Dorfmüller: 
‘Tell your friend – he probably meant the Führer – that the troops have fought heroically, in 
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Königsberg is achieved what was humanly possible. It would be madness and a crime against 
the civilian population to continue to fight.’166 Koch, however, had no intention to ask for a 
surrender. But, in any case, this would have met with strong opposition from the army; another 
indiction of ‘cumulative radicalisation’. Indeed, whereas throughout 1943 and 1944 a number 
of prominent foreign cities – Rome, Florence, Athens and Paris – had been declared open cities, 
either on the initiative of their commanders or with the full knowledge of Hitler, in late 1944, 
Himmler proclaimed that ‘No German city will be declared an open city. Every town and every 
village will be defended at all costs.’167 Königsberg’s fortress command adhered to this maxim 
without question.  
Why was the army so unwilling to capitulate without a fight? In the early 1990s, the 
social historian, Erhard Lucas-Busemann, analysed the fall of Königsberg and Breslau, where 
he explicitly addressed the ‘incapability to capitulate’ of the two fortress commanders.168 It 
foreshadowed a debate that would define the second half of the 1990s: that of the complicity 
of the Wehrmacht in Germany’s war of annihilation. Lucas-Busemann pointed to the 
commanders’ familiarity with the Barbarossa-Erlass, the Kommissarbefehl, the Richtlinien für 
das Verhalten der Truppe in Rußland, as well as the cooperation between Wehrmacht and SS 
behind the front.169 As Lasch’s regiment had been present in July 1941, when the infamous 
Riga pogrom commenced,  while later his 217th infantry division had encircled Leningrad, it 
would be impossible to maintain that he had not been actively been complicit in crimes against 
humanity on the Eastern Front, or that he had no knowledge of the war’s genocidal aspects.170 
These factors certainly were important in Lasch’s inner circle, but, especially since he 
maintained that he belived he had done nothing wrong while in the Soviet Union, they can only 
provide a part of the reason why Königsberg’s fortress command fought on for four days before 
it finally decided to surrender.171  
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For the German army, honour was at stake. What the OKW seemed to have grasped 
very well was that surrender, in the first place, was a personal decision. It is therefore 
unsurprising  that in the current historiography personal and psychological factors are 
emphasised in surrender, rather than purely military considerations.172 The German army had 
sought to connect surrender to dishonour as early as the fall of France in the spring of 1940, 
when – as a final humiliation – the French army was forced to accept Germany’s armistice 
terms at the exact spot near Compiègne and in the same railway carriage where Germany had 
been forced to do the same in 1918.173 By 1942 the tables had started to turn and from 1943 
onwards it was the German army that found itself surrendering. For example, the capitulation 
of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad in early 1943 was considered a national tragedy, and was 
followed by the establishment of the communist-led NKFD and BDO (Bund Deutscher 
Offiziere) under General Seydlitz and Field Marshal Paulus, acts that were perceived as a stain 
on the prestige of the Wehrmacht.174 By 1945 some commanders had decided to commit suicide 
rather than surrender unconditionally, with Field Marshal Walter Model choosing to shoot 
himself in a forest, rather than having to oversee the capitulation of his Army Group.175 In 
Königsberg, no commanders committed suicide, but surrendering a fortress, a ‘symbol of the 
nation’s unwavering willingness to fight’, ranked among the most dishonourable acts a general 
could contemplate.176 A surrender was deemed unworthy of the German military tradition. 
Indeed, on 7 February 1944, a month before the defence around fortresses was elevated to 
strategy, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel used a classic ‘fall-where-you-stand’-rhetoric to 
convey what he expected of commanders that had been entrusted with the defence of a city or 
area: ‘Capitulation, ceasing the resistance, evasion or retreat do not at apply to fortress- and 
battle commanders. The fate of the fortress- and battle commanders is connected with the area 
entrusted to him. Also the commander of a ship goes under with it with the flag in mast. The 
history of German soldiery has never known a different view.’ To show the seriousness of the 
order, the memorandum’s preamble pointed out that two commanders had already been 
executed after they had left their positions.177  
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Lasch could have been in no doubt about his duty to uphold the honour of the 
Wehrmacht. Being entrusted with the defence of a city like Königsberg (and the same goes for 
other fortresses) was a high point in a military career, and violating the trust of the men that 
had enabled this career tarnished that.178 On 8 April 1945, hours before communication broke 
down with the outside world, he received a telegram from General Müller, the commander of 
the Fourth Army, under which authority Festung Königsberg fell, stressing that Lasch’s 
officers’ honour bound him to hold Königsberg to the last bullet.179 This is most likely why in 
his memoirs, whilst he was keen to emphasise that he had decided to capitulate ‘to bring an 
end to the terror’ for the sake of the population, he also went to great lengths to show that when 
the surrender of Königsberg took place, the city had almost completely been overrun, except 
for some small isolated pockets of resistance.180 In the face of defeat, Lasch, like most 
commanders, did not subscribe to the idea of ‘dying with honour’ which Hitler had sought to 
instil among the troops.  
Indeed, the discrepancy between the string of orders envisaging a soldier dying ‘with a 
weapon in his hand’, and commanders’ resolve to base their decisions on the tactical situation, 
is indeed well-established in the literature.181 Königsberg was not the first fortress to surrender, 
and Lasch’s behaviour was in line with German military behaviour elsewhere. In September 
1944, for example, after Hitler’s initial protestations, Army Group North was evacuated from 
Estonia, so Festung Reval (Tallinn) and Festung Wesenburg (Rakvere) fell without a fight.182 
Famously, in August 1944 Festung Paris was surrendered without Hitler’s consent and against 
his explicit will.183 In East Prussia, both Festung Elbing, but more importantly Festung Lötzen, 
one of the cornerstones of the province’s defence, were left virtually undefended.184 As a result, 
by 1945 Hitler’s trust in army commanders had almost completely vanished in regard to the 
fortress strategy. On 26 March, he ordered that from then on only naval officers could be 
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appointed as fortress commanders, ‘since already many fortresses [have fallen], but still no 
ship has been lost without a fight to the end.’185 The order undoubtedly hurt the pride of the top 
ranks of the army, but it is unlikely that it led to more resolved fortress staffs.  
To further ‘encourage’ commanders to fight to the end, the practice of Sippenhaft, 
family liability punishment, was greatly expanded during the last year of the war: in cases such 
as surrender or desertion, a soldier’s family risked imprisonment on his behalf.186 This also 
weighed on Lasch’s mind. Army General Ivan Bagramyan observed that during interrogation 
of the captured German Generals, ‘The fortress commander looked particularly downcast and 
wretched. (…) We had learned from radio monitoring that the imbecile Führer had declared 
him a traitor for the surrender of the fortress and ordered the arrest of his family. Obviously, 
General Lasch was depressed by this.’187 The nature of an encircled fortress made it impossible 
for anyone outside of it to prevent its capitulation, but by systematically linking surrender to 
the breaking of trust and the military tradition, and to the threat of punishment of family 
members, the OKW nevertheless built in some ‘delaying factors’ in regard to a fortress’ 
surrender. 
A further consideration was the practical difficulty of assuring a surrender. The 
reputation of one of the best-understood signs of surrender, the white flag, had steadily 
diminished throughout the war.188 Probably the most infamous example took place on 29 
December 1944, when in two Budapest neighbourhoods two Soviet envoys, both carrying 
white flags, were killed, even though  their arrival at the German lines had been announced 
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well in advance.189 The OKW and OKH approached the matter by stressing that the 
international coverage of the shooting of the parleys was nothing but a ‘mendacious version of 
events’ that only sought to accuse the German army of breaching international law. To prevent 
this kind of negative press in the future, parleys would ‘no longer be received, but have to be 
sent back before reaching our lines.’190 In effect, this order made capitulation talks significantly 
harder to organise.  
There was similar pushback when Wehrmacht troops themselves considered the use of 
white flags, with some commanders even forbidding their men to prepare them.191 By 1945, 
even as the potential for surrender was obvious to everyone, sustained efforts were made to 
discourage troops from contemplating it. To prevent capitulation talks, Walter Model, the 
commander of Army Group B, in late March 1945 went as far as to order that ‘Manifestations 
of subversion and acts of sabotage at the command post, regardless whether the offender is a 
soldier or a civilian, are to be prevented by armed force.’192 Model’s portrayal of commanders 
willing to consider negotiations as offenders (Täter) symbolises the widespread dismissal and 
scepticism towards the practice. It should therefore be questioned whether Himmler’s infamous 
‘flag order’ of 3 April (‘When a white flag appears from a house, any male inside is to be shot’), 
which has generally been linked to the National-Socialist Durchhalte-terror, had any additional 
impact.193 Although in all likeliness army envoys in Königsberg were indeed fired on by Party 
members, the opposition to the use of a white flag was by then already widespread in the 
Wehrmacht. For example, Obergefreiter Sinzig, Oberst von Süsskind-Schwendi’s orderly, was 
only ordered to put up the white flag over General Lasch’s command post ‘once the first 
Russian machine gun fire coming from the Paradeplatz can be heard.’ Furthermore, Sinzig 
remembered that even though Lasch’s bunker lay directly under the Paradeplatz, which meant 
that Soviet troops were only dozens of metres away by the time the flag went up, there was still 
opposition to it from soldiers:   
There I see a little boy hop from funnel to funnel and suddenly the little fellow (I guess he is 16 or 
17 years old) is in front of me and points to the white flag that I had now hoisted and said: “What 
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kind of nonsense is this? Our comrades are out there, defending [sic] and bleeding to death, and you 
hoist the white flag here.” 194 
Indeed, this type of defiance meant that fighting went on long after the military situation had 
become hopeless. When on 8 April the city was cut off after the link-up between the Forty-
third and Eleventh Guards Army, Marshal Vasilevsky immediately ordered leaflets to be 
thrown over the city in order to persuade Lasch to surrender, but Lasch still refused to do so 
and continue to fight.195 That decision brought battle into the midst of the civilian population, 
where there was a fight ‘for houses and streets with extreme severity.’196 It is at this point that 
any of Lasch’s post-war assurances that he had taken into account  the safety of the population 
fall flat. The garrison’s self-propelled guns were so close to field hospitals that doctors had to 
ask them to move, so to respect the rules of the international Red Cross, while some of the 
German troops who passed through them meanwhile continued to fire on enemy combatants.197 
In his memoirs, Michael Wieck, one of the few ‘certified Jews’ (a ‘Geltungsjude’) that had 
remained in Königsberg by 1945, called Lasch out on this ‘discrepancy’: ‘Had you, General 
Lasch, really cared about the civilian population and the preservation of human life, like you 
claimed afterwards, you should have capitulated much earlier. Not only when the Russians 
were already at the Paradeplatz in front of your bunker, or near to it.’198  
General Lasch eventually decided to surrender on the morning of 9 April. By that time 
the garrison was almost out of ammunition, and only parts of the inner city were still in German 
hands.199 All contact with the outside world had been lost.200 Moreover, Lasch knew that the 
5th Panzer division, which had stayed behind on the Samland after ‘Operation Westwind’, 
would not attempt to relief the fortress’ garrison, while a final westward break-out attempt by 
troops north of the river Pregel had also failed. That attempt, conducted around midnight on 8-
9 April, was supposed to remain secret from the population, but word nevertheless got out, and 
as more and more civilians gathered near the area from which the attack was to be launched 
the element of surprise was lost. Soviet artillery started shelling the gathered masses, inflicting 
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a large number of casualties.201 This was another indictment of the negligence of the army and 
Party.  
The General, thus, fought on as long as it made any military sense, although – and this 
is where he broke with the National Socialist rhetoric – he had no intention to sacrifice his life, 
or those of his staff, in the process. Nevertheless, even in this dire situation, the call for 
surrender caused a backlash among some of the troops. In his memoirs, Lasch plays up the role 
of the SS, which wanted to continue the fight, but among other troops who wanted to continue 
were the staff of the 69th infantry division, which had retreated into the city in late January.202 
Such defiance was not unique in East Prussia. Perry Biddiscomble found that in mid-April, a 
week later, many of 5th Panzer Division’s officers, faced with depleted ammunition stocks and 
limited operational space, believed that ‘the division’s best bet would be to destroy its tanks 
and infiltrate southwards through Soviet lines in order to launch a partisan campaign, or 
perhaps to form small battle groups and independently march back to German lines.’ The 
division’s commander decided against it, and many of the troops subsequently mutinied.203 
Thus, the decision to (dis)continue a defence of Königsberg, rested significantly on local actors 
and circumstances, as indeed the research of Neitzel and Welzer has shown. For Königsberg’s 
fortress command, the decision to surrender came at the last possible moment. Yet, still thirty 
years after the war, the fortress’ chief of staff, Susskind-Schwendi felt the need to stress that 
what the fortress command effectively intended was ‘not a capitulation of the fortress. 
Konigsberg had already fallen. It was a surrender of the remaining troops.’204  
To arrange the surrender, envoys were dispatched from the different strongholds in 
order to make contact with Soviet troops.205 After a few hours, during which time the fighting 
continued, envoys sent by the commander of the Trommelplatz barracks, Oberstleutnant Bruno 
Kerwin, finally managed to reach Soviet lines. After initial contact had been established, 
Kerwin was summoned to a Soviet regimental headquarters, where he had to convince the 
commander of the sincerity of the message. Again, many hours passed. Eventually, he guided 
Soviet representatives through German lines, and in the late evening he arrived at Lasch’s 
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command post with the words ‘General, as ordered I have executed a soldier’s saddest task. 
Here is the Russian envoy.’206 Kerwin’s sentiments underline just how deep-seated the aversion 
to surrendering was within the army hierarchy. 
Finally, around 2 a.m. on 10 April the capitulation was signed.207 The terms of surrender 
offer a final glimpse into General Lasch’s motivations and concerns and leave no doubt that 
military considerations were of significantly more importance than the care for the population. 
None of the ten points listed in the document concerned Königsberg’s remaining civilians. 
Instead, the document opened with three points guaranteeing officer privileges: assuring that 
they could keep their blade weapons, an orderly, and their kit.208 Moreover, the document did 
not put an end to the fighting. Lasch stressed that ‘Eliminating remaining strongholds is the 
task of the Russian army’, and, as a result, isolated pockets, large enough to be seen by the 
Army Group reconnaissance air planes, kept fighting until days after the fortress’ 
capitulation.209 Eventually the fighting moved to the basements, which during the siege had 
been interconnected. As the capacity of the air-raid shelters built in the war was limited, many 
people had taken shelter in these basements. To clear them, Soviet soldiers used flamethrowers 
and grenades, further contributing to the civilian death toll.210 
Due to three days of preliminary bombardment, four days of heavy street fighting, 
combined with continuous artillery bombardment and aerial bombardment by 2,500 aircrafts, 
and the mopping up of isolated units in the days that followed the capitulation, the high civilian 
casualties in Königsberg are understandable. The more important question of why, despite the 
presence of a corridor to Pillau, so many civilians were still in the city by April, has 
nevertheless remained largely unaddressed. Even after it became clear that the final assault was 
only days away, the fortress command devoted little attention to the evacuation of the civilian 
population. Meanwhile, opportunities to come to some arrangement with the Soviets to spare 
civilian lives were spurned. The fortress command categorically refused to take civilian 
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considerations into account, did not declare Königsberg an open city, and rejected multiple 
possibilities to discuss the surrender of the garrison. The final capitulation still reveals no sign 
of empathy towards the remaining population. Therefore, we can only conclude that the 
Wehrmacht took a conscious decision to expose civilians to the violence of urban warfare. It 




If we are to analyse the Wehrmacht’s approach towards evacuation in 1944-45, we must first 
understand what evolved over the years before. On the Eastern Front, the concept of 
‘evacuation’ had been steadily hollowed out: when it concerned goods, it came to mean ‘theft’, 
and when it concerned people, it came to mean ‘displacement’. It was with this mindset that 
the Wehrmacht returned across the borders of Germany during the summer of 1944. During 
the final year of the war, it was the German population itself that was to be evacuated by its 
authorities. The series of evacuations that took place in East Prussia were prompted by the 
Soviet offensives, although care for the civilian population was of subordinate importance. The 
deployment of able-bodied civilians at the Ostwall, which we discussed in Chapter 1, has 
already illustrated this, but evacuation would eventually encompass the entire population of 
East Prussia. This chapter has shown that, for the Wehrmacht, evacuation measures remained, 
above all, concerned with the securing of goods, and in cases when evacuation did concern 
civilians, they were above all motivated by the need to clear an area of operations. In the 
evacuated areas soldiers displayed behaviour that had marked the previous years; 
indiscriminate destruction and plunder of German property was extremely common, and it did 
not take long for commanders to realise that the soldiers, brutalised by years of serving on the 
Eastern Front, exploited the domestic chaos in a similar fashion. These issues remained 
unresolved until the end of the war. 
 Whilst most commanders at the OKH and OKW knew that, after 1943, there was little 
chance to end the war in ‘final victory’, and, moreover, no coherent strategy existed to achieve 
that, they still did not champion large-scale evacuation measures that would ensure the safety 
of civilians. In anticipation of the Soviet offensive, only the evacuation of goods was 
considered in detail by the military. This, however, did not mean that the Wehrmacht left the 
evacuation of civilians solely to the Party. The evacuation of civilians was discussed on all 
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levels: both between the high command and the RVKs, as well as between individual divisions 
and the Kreisleiters of the areas in which they were situated. As long as the Wehrmacht was 
ensured manoeuvrability in the area of operations, it willingly followed the orders and requests 
of the Party. The chaos of the first weeks of the Soviet offensive in January 1945 – so often 
blamed on the Party and the Soviets – was therefore anticipated by the Wehrmacht. 
 Once the final Soviet offensive commenced in January 1945, RVKs lost most of their 
power, and local army commanders became finally responsible for East Prussia, but continued 
to disregard the plight of the population. As the behaviour of General Lasch shows, the misery 
of civilians was not merely the collateral damage of operational conduct. The main roads in 
East Prussia were closed to civilians, a measure that was ruthlessly enforced. Commanders also 
left the evacuation of civilians to the Party after the front had stabilised in late January, even 
though it was clear that the Party could not handle the developing refugee crisis. The 
Wehrmacht expressed no intention to come to the aid of the struggling Party authorities. At 
national level, the OKW and OKH ranked the evacuation as least important, and instead pushed 
for the transport of military materiel. To a certain extent, the choices for Königsberg’s fortress 
command were thus limited, but the sheer absense of attention to the local refugee question – 
especially the situation in the refugee camps on the Samland – is nevertheless striking. This 
should not necessarily be simply traced to the unwillingness of men like Lasch and Wagner; 
more likely, this mindset resulted from the indifference the matter caused as a result of the 
incapability to align the refugee question with the defence of the city.  Therefore, in the period 
between ‘Operation Westwind’ and the final storming of Königsberg in April 1945, neither 
Party nor Wehrmacht was willing to devote adequate resources to it. 
 Whereas in the summer of 1944 Party and Wehrmacht at least sought to form a 
coherent, albeit limited, evacuation policy, by the spring of 1945 neither concerned itself with 
the plight of the civilian population. This chapter has sought to explain this change through the 
lens of ‘cumulative radicalisation’. There had long been disputes between the Wehrmacht and 
the Party concerning the different overlapping authorities and responsibilities, both 
domestically and abroad. But rather than being a mitigating factor, upon their return from the 
Soviet Union the Wehrmacht brought with it an institutionalised disregard for civilians and 
their property as it returned from the Soviet Union, instead devoting all possible resources to 
fighting defensive battles. Party officials, in turn, believed that  they had no option but to follow 
suit.  By 1945, both Party and Wehrmacht had thus manoevred themselves into a position where 
148 
 
the only way to demonstrate their value was by focusing on Germany’s defence rather than 








So far, this thesis has mainly examined the indirect repercussions of the Wehrmacht’s presence 
in Germany. This final chapter will venture beyond these findings, and examine the role of the 
Wehrmacht in the direct violence during the final months of the National Socialist regime. We 
will analyse how the defence of Königsberg was organised, and will particularly focus on the 
role of violence against civilians as a means of coercion. In a recent examination of violence 
in late-war Germany, Sven Keller found that ‘violence not only affected its direct victims, but 
communicated unambiguous messages to others, displaying the sway and dominance of the 
new and social order that was to be.’1 Keller, like most historians, primarily explains the 
violence in 1945 as a continuation of the National Socialist culture of oppression and 
intimidation.2  By doing so, he seemingly ignores that the regime had lost its monopoly on 
violence, having to share it with the 10-million-strong Wehrmacht that was retreating further 
and further into Germany territory.3 
Once this is recognised, it opens the door to a new approach towards understanding the 
interaction between the German troops and Party officials on the one hand, and the civilians 
they were ordered to protect on the other. Examining the agendas of the different actors allows 
us to reconstruct their place within Königsberg’s society during the final months of the war. 
The year 1945 engendered a wave of German intra-ethnic violence that has largely been pinned 
on Nazi officials, and, to a lesser extent, on stubborn, indoctrinated troops. Challenging this 
means prying into an open wound, since the question of why Germans continued to fight in 
1945 tends to assign blame.4 Yet, as we have seen, given the diminishing reach of the state 
                                                          
1 Keller, “Volksgemeinschaft and Violence ,” 227.  
2 Keller, Volksgemeinschaft am Ende.  
3 Wette, Die Wehrmacht, 183. 
4 Bessel, Germany 1945, 3.  
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during the last year of the war, a top-down explanation seems inadequate to understand the 
scope of the violence. This chapter explores this hypothesis.  
 
I. The German soldier returns to Germany 
 
When, in mid-January 1945, the Soviet offensives into Germany commenced, the German 
military, for the first time since the Wars of Liberation in the early 1800s, had to conduct large-
scale operations in the midst of its own population.5 As a result of extensive research into the 
behaviour of the Wehrmacht abroad, the German soldier’s radicalised behaviour towards the 
foreign populations is beyond dispute.6 However, how the Weltanschauungskrieg affected his 
general outlook on civilian life as a whole, and how the underlying mindset manifested itself 
once back in Germany, has hardly been addressed. This section argues that the behavioural 
patterns that enabled troops to cope with the ‘everyday life of the war of annihilation’ (as ‘a 
sum of repression, exploitation, enslavement and the exposure to deadly situations’) did not 
disappear once the racial rationale fell away as they were pushed back into Germany.7 There 
were, moreover, unique conditions on the German home front, which allowed violent 
behaviour to be sustained into 1945. An interesting approach comes from Richard Jung, a 
German psychiatrist who already in 1961 argued that the particularly violent nature of the war 
on the Eastern Front, ‘coupled with the distance from home and the consequent paucity of 
leaves, [lessened] the chance of breakdowns among men too preoccupied with fighting for their 
lives, far from any reminders from home.’8 This begs the question what happened when they 
were fighting at home. By addressing some of the factors that were in play in 1945, this section 
provides a starting point for the understanding of the seemingly random and uncontrolled late-
war violence, although – to prevent writing a justification – we should be careful to draw too 
far-reaching conclusions from these findings.  
                                                          
5 As we already saw, the German army fought in East Prussia in the second half of 1914 and early 1915, 
but these operations were limited in nature. Moreover, the Russian incursion was unanticipated and the 
fighting was not placed within the wider context of fighting in the interior, but seen as an exception. See: 
Watson, Ring of Steel, 160-81. 
6 See: Hartmann, Hürter and Jureit, Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Bilanz einer Debatte.  
7 Christoph Rass, “Verbrecheriche Kriegsführung an der Front: Eine Infanteriedivision und ihre Soldaten,” 
in Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Bilanz eine Debatte, ed. Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter and Ulrike 
Jureit (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014), 89. 
8 Cocks, Psychotherapy in the Third Reich, 318. 
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Although Total War demanded ever-greater civilian energies to be devoted to the war 
effort, civilians and soldiers remained two distinct groups. Although within the Wehrmacht 
there were ‘overlapping convictions’, and recent research has found that most generals only 
had a superficial understanding of the Volksgemeinschaft, they fully allowed themselves to be 
integrated in the new German state and increasingly internalised its doctrines.9 This should 
always be kept in mind while examining the Wehrmacht, but to understand the friction between 
civilians and troops, it is nevertheless necessary to pay attention to the differences, rather than 
to the similarities. These should be respected, since a dissociation from civilian behaviour is a 
key aspect of military life, which is not at all unique to the German Wehrmacht. An analysis 
of recent sociological studies has found that many veterans – especially those who saw combat 
– have problems adapting to civilian life.10 Indeed, the inherent purpose of army training has 
long been to ‘break down the ties that bind young men to society at large’, while at the same 
time serving to create a new bond based on camaraderie.  
By the start of the Second World War, the German army could look back on a long 
tradition in this regard.11 Omer Bartov has shown the relative ease with which the working 
class was absorbed in the German army, turning members of the SPD and KPD alike into loyal 
soldiers.12 Likewise, Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer have recently argued that, rather than 
the National Socialist Weltanschauung, ‘the decisive factor in [the soldiers’] basal orientation 
– the way in which they perceived and interpreted events – were the military value system and 
the immediate social environment’, which hardened due to a long exposure to the violence of 
war.13 The wartime behaviour of United States’ marines towards Japanese soldiers and 
prisoners of war (including the infamous ‘skull-cooking’) indeed shows that brutalisation does 
not require a dictatorship or years of sustained political indoctrination.14 Many young German 
men even decided to join the army as a way to escape the oppressive nature of the National 
Socialist community.15 
                                                          
9 Johannes Hürter, “The Military Elite and the Volksgemeinschaft,” 266-67 
10 A. MacLean and G. H. Elder Jr., “Military Service in the Life Course,” Annual Review of Sociology 33, 
(2007): 175-196. These veterans showed increased levels of criminal behaviour and poorer socio-
economic development.  
11 Martin van Crefeld, The Culture of War (New York: Spellmount, 2009), 46-56. 
12 O. Bartov, “The Missing Years: German Workers, German Soldiers,” German History 8, no.1 (1990): 50-
57, 62-65. 
13 Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 317-18.  
14 Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 116-120.  
15 Thomas Kühne, Kameradschaft: Die Soldaten des nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhundert, 
Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 114. 
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 Rather than a National Socialist spirit, the wartime Wehrmacht was above all held 
together by an atmosphere of Kameradschaft (camaraderie), which was built around small core 
groups. It encouraged ‘real manly’ behaviour, which often translated into debauchery, drinking 
bouts, minor theft, and sexual escapades; all practices that were strongly condemned back in 
Germany, but widely accepted in the army. During times of stress on the battlefield, 
Kameradschaft proved to be resilient and, unsurprisingly, was not perceived as negative, since 
it held troops together and helped to maintain their staying power. However, it also encouraged 
units to focus their anger against a mutual enemy, and prompted them to react violently against 
threats to cut comradely ties.16 Soldiers constantly felt watched and judged by their comrades; 
‘hardness’ was the norm and showing signs of ‘softness’ was frowned upon.17 As such, 
Kameradschaft further deepened the wedge between the civilian population and the army.  
Moreover, during the years prior to 1945, German troops had adopted the modus 
operandi that the local population they interacted with – clearly distinguishable by its habits, 
behaviour, and language – could not be relied upon. Soviet civilians, in particular, were viewed 
with the deepest suspicion. This mistrust was not at all focused on men of fighting age: as early 
as September 1941 Rear Army Group Centre commander General Max von Schneckendorf 
instructed troops to pay sustained attention to ‘the elderly, women, and adolescents’, since he 
felt that partisans misused the fact that German troops tended to view these groups with less 
suspicion.18 Furthermore, from mid-1943 onwards, Germany’s allies – Italy, Rumania, 
Bulgaria, and Finland – capitulated and subsequently declared war on Germany, confirming 
the deep-routed distrust of German soldiers towards ‘outsiders’.19  
Yet, although it would be tempting to assume that German soldiers felt at ease once 
back in Germany, the troops’ behaviour in East Prussia revealed that they also questioned their 
compatriots’ reliability. The lack of trust resulted from the persistent repetition of the ‘stab in 
the back’ myth, one of the corner stones of German interwar self-assertion, which had stressed 
that the German army had not been defeated on the battlefield in 1918, but due to a perceived 
betrayal on the home front.20 Some of these sentiments were rekindled by German civilian 
behaviour. Increased levels of divorce and suicide directly impacted troops’ morale.21 War-
                                                          
16 Kühne, Kameradschaft, 113-71.  
17 Ibid., 131-35, 140-42 
18 Browning, “The Holocaust: Basis and Objective of the Volksgemeinschaft?”, 224. 
19 Evan Mawdsley, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945 (New York: Hodder Arnold, 2007), 
294, 342-45.  
20 Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare”, 550-54. 
21 Grunberger, A Social History of the Third Reich, 37; Christian Goeschel, Suicide in Nazi Germany (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 119-20. 
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weary remarks were heard from 1941 onwards and were widespread by 1943.22 By that time 
Germany was being bombed round the clock, so soldiers on leave heard these kind of remarks 
among the population much earlier than among their own men, and they were ‘puzzled and 
shocked by the bad manners of the civilian population.’23 As a result of the scarcity of food, it 
was noted that some civilians ‘scolded wounded soldiers because they did not eat in their 
hospitals, but contested the food in the restaurants.’24 Work discipline in the factories, 
especially among women and adolescents, deteriorated significantly throughout the war.25 
Already in 1943 the fear for a repetition of ‘1918’, a collapse of the home front, was felt so 
strongly that the Ministry of Propaganda started a campaign to highlight the differences with 
twenty-five years earlier.26 
What further added to the schism between troops and civilians in 1945 was their 
different appreciation of Germany’s plight. Many soldiers took much longer to realise that the 
war was lost. And even if this notion had registered, it hardly impacted individual behaviour, 
since, according to the research of Neitzel and Welzer, ‘actions and decisions in concrete 
situations are usually made without reference to the “big picture.”’27 This factor logically 
gained in importance in 1945. Moreover, as was found in the same study, in a potentially hostile 
environment, soldiers are likely to experience threats, regardless of whether they are real or 
perceived.28 When we apply these findings to the unsuccessful battles in East Prussia in 1945, 
we indeed see that troops were often unwilling either to pin defeat on their own failings or on 
the maturity of Soviet operational conduct, instead looking for other explanations for the 
defeats. Thus, the proximity of German civilians to the battle field made them a convenient 
scapegoat. With the frontline running through Germany the fear of desertion grew, since it was 
correctly assumed that soldiers could more easily go into hiding with the help of local people 
who spoke the language.29 During the relative calm that predated the Soviet offensive many 
soldiers had taken part in anti-partisan actions, making it clear that the enemy – once again – 
most likely looked like an ordinary civilian, or worse still, like a German soldier.30 The fear of 
                                                          
22 Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, 141-45. 
23 Richard Grunberger, A Social History of the Third Reich (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 37, 
39; Marlis Steinert, Hitler’s War and the Germans, Public mood and Attitude during the Second World War 
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24 Werner, »Bleib übrig!«, 331. 
25 Ibid., 319, 321.  
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27 Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 317. 
28 Ibid., 321-29. 
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men wearing the same uniform can best be explained by looking at the casualties of that year: 
the massive number of casualties had to be made up by equal numbers of new recruits, the man 
in the next foxhole was increasingly a stranger.31 Whereas the average time between 
recruitment and death of a Wehrmacht recruit drafted in 1939 was four years, in early 1945 this 
had plummeted to a month.32 Especially worrying was the turnover of officers: tens of 
thousands of men were hurriedly trained to fill the depleted ranks, although a majority of these 
men, according to a report of an officer course, ‘lack the inner calling of a military and political 
leader, many even [lack] the willingness to become an officer.’33 The turnover, in turn, meant 
that ever fewer troops knew the men that formed their chain of command. On 11 November 
1944 the OKH passed down an order concerning ‘defensive measures against infiltration of 
hostile or treacherous elements’, which explained how troops should verify orders from 
unknown officers. The order had already been distributed before, in early August that year, but, 
‘given the imminent new main attack on the Eastern Front’, troops were again to be taught on 
the matter.34  
The OKH was certainly not wrong to do this: one of the Soviet Union’s most famous 
dissidents, Lev Kopolev, whose unit, a political department of a Soviet Front, was responsible 
in East Prussia for ‘propaganda and psychological warfare against the enemy’,  recalled how 
special members of the NKFD, dubbed ‘commissars of panic’, were dropped behind German 
lines in order to ‘spread rumours about the Soviet advance, to yell, “The Russians have broken 
through!”, “Tanks behind us!”, and the like at opportune moments, and generally to spread 
confusion in the German ranks.’35 Still unwilling to pin the mounting defeats on the quality of 
the Soviet operational conduct, the Wehrmacht and Party kept searching for hostile elements 
among its own ranks to explain the situation. A circular distributed on February 1, 1945, 
instructed that ‘suspicious persons, whether they wear the uniform of the German Wehrmacht, 
Organisation Todt, or a Party uniform, are to be carefully checked by the police or the 
appropriate Wehrmacht patrols. All vehicles that are moving out westwards are therefore to be 
                                                          
31 Rüdiger Overmans, Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 
1999), 238, 318. Over 560,000 soldiers fell in July and August 1944, at the height of Bagration. In January 
1945, as the final Soviet offensives commenced, the number of casualties peaked at 450,000. In February, 
March and April, between 280,000 and 300,000 German soldiers died each month.  
32 Overmans, Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 318. 
33 Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, 177-81.  
34 BArch RH 2/316, 125-126: OKH/GenStdH/ Op Abt (roem. 1a) Nr.7009/44 g.Kdos. roem.2.Ang. 
10.11.1944 
35 Lev Kopelev, No Jail for Thought (London: Secker & Warburg, 1977), 15, 35.  
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checked with particular care.’ 36 Yet, all civilians moved west, fleeing ahead of the Soviet 
troops, and every time a unit fell back it was westwards. As such, any move to safety could be 
deemed as suspicious. 
What compounded matters was that the German rank-and-file was given considerable 
leeway in judging whether actions they observed were a threat to fighting strength. In 
November 1944, the OKH passed down orders concerning deserters, stating that soldiers 
intending to desert were to be fired upon by their own comrades.37 This was once again stressed 
in the ‘Provisions on the conduct of officers and men in times of crisis’, distributed on 28 
January 1945. Not only was the use of deadly force encouraged if this was considered the only 
way to maintain discipline, the provisions also opened the door for further indiscriminate 
violence: ‘He who, in the case of major breaches of duty, acts courageously and responsibly 
(…) shall not be held accountable, even if he exceeds his powers.’38 This measure potentially 
allowed every soldier to become both judge, jury, and executioner. Despite the apprehensive 
atmosphere that was present in the army, and despite the fact that these men – often stressed 
and burned out after long periods of fighting – could hardly be considered as objective, they 
were still actively conditioned to look at their surroundings for signs of defeatism and 
sabotage.39 Thus, fanatics within the army were not only enabled to kill suspicious alien 
elements, they were also encouraged to be active participants in maintaining discipline among 
their own ranks and act upon it personally when breached. For example, the Volkssturm 
Knight’s Cross holder, Tiburzy, was not only hailed by Kreisleiter Wagner for knocking out 
five Soviet tanks, but also for the fact that he shot a platoon commander who had ordered his 
man to fall back.40 Similarly, in a post-war questionnaire, Oberstleutnant Hans-Heinrich 
Wendtlandt, a regimental commander, told how in late January 1945 he put a Luftwaffe major 
in front of a court-martial after he had lost his nerves, although, Wendtlandt claimed, ‘the 
                                                          
36 BArch NS 6/354, 54: Der Leiter  der Partei-Kanzlei, Führerhauptquartier, den 1.2.1945. Rundschreiben 
47/45 g. Betrifft: Feindpropaganda. The ‘Organisation Todt’ (OT) was a civil and military engineering 
group that worked in close cooperation with Nazi authorities.  
37 BArch RW 4/725, 14  – Maßnahmen gegen Überläufer, Landesverrat in der Kriegsgefangenschaft  
38 Der Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht: “Bestimmungen über das Verhalten von Offizier und 
Mann in Krisenzeiten”, 28 January, 1945. Printed in: Rudolf Absolon, Das Wehrmachtstrafrecht im 2. 
Weltkrieg - Sammlung der grundlegenden Gesetze, Verordnungen und Erlasse (Kornelimünster: 
Bundesarchiv, Abt. Zentralnachweisstelle, 1958), 93-94.  
39 O. Bartov, “The Conduct of War: Soldiers and the Barbarization of Warfare” The Journal of Modern 
History 64, Supplement: Resistance Against the Third Reich (1992), 35-8.  
40 Lasch, So fiel Königsberg, 140. 
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verdict [had] not become known’ to him.41 These two cases show signs of what is referred to 
as ‘forward panic’, which the sociologist Randall Collins describes as follows: 
A forward panic starts with tension and fear in a conflict situation. This is the normal condition of 
violent conflict, but here the tension is prolonged and builts up (…) There is a shift from relative 
passive – waiting, holding back until one is in a position to bring a conflict to a head – to be fully 
active. When the opportunity finally arrives, the tension/fear comes out in an emotional rush.42   
On occasions when this violence could not be directed at the enemy who had caused the panic, 
it was directed at the “next-best” threat: cowards or shirkers. A SS situation report from 
Königsberg, dated 17 February 1945, seemed to illustrate the widespread willingness of troops 
to have their say in matters of life and death: ‘Among the troops there is huge outrage about 
the flight of doctors and the hospital personnel. It is being demanded that those who fled, as 
well as the officers of the [abandoned and ignited] ammunition depots, who have also fled, are 
to be executed.’43 Some soldiers nevertheless contemplated abandoning their comrades. In a 
surrounded fortress with a stable front, moreover, defecting – as such becoming part of the 
‘Verrätergesindel’, traitor scum – was even more likely to occur since troops had more time to 
weigh their options.44 Every man who eventually decided to defect played into his comrades’ 
confirmation bias. The function and position that fortresses occupied in Germany’s defence, 
moreover, made it more likely that soldiers with mental health problems were garrisoned there, 
which, in turn, increased the chance of violence. As the war progressed, doctors saw a sharp 
increase in chronic stomach disorder, which was often a symptom of deeper psychological 
problems. From mid-1943 special ‘stomach battalions’ were established, which were to occupy 
positions away from the front. Some of the garrisons of Königsberg’s forts consisted of these 
kinds of units.45 To compound matters, being encircled in fortresses – unflatteringly referred 
to as ‘Kessel’ (boilers) – weighed heavy on troops, and in a number of cases even led to a 
phenomenon referred to as ‘Kesselpsychose’ (boiler psychosis).46  
All these factors made it likely that Wehrmacht violence against civilians would not be 
limited to occupied territories.  Considering the state of mind regarding civilians, and the 
                                                          
41 BArch Ost-Dok. 8/579, 9: Hans-Heinrich Wendtlandt, Oberstleutnant, Kommandeur des 
Grenadierregiments 1094: „Der Endkampf“ (undated) 
42 Randall Collins, Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 85.  
43 BArch NS19/2068, 7. An Reichsführer-SS Feldkommandostelle, Betrifft: Meldungen aus dem Ostraum 
Königsberg, 15.2.45.  
44 BArch NS19/2068, 62. An Reichsführer-SS Feldkommandostelle, Betrifft: Meldungen aus dem Ostraum 
Königsberg, 13.3.45; “Verachtung dem Verrätergesindel,” Preußische Zeitung, February 11, 1945.   
45 Cocks, Psychotherapy in the Third Reich, 316; Lasch, So fiel Königsberg, 111.  
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mental strain caused by the military defeats, coupled with the increasing willingness and 
reliance on soldiers themselves to pass judgement, there is much reason to assume that violence 
could, in a domestic setting, retain much of its arbitrary character. But one major difference 
between the Soviet Union and Germany was the lawlessness in the former, which would 
suggest that the violence in Germany could be curbed once soldiers were subject to domestic 
laws. The next section will examine how this issue played out.   
 
II. Upholding military law in Königsberg 
 
As we have seen, on 28 January 1945, General Lasch accepted the position as fortress 
commander. Establishing his authority, especially with regard to the Party, was one of his 
primary concerns during the first days of his appointment. This section will examine how Lasch 
cemented his position by establishing a ‘Wehrmacht rule of law’ in Königsberg. By pushing 
through martial law in the city before the Party could regroup itself, he presented it as a fait 
accompli.47 As we will see, this would in turn enable Lasch to pursue his own agenda more 
effectively. Moreover, the implementation of martial law impressed a military way of thinking 
on the city, thereby giving credence to the Wehrmacht as the ultimate authority.  
 Prior to Lasch’s appointment as fortress commander, the commander of the 1st infantry 
division, General Schittnig, had held that position, as his division was the only unit to arrive in 
the city more or less intact, and with a staff large enough to oversee the running of the fortress.48 
When Lasch took over the city was in a state of chaos and therefore, upon his appointment, he 
asked for, and was given, a 100-man staff that had earlier been part of the 1st infantry division. 
The type of character that was expected for these positions was something that Hitler himself 
had clearly communicated since the earliest beginnings of the fortress strategy. On 21 June, 
1944, he encouraged Generalleutnant Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben, the commander of the 
encircled Festung Cherbourg, to ‘put the toughest men in the fortress on your staff and root out 
                                                          
47 H. Heer, “Extreme Normalität. Generalmajor Gustav Freiherr von Mauchenheim gen. Bechtolsheim: 
Umfeld, Motive und Entschlussbildung eines Holocaust-Täters” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 51 
no. 8 (2003): 752-53.  
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every appearance of cowardice or timidity.’49 In Königsberg, the bulk of these men, especially 
its officers, came from the city itself, as it had served as the garrison city of some of its 
regiments for over 300 years.50 The symbolic value of these men defending their home city 
was not lost on the editors of the Preußische Zeitung: ‘The fortunes of war have willed that 
numerous sons of the East Prussian Heimat have become the defenders of their Gau-capital.’ 
51 Of course, it was not so much the ‘fortunes of war’, but rather the deliberate choices of the 
OKH, which in August 1944 had transferred the division from Nord-Ukraine to Army Group 
Centre to bolster the defence of East Prussia.52 If psychological considerations had been part 
of the decision to move the division, the OKH was certainly successful in this regard, as soldiers 
appeared to gain motivation from fighting for their province. In Feldpost letters to their families 
they shared their concerns about the fate of East Prussia, but also expressed great pride in 
defending it.53 Nonetheless, the might of the Soviet advance in January 1945 had destroyed 
much of the quasi-romantic notion that they were fighting for their Heimat. On 26 January 
1945, the war diary of the 1st infantry division noted: ‘It is almost unbearable here – the city 
that we once left so happy and confident for victory is in great commotion.’54 Abroad German 
troops had learned to quell unrest by executing the many ‘criminal orders’, especially by the 
use of collective punishment.55 But things were more complex in Germany.  
Königsberg had been a fortress since late 1944, but martial law, the defining 
characteristic of the Königsberg’s fortress era, was only introduced as Soviet troops approached 
the city, for which Lasch, as fortress commander, bore the final responsibility.56 Germany’s 
wartime laws were in constant flux: when Lasch took command, the most recent changes to 
the ‘Wartime Criminal Code of Procedure’ (Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung) were barely two 
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weeks old.57 So, rather than discussing their finer details, we will try to define how they were 
interpreted. Already by the beginning of the Second World War, the German military court 
system had been fully aligned with National Socialist thought. Death sentences were mainly 
reserved for cases of desertion and the ‘decomposition’ of military strength 
(Wehrkraftzersetzung) and, as such, they differed little from earlier military courts. What was 
different was the way that a verdict was reached. From August 1939 onwards, judges were 
ordered not necessarily to base their judgements on the facts alone, but rather to give a verdict 
that would serve the ‘people’s and military community’ (Volks- und Wehrgemeinschaft).58 As 
some judges prior to the court proceedings already knew that they would pass the death 
sentence, they were known to resort to political tirades, rather than explaining their verdict 
along judicial lines.59 Wolfram Wette found that military courts allowed themselves significant 
leeway by basing death sentences on the rather broad concepts of abetting the enemy or causing 
a disadvantage to their own military.60 By the end of 1944, according to the research of Manfred 
Messerschmidt and Fritz Wüllner, 26,000 to 27,000 people had been executed by army courts, 
18,500 of whom were soldiers.61 The historian Stephen Welch has shown that the traumatic 
defeat of the First World War, during which only eighteen German soldiers had been sentenced 
to death for desertion, severely impacted the conduct of the National Socialist military justice 
system, concluding that ‘The relative moderation of German military justice in the First World 
War came under sharp attack in the immediate post-war years by critics who argued that it was 
one of the factors which had contributed to Germany’s defeat.’62 This lenience was thoroughly 
rooted out during the Second World War, while also the Wehrmacht itself enforced a much 
stricter self-discipline, even without being pressured by National Socialist bodies.63  
                                                          
57 Reichsgesetzblatt Teil I, Nr. 3 Ausgegeben in Berlin am 22. Januar 1945: Elfte Verordnung zur 
Durchführung und Ergänzung, Verordnung über das militärische Strafverfahren im Kriege und bei 
besonderem Einsatz. Vom 11. Januar 1945.   
58 Ulrich Baumann and Magnus Koch, „Was damals Recht war…“ Soldaten und Zivilisten vor Gerichten der 
Wehrmacht (Berlin, Be.Bra verlag, 2008), 27, 30. 
59 Wolfram Wette and Detlef Vogel, Das letzte Tabu: NS-Militärjustiz und »Kriegsverrat«, (Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2007), 32 
60 Wette and Vogel, Das letzte Tabu, 23 
61 Manfred Messerschmidt, Fritz Wüllner, Die Wehrmachtjustiz im Dienste des Nationalsozialismus. 
Zerstörung einer Legende (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), 78-79. 
62 Stephen Welch, “ ‘Harsh but Just’? German Military Justice in the Second World War: A Comparative 
Study of the Court-Martialling of German and US Deserters,” German History 17, no. 3 (1999): 376; 
Kershaw, The End, 220; Bessel, Germany 1945, 63. 
63 Robert Loeffel, “Soldiers and Terror: Re-evaluating the Complicity of the Wehrmacht in Nazi Germany,” 
German History 27, no. 4, (2009), 514–530. Using Sippenhaft¸ or family liability punishment, Robert 
Loeffel proposed that rather than reflecting the desire of the Gestapo, ‘it was the Wehrmacht itself that 
drove the attempt to apply terror’ against its own troops.  
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Welch has stressed that severe punishments were not only meted out because they 
ensured ‘absolute obedience and discipline’, but also because desertion revealed the soldier’s 
inability to grasp the importance of the Volksgemeinschaft.64 A deserting soldier was labelled 
a Wehrmachtsschädling, a military parasite, which, as Welch found, often sealed his fate even 
before the trial itself: ‘The invocation of the deserter as a parasite, an asocial outsider, a 
degenerate, or a psychopathic inferior meant that it was no longer necessary to devote much 
attention to discovering the actual motives of the individual deserter; it was sufficient simply 
to demonstrate that his type represented a threat to the community.’65  
Alongside this, there was a profusion of public executions of foreign civilians, especially 
on the Eastern Front. Collective punishment had been instituted as German troops invaded the 
Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, and mass executions, mostly under the rubric of quelling 
incipient guerrilla activity, became standard practice.66 The many pictures of hanged Soviet 
partisans – either real or supposed – taken by German soldiers suggest that there was a kind of 
gratification in their open display, if not to say some pride. In the war against Judeo-
Bolshevism, the so-called Weltanschauungskrieg, the line between combatant and non-
combatant blurred, and the rise of the partisan movement meant that German soldiers 
developed a tendency to consider civilians as a legitimate threat. Although this should certainly 
not be seen as an excuse for the excessive amounts of violence in the Soviet Union, or the 
violence that lay ahead, it might help to explain the behaviour of German troops in 1945. The 
way civilians were dealt with fell well outside the rules of war set out by the Hague 
conventions. As Generaloberst Franz Halder noted in his war diary, their prosecution was ‘no 
job for Military Courts (…) This war be very different from the war in the West. In the East, 
harshness today means lenience in the future.’67  
For most of the war the home front and front line were separated by hundreds of miles, 
but in late 1944 the two came together. How did military courts operate once back on the home 
front in relation to civilians? Immediately after his appointment Lasch established a fortress 
court.68 Theoretically, it was the task of the military police, Feldgendarmerie, and officer 
patrols, Streifen, to bring in deserters to face judgement by this court. However, since the 
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immediate defence of Königsberg and the restoration of order were of overriding importance, 
they were permitted to pass their own judgement, and subsequently act on it. This procedure, 
known as ‘drumhead court-martial’ (Standgericht), had developed throughout the war. In June 
1943 Hitler had ordered the establishment of ‘Special drumhead courts-martial’ which served 
to ‘fast-track the judgement of political crimes’ worthy of death or imprisonment, stressing that 
‘the enforcement should immediately follow the confirmation of the judgment.’69 On 20 
September 1944, the legislation was expanded: ‘So far, the military and general criminal courts 
were appointed separately for trial of political offences directed against the community. The 
Total War does not justify this anymore. It requires a unified defence [against] any 
decomposition of the national resilience of our people.’70 Three days later, on 23 September, 
the OKW passed down ‘Measures against disintegration in the troops’. In the immediate rear 
of Army Groups, ‘Feldjägerkommandos’ were to crack down on the spot against signs of 
disintegration ‘with extreme severity’ to prevent soldiers from detaching themselves from the 
frontline and just hanging around in the rear to await defeat, as had happened in 1918.71 Keller 
has argued that as a result of the bugbear of 1918, the manner in which Standgerichte proceeded 
‘assumed an avenging character’ against those who did not want to continue to fight to the end, 
as surrender led to chaos and humiliation.72 This mindset, bolstered by the language found in 
the different orders, encouraged these men to act both autonomously and extremely ruthlessly, 
and General Lasch, as the supreme legal authority in the fortress, allowed the military police 
and the Streifen virtually unrestricted leeway.73  
The chief editor of the Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung, Martin Wegener, closely 
observed the behaviour of these men, and illustrated that the distinction between soldiers and 
civilians seemed to disappear:   
Officer patrols were sent through the basements to fetch the hiding soldiers, who in some cases had 
already changed to the civilian clothing that was present in abundance in the abandoned houses. 
The vast majority of the soldiers willingly obeyed the command to return to their units at the front. 
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There was also resistance of the most serious kind, which required the strongest application of the 
laws of war. More common than among soldiers were the executions among the plunderers, thieves 
and murderers from the ranks of Ostarbeiter, refugees and locals. The drumhead courts that were 
deployed for these culprits only knew one punishment, even for small thefts: death through hanging. 
One of the assessors, an Ortsgruppenleiter (local leader) of the Nazi Party who normally oversaw 
the administration of a large hospital, otherwise known as an unusually good-natured man, 
answered to the question, whether he could justify such judgments for his conscience: “They and 
we are helped the best with it, and this is decisive for me.” Incidentally, headquarters demanded the 
speedy removal of the bodies of the hanged, among whom were women.74 
 
Indeed, the fortress command readily invoked the threat of summary execution. Werner 
Terpitz, a young forced recruit of the 561st Volksgrendadier Division remembered: ‘On big 
yellow posters on the hoardings stood: All sixteen- to sixty-year olds have until 3 February to 
enrol in the Volkssturm or the Wehrmacht. Failure to comply is punishable by death.’75 From 
a military point of view the patrols were highly successful, as they ensured that over 20,000 
men, mostly stragglers, were returned to the front line, initially as 100-man emergency units, 
which later, when the front stabilised, could be incorporated into divisions.76 The process of 
becoming part of these emergency units is best described by Guy Sajer, a veteran of the 
Großdeutschland division:  
Our group was gone over with a fine-toothed comb by the Kommandos responsible for sending men 
back to their original units. As they didn’t know where most of these units were, the best they could 
do was to form the strays into new groups, which everyone wished to avoid. These new units, with 
no official affiliation or assignments, simply sapped the actual strength of the army as recorded by 
military registration and on the maps at headquarters. The men assigned to these varied and 
unmeasurable groups could not be fitted into any logical organisation. Already classified as missing 
or dead by their original units, they were officially considered dead, and used as unexpected 
reinforcements whom there was no reason to spare.77 
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With the introduction of martial law, everyone in Königsberg could be measured by the same 
yardstick: the ability to contribute to the city’s defence. During the first week of the siege, the 
Streifen showed a complete disregard for the physical and mental state of those they 
encountered, and cracked down on any perceived threat, of which – in their eyes – desertion 
was the most obvious manifestation. Men were not allowed to leave the city anymore, while 
doctors were forbidden to write sick leaves.78 Anyone who refused to go to the front was 
effectively deemed a deserter.  
The quality of the men the Streifen picked up appeared to be of the least importance. 
Lothar Finke, an Eastern Front veteran who arrived in the city in late January, recalled that the 
searches by these Heldengreifkommandos, ‘hero-snatcher commandos’, were not limited solely 
to soldiers, but also focused on ‘old, recovering and partly disabled men’ and was an 
‘unpleasant and unfriendly activity.’79 Despite his young age, even Hans-Burkhardt Sumowski 
noted civilians’ fear and resentment of the military police.80 Adolf Klein, who was sent with 
his Volkssturm unit to Königsberg, remembered how his men desperately tried to avoid being 
picked up by Streifen. When they were eventually rounded up, he felt treated like ‘herded cattle, 
which would be brought to the slaughter in the coming hours.’81 Indeed, Volkssturm men 
disproportionally fell victim to drumhead courts, since their units were most likely to 
disintegrate. Even though they had been incorporated into the military command structure, their 
battalions were often only to be deployed in the defence of their home towns. When this failed 
– which it usually did in the first weeks of the Soviet offensive – Volkssturm units were likely 
to retreat in disorderly fashion. Many of these men had been called up to serve in the defence 
of East Prussia only after the offensive had already commenced, and, unlike other units, they 
had never experienced a retreat before.82 Poorly supplied, poorly armed, poorly clothed, and 
often in poor health, the men were soldiers only in name, which, moreover, most felt they 
were.83  
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Even though the officers of the 1st infantry division were ordered to crack down on 
people originating from their immediate peace time surroundings, they did not consider their 
assignment to conflict with their conscience.84 ‘The first task is to establish order,’ wrote 
Hauptmann Lenz, an adjutant in the staff of the 1st infantry division, after the war. ‘With the 
help of the wounded officers of the division stragglers are picked up, collected and placed in 
emergency units and quickly thrown [into battle] at threatened parts of the front.’85 In their 
efforts to search for deserters the officers of the 1st infantry division showed no leniency and 
seemed proud of their behaviour, as the war diary of the division attests: ‘With an iron broom 
the streets are “swept”,’ an officer of the 1st division noted in the divisional war diary in late 
January 1945. ‘We succeed to restore the order everywhere in a few days. (…) Saboteurs and 
shirkers are bore down on – nasty rumour-mongers will be put a stop shortly.’86 On 2 February, 
Generaloberst Lothar Rendulic, the commander of Army Group North, which fought in East 
Prussia, passed down a circular to his subordinates to clarify how they should proceed upon 
encountering stragglers: ‘From 3 February onwards, all soldiers of all branches of the 
Wehrmacht that are encountered away from their unit, in streets, towns or refugee columns, or 
at field dressing stations without being wounded, and declare to be stragglers seeking their unit, 
are to be summarily shot! Flying courts-martial are immediately employed to this end.’87 In the 
post-war years, this type of orders has caused Rendulic to be viewed as a dyed-in-the-wool 
Nazi, but the order was eventually copied by all commanders in Germany, including more 
moderate men, such as Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, the Commander in Chief in the West. 
Rather than a testimony of loyalty towards the Nazi regime, it is more likely that men like 
Rendulic saw the orders as a continuation of military law.88  
On 10 February, just over a week after the encirclement of Königsberg, The Times 
reported on the measures taken by General Lasch: ‘Königsberg is now in a desperate plight, 
though the garrison commander has repeated his orders to fight to the last and rounded up some 
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1,500 deserters for punishment duties on the front line.’89 In the post-war years Lasch 
downplayed the scope of his actions and the reach of the Streifen. He had one of his former 
subordinates, Oberstleutnant Dr. Sauvant, write down his recollections, rather than presenting 
his own. ‘In the interest of maintaining discipline it was impossible to avoid, in special cases 
of blatant cowardice and desertion, the enforcement of court martial death sentences by 
shooting.’ Sauvant subsequently stated that for Lasch, as the commander with the final 
responsibility, this was tough, but nonetheless considered an ‘overriding requirement of 
duty’.90 The Wehrmacht’s duty, those days, was keeping the city out of the hands of the Soviets, 
something that was actively conveyed to the civilian population. After the summary execution 
of two soldiers at the Nordbahnhof in the afternoon of 1 February, Major Ipsen, the NSFO of 
Festung Königsberg, gave a speech to those present, which was printed the next day in the 
‘Festung Königsberg’ newspaper: ‘With the enemy at the gates of the city’, noted Ipsen, ‘it is 
important that every one of us, soldier and Volkssturm man, woman and Hitler Youth, keeps 
their nerve in these critical hours, and is firm and determined to persevere and to fight.’ He 
continued that ‘It must and will succeed that Königsberg’s brave battle community not only 
withstands these hours of crisis (…), but also decisively contributes to the imminent turning 
point!’91 Passers by often witnessed people being executed near the Nordbahnhof and the 
Hauptbahnhof during the last days of January in Königsberg. These were not only soldiers 
strung up for desertion, but also civilians executed for looting. Many of these executions were 
obligatory to visit for soldiers to deter them from deserting, and bodies were often left for days, 
with placards attached to their chest indicating both their ‘crime’ and, in case of soldiers, their 
former unit.92 By the end of January order had returned in Königsberg, and the Streifen and 
military police had played an important role in achieving this. In some cases, civilians had 
personally asked them to drive away plunderers, showing that they became almost immediately 
recognised as figures of authority.93  
The visible presence of the Streifen, and the harsh line they took, were the clearest 
manifestations that a change of power had occurred in Königsberg. In his work on the first year 
of the Weimar Republic, Mark Jones points to the ‘pedagogical violence’ used in Berlin by the 
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newly-formed German state to ‘found its authority and prove its will to rule’: this section shows 
that similar motivations were at play in Königsberg in 1945.94 The readiness to crack down on 
perceived stragglers, saboteurs, and shirkers – including civilians – distinguished the 
Wehrmacht from the Party.95 There should be no doubt that violence and authority were 
intrinsically linked in Königsberg, and that, after serving on the Eastern Front, many 
commanders had considerably more expertise in this regard. This made the army the major 
stakeholder in the public violence against the local community. Yet authority could not rest on 
violence alone. The next section will therefore examine what efforts the fortress command 
made to accommodate the population of Königsberg, and assess how these shaped the 
understanding between civilians and the former.   
 
III. Königsberg under siege 
 
Two seemingly contradicting trends are clearly distinguishable in Königsberg. As we will see 
in the subsequent sections, the fortress command cracked down on any sign of disintegration. 
At the same time, both Party and Wehrmacht invested much energy in maintaining a sense of 
normality in the fortress.96 To explain this paradoxical behaviour, this section consists of two 
parts. Firstly, it provides an overview of the efforts that were made to accommodate the civilian 
population. We will then turn to the reservations and concerns the fortress command connected 
to these efforts. The conclusion of this section will establish how this behaviour related to the 
broader German context, in order to eventually determine how it tied into the radicalisation 
that took place in 1945.   
During Königsberg’s siege, the fortress command mainly seemed to have operated with 
two principles regarding civilians: assuring their basic needs, most importantly food and 
housing, and keeping track of their movement. In the first weeks of the encirclement, in early 
February, the provisioning of the civilian population was well-organised. As a document 
concerning the provisioning of ‘fortresses of which their inclusion at least has to be reckoned 
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with’, dated 25 February 1945, shows, food supply for fortress cities was assured well in 
advance of their encirclement.97 Moreover, as Königsberg had been a major supply hub for the 
Eastern Front, it housed many warehouses that contained food stocks, and the fortress could 
rely on the plentiful cattle that had been brought in from the east of the province.98 Table 1 
indicates that in a number of aspects the weekly rations in Königsberg fell below the national 
level during the siege. But, contrary to the statistics, most civilians remember the fortress era 
as a time when food was well distributed, and few complained about food shortages.99  
 
 National weekly ration       
5 February to 4 March.100 
Weekly ration Königsberg 
5 to 11 February.101  
Weekly ration Königsberg 
12 to 18 February.102 
Bread 2,225 grams 2,500 grams 2,500 grams 
Fat 156,25 grams 150 grams 125 grams 
Meat 362,5 grams 375 grams 250 grams 
Sugar  312,5 grams 200 grams 125 grams 
Spreads  - 187,5 grams 125 grams 
Cereals 225 grams 150 grams 125 grams 
Legumes - - 125 grams 
Coffee subst. 31,25 grams 62,5 grams 62,5 grams 
Cheese 15,63 grams - - 
Potatoes 2,500 grams Unknown* Unknown 
Fish 62,5 grams - - 
* On 23 February, the Preußische Zeitung: ‘maximum 2 kg potatoes per person per week’. 
Table 1: Weekly rations in Königsberg, February 1945 
Furthermore, pregnant and breastfeeding women received extra rations of nutrients, butter and 
milk, babies received extra fats, but also diabetics received extra meat and nutrients, while also 
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the gastrointestinal ill received extra fats.103 Meanwhile, the matter of housing was also tackled 
with relative ease. As we have seen, in the wake of the bombing of Königsberg many people 
fled the city, and in early January another wave of civilians had departed. Blockwarte assessed 
which buildings were unoccupied and the homeless received the keys of the houses they had 
been allocated.104 There was still running water and the local Siemens plant supplied energy.105  
In a wider sense, the fortress command actively worked to assure an atmosphere of 
normality. On 19 February certificates for household goods were distributed, which could be 
used in six different stores throughout the city. A seventh store for household goods opened on 
23 February, together with another for textiles and a store for footwear.106 By order of 
Kreisleiter Wagner, all stores were to open their doors on Sunday as well. Three cinemas played 
a total of 42 films per week.107 And even though the Albertus University had officially been 
closed, some lectures continued, albeit on a much smaller scale.108 On top of the nine banks 
that already ensured that salaries and pensions were paid to labourers, employees, officials and 
teachers, the giro-office was reopened for three hours a day.109 These efforts were appreciated 
by the population, and gave rise to a ‘timid optimism’.110 Different police authorities also 
continued to function. Feldwebel Mathias Nölke, for example, visited both the Gestapo 
headquarters and the Polizeipräsidium (police headquarters) in early March, trying to get 
clarification about his father-in-law, who was missing.111 Although historians tend to view the 
police apparatus in 1945 merely through the lens of radicalisation, documents in Königsberg 
show a string of ordinary tasks that were still being executed by local police authorities. In mid-
February, for instance, police patrols were sent through the streets to check up on blackout 
measures.112 Whenever Volkssturm men were wounded during training, it was the task of the 
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police to compile a report on it, which was done with great attention to detail.113 People could 
still officially get married in March.114 These efforts were a stark contrast with the minimal 
care that was provided in the refugee camps on the Samland, and made the decision to remain 
in a besieged city appear sensible, rather than life-threatening. 
  This does not mean that people in Königsberg were oblivious to the danger he city 
was in; it would be fairer to consider their attitude as ‘resigned’. Wolfgang Franz Werner has 
long established that most German civilians in 1945, ‘in the light of the inevitable defeat, would 
not expose themselves to further risks, and at least wanted to undergo the downfall in a familiar 
environment.’115 Indeed, many parishes continued to operate as priests did not want to abandon 
their ‘flock’.116 Church services remained particularly well-attended and peaked at Easter, just 
days before the final storming.117 This fits in with  the research of Jill Stephenson, who, in her 
analysis of the German home front during the war, found that ‘in time of crisis, people turned 
- or in some cases returned - to traditional allegiances, most notably the Christian Churches.’118  
However, the accommodating stance of the fortress command towards civilians did not 
come about without hesitation or concern. As indicated, military commanders had always tried 
to remove civilians from the area of operations, not only to allow for unrestricted movement, 
but also to quell potential partisan activity. It was relatively easy to drop agents behind the lines 
on the Samland peninsula, who could then make their way into Königsberg.119 The Soviets 
actively played on these fears by dropping leaflets into the fortress, which encouraged civilians 
to stop working and hide deserters until Soviet troops arrived.120 The fear increased as the siege 
went on, and on 19 March a ‘Großrazzia’ was conducted by the police to search for enemy 
agents. Of the 2,560 people checked, 23 were detained by the authorities.121 Indeed, the 
Preußische Zeitung devoted much attention to the topic of fear in Königsberg. On 8 February, 
a week after the city’s encirclement, it was announced: ‘Anyone can have fear. When it is dealt 
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with, everything is clear. [However,] those who, out of fear, become cowards, throw in the 
towel and become criminals.’122 
In particular, civilians were not to be trusted with military information, but this was 
near-impossible, especially in the crowded basements of the inner city. Günter Braunschweig, 
the commander of a detachment of self-propelled guns recalled that ‘keeping our actions a 
secret is impossible, we are sitting, squatting, and lying almost on top of each other, rather than 
next to each other.’123 During the fortress era, a stream of articles in the Preußische Zeitung 
sought to encourage the inhabitants to keep to themselves. Discretion was presented as a 
Prussian virtue.124 Everyone was made aware that there were saboteurs and spies in the fortress. 
In a fictitious story, presented as if had actually occurred, a front-page article, ‘The secret’, 
explained ‘what garrulous women brought about.’ The gossip of one of them included a story 
about German soldiers who walked through her garden at night. This was overheard by a ‘spy’. 
A few days later, a German patrol was ambushed in her garden.125 The official advice to avoid 
such betrayals was stern and simple: Mund halten – shut up.126 The efforts certainly paid off, 
as an SS report of early March illustrated: ‘Among the population and the armed forces there 
is outrage over a broadcast message (…) that a liqueurs and soap factory in Königsberg is now 
producing ammunition. This is considered as a breach of military secrets.’127 The treatment of 
the refugees on the Samland, which we discussed in the previous chapter, makes clear that the 
well-being of the population was not the fortress command’s prime concern. Nevertheless, 
from a military point of view, keeping a large civilian population in the city made sense, mainly 
because allowing civilians to stay in Königsberg assured that they continued to contribute to 
the local war effort  
At first sight, the efforts to maintain the living conditions in Königsberg, and the wave 
of violence that swept over the city, seem unrelated. To connect these two processes, we might 
turn to the concept of ‘moral licencing’, a theory that examines ‘the internal balancing of moral 
self-worth and the cost inherent in altruistic behaviour.’ This research suggests ‘that affirming 
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a moral identity leads people to act immorally.’128 We have already seen that moral authority 
was of great importance in the establishment of the fortress command. The creation of 
‘normality’ in Königsberg tied into the same tendency, as it provided a justification for the way 
the fortress command behaved towards the city’s population. The authority of General Lasch 
and his staff was assured through draconian measures, but – from a moral standpoint – this was 
justified in order to assure public order. It was unmistakable that the military in late-January 
had restored order in Königsberg. Subsequently, a disciplined populace, controlled by the 
fortress command, had, against the odds, increased the liveability in the city. For Lasch, the 
balance sheet of his rule was therefore positive. This, in turn, meant that the fortress staff felt 
empowered to take further far-reaching measures to assure the continuation of this community. 
Any hesitation to deploy civilians in the defence of the city fell away. As we will see in the 
coming sections, these measures were extensively used, becoming a vital element in the 
Kampfgemeinschaft the fortress command sought to create.   
 
IV. Festungsdienst in Königsberg  
 
In his memoirs, General Lasch claimed to have transformed Königsberg into a 
Kampfgemeinschaft, a ‘battle community’, thanks to the willingness of the population to assist 
in its defence.129 This narrative was developing during the siege itself, as from early February 
onwards, the Preußische Zeitung spoke of Königsberg as a Festungsgemeinschaft, a ‘fortress 
community’.130 Establishing how this community came to replace the Volksgemeinschaft, 
which had sufficed up to then, and what the new community encompassed, will help to explain 
the role of German civilians during the final months of war.  
On 9 February, the fortress command took its final step towards Total War when it 
proclaimed Festungsdienst, or Fortress Service. Explanatory pamphlets, meant for all 
Königsbergers – men, women, and children – were distributed among the population. The 
content of the pamphlets originated from Kreisleiter Wagner, who nevertheless stressed that 
they had been agreed by Lasch. A martial tone, borrowed from the army, dominated the 
pamphlets. It was clear from the wording that the civilians who were still in Königsberg were 
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to prove themselves worthy of being defended, and, in a way, ‘earn’ that right: ‘Not only 
weapons and machines offer us protection, but above all the strong hearts. Danger and distress 
separate the wheat from the chaff. Sweat saves blood! Everyone pitches in!’ The Kreisleiter 
went on: 
 
The Bolshevik stands before the gates of our city. Shoulder to shoulder with the Wehrmacht and 
the men of the Volkssturm we will defend our city. We will build out Königsberg into an 
impenetrable fortress and hold it until the Bolshevik hordes are annihilated by the armies of the 
Reich.  
Therefore, I order, in agreement with the battle commander, for every Königsberger, a fortress 
duty for four hours per day. 131  
 
Interestingly, in his assessment of the defensive measures in Königsberg, the German historian 
Heinz Schön cited parts of this pamphlet, but left out the passage that refered to the army, thus 
portraying the Party as the sole radicalised actor in the final stage of the war. He argued that 
‘every Königsberger knew that the Party saw only one task for all: “Fight and win – or die!”’132 
Schön’s assessment probably stems from the fact that the Party oversaw the implementation of 
the Fortress Service, since the allocation to the different sites of deployment was done by the 
local Ortsgruppe, but it downplays the role of the Wehrmacht.133  
On 11 February, on the front page of the Preußische Zeitung, the call to service was 
repeated, and the scope of the call more closely defined. It was stressed that only ‘mothers of 
infants and pregnant women’ were to be excluded from the Fortress Service.134 As most of the 
men were long at the front, Fortress Service was thus mainly intended for older children, the 
elderly, and women who would serve for four hours per day. Failure to report for Fortress 
Service meant that one would not be eligible for ration cards.135 Hans-Burkhardt Sumowski, 
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who was only eight years old at the time of Königsberg’s siege, remembers how he was asked 
to haul grenades with his sled, pass artillery coordinates, and help mine a bridge. Meanwhile, 
his grandmother was ordered to sew ammunition pouches, while his grandfather was deployed 
in a tank repair depot.136 The prevalence of older people was so clear that among German troops 
Königsberg was referred to as ‘Festung der Greise’: the fortress of the elderly.137 Much of the 
Fortress Service consisted of constructing defensive positions, sometimes under Soviet artillery 
fire. During the first days of its implementation supervisors therefore showed up with carbines 
to ensure order, but armed guards were immediately forbidden by General Lasch, due to the 
outrage their sight caused.138  
A central role in the Fortress Service was allocated to the NS-Frauenschaft (NSF), or 
National Socialist Women's League, the women’s wing of the Nazi Party. Since the SS, SA 
and the Hitlerjugend were already incorporated into the military command structure, the NSF 
remained the only noteworthy National Socialist organisation that could theoretically boast 
some independence from the Wehrmacht.139 Although there are some sources that show that 
women were trained for combat roles in East Prussia from late-1944 onwards (known as 
Fraueneinsatz), nothing suggests that German women were deployed as soldiers in and around 
Festung Königsberg.140 Rather, the Fortress Service was reminiscent of the Kriegshilfsdienst, 
or Auxiliary War Service, which was implemented in July 1941 with the purpose of drafting 
women into clerical work for the military or local administration, or into armaments.141 The 
notable difference, of course, was that the Auxiliary War Service was not in an immediately 
threatened area. 
As part of the Fortress Service, the NSF was ordered, for example, to ‘set up a sewing 
room for every Volkssturm battalion, where the men of the battalion can constantly have their 
laundry and socks fixed.’142 More importantly, most of the care for refugees, bombed out 
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families, and mothers with small children was left to the NSF.143 Together with the German 
Red Cross, the NSF ran all hospitals in the fortress, a role that was repeatedly played up in the 
propaganda: ‘We visited these women in the hospitals and found all professions among them. 
On top of their chores and the care for their children and families, they worked in the sewing 
rooms, the catering, in the Ortsgruppen and so on, only to return a few hours per day to look 
after “their” wounded.’144 The Party thus placed itself completely at the disposal of the 
Wehrmacht and although the NSF remained recognisable as a Party-controlled body, its 
National Socialist values took a back seat during the siege.  
 The way Fortress Service impacted daily life in besieged Königsberg tells us much 
about Germany’s transition from a Volksgemeinschaft to a Kampfgemeinschaft. When the war 
turned against Germany, many, if not most Germans considered the Volksgemeinschaft as a 
purely utilitarian concept. It increasingly became, as Clemens Vollnhals put it, ‘an apathetic 
emergency organisation that had only one goal: surviving the war.’ 145 The idea of a 
Kampfgemeinschaft, which emerged out of the Volksgemeinschaft, better reflected the wartime 
sentiments of the German population ‘Kampf’ was initially defined as ‘struggle’, in which the 
war itself, according to Christopher Browning, represented a ‘struggle for self-defence and 
survival of a threatened and beleaguered racial community.’146 As the war reached the borders 
of Germany, the concept rid itself of its metaphysical baggage, and ‘Kampf’ was interpreted in 
military terms, as ‘battle’. Whereas the Volksgemeinschaft ideally consisted of a people with a 
shared vision, Königsberg’s ‘battle community’ simply consisted of combatants and those who 
helped to prolong the defence. The introduction of the all-encompassing Fortress Service made 
inclusion in this community obligatory, and a clear way to determine who contributed to that 
community and who did not. For some civilians, this even meant taking their place on the front 
line. The implications of this will be addressed in the next section.  
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V. The Volkssturm in Königsberg 
 
In a series of meetings in late December 1944 and early January 1945 the army pushed for 
Volkssturm battalions to be used as an active part of Königsberg’s security garrison.147 
Although arguments over their exact size and deployment continued in the weeks that followed, 
by the time the first Soviet troops approached the city there were indeed a number of battalions 
that could be deployed in its defence.148 When on 26 January Soviet troops undertook a surprise 
attack (coup de main) east of the city at Palmburg, it was the Volkssturm, rather than the army, 
who fought them off. In Mandeln, in the same area, they even held the line while Luftwaffe 
units fled through their lines. The Bäckerberg, a hill overlooking Königsberg in the north, was 
similarly held by the Volkssturm during the first days of the attack on the city, and the earliest 
Soviet attack on Neuhausen was fended off by Volkssturm units, led by Kreisleiter Wagner.149 
On 2 February, one of these militiamen, Ernst Tiburzy, managed to knock out five Soviet tanks, 
thereby stopping an attack in its tracks, a feat for which he received the Knight’s Cross later 
that month.150 To bolster Königsberg’s defence, in late January the Gestapo even released 
‘decent’ criminals from prison, and immediately sent them to Volkssturm units at the front, 
where they joined the astonished defenders.151 More than the city’s inhabitants might have 
known, and certainly more than they were given credit for, Volkssturm troops held large parts 
of the city’s eastern sector for two days, virtually on their own, against ‘sustained attacks’ from 
a Soviet corps, unaware whether reinforcements would arrive or what was happening around 
them.152   
From the moment the Volkssturm was established by the Party in late 1944, the central 
complaint many field commanders consistently put forward concerned the militia’s fighting 
capability as an independent unit. ‘We lack manpower for our infantry regiments but they form 
                                                          
147 BArch RH 2/ 331b 158-161: Op Abt/ Abt Lds Bef 252/45 geh. 5.1.1945. Vortragsnotiz Betr. 
Begriffsbestimmung der “Festung Königsberg” sowie Arbeitseinsatz zum Ausbau der Festung; 
Volkssturmeinsatz in Ostpreussen. 
148 BArch RH 2/317, 103:  Fernschreiben mit Anschriftenübermittlung, 
OKH/GenStdH/Op.Abt/Abt.Lds.Bef. Nr 13079/44 g.K. 14.12.1944 gez. v. Bonin  
149 ASK 22034: Aufzeichnungen des Hauptschriftleiters der Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung Wegener 
über seine Erlebnisse in Königsberg Januar/März 1945. 3; ASK 22034: Magunia, Abschrift, 4,5;  Ost-Dok. 
8/588: Dr. Hellmuth Will, Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Königsberg, 2; BArch Ost-Dok. 10/890: Major der 
Reserve Kurt Dieckert: Die Einschließung und Belagerung von Königsberg, 60. 
150 Kissel, Der Deutsche Volkssturm 1944/1945, 63.  
151 Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm, 27; Tilitzki, Alltag in Ostpreußen, 308; BArch Ost-Dok. 8/598: Adolf Klein, 
Einsatz der Volkssturm in Königsberg 1945, 61. This release was in line with orders passed down by the 
Reich ministry of Justice in late 1944. See: Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons, 331.  
152 Boiko, S dumoj o Rodine, 256; Lasch, So fiel Königsberg, 45; Willems, Defiant Breakwaters or Desperate 
Blunders?, 362-364, 370-71. 
176 
 
the Volkssturm. It is absolute madness’ an officer told the war correspondent Günter Heysing: 
‘alone they are only cannon fodder.’153 During the last months of 1944, Wehrmacht 
commanders continued to complain about the poor performance as a result of the restricted 
cooperation. On 27 January 1945, Hitler finally heeded to their complaints, and ordered that 
the Volkssturm be fully embedded into army’s command structure: ‘The experience in the East 
shows that Volkssturm, emergency and ersatz units, when placed on their own resources, have 
only slight fighting value and are quickly smashed. The fighting value of these units, for the 
most part numerically strong but inadequately armed for modern combat, is incomparably 
higher in the framework of troops of the field army.’154 In effect, the order signalled that, from 
then on, the army would get the final say over the deployment of Volkssturm units, but also 
implicitly admitted that the Party had been unable effectively to lead these units. When the 
front around Königsberg stabilised in the first week of February, the Volkssturm men were 
duly incorporated into the fortress’s military command structure. 
In practice, this meant that Königsberg’s Volkssturm contingent was slowly 
cannibalised. Some 10,000 Volkssturm members served in ten to twelve battalions in late 
January, of which 5,000 remained by early April, days before the final storming.155 Throughout 
February and March, many of the older and less-able bodied Volkssturm men were deployed 
to rear-area work that was often less demanding.156 On the other hand, almost immediately, 
most young boys were taken from their Volkssturm units, and drafted into the 1st infantry 
division, the 5th Panzer division, or the 548th or 561st Volksgrenadier division.157 Hauptmann 
Lenz remembered that  
The Division strives – just like the 5th Panzer Division, which is also present in the fortress – to 
again form units out of wounded and new recruits. The representative of Reich Defence 
Commissioner Gauleiter Koch, Kreisleiter Wagner (himself a reserve officer in the division), 
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provides the division with young recruits subordinated to him, particularly several hundred Hitler 
Youth members.158  
Sometimes their young age stunned the division’s veterans. Hauptmann Schröder, the 
commander of Füsilier battalion 1, part of the 1st division, recalled that 
The battalion received 60 to 80 Hitlerjungen of the ages 14 and 15 as recruits for training in early 
February. With some shock, we accepted these half-kids. The swearing in took place in a dignified 
and festive form at the tennis court. With great and unparalleled zeal, these boys dove into their 
training. The majority could not be supplied with steel helmets, as they were too large and fell over 
their eyes during firing. A solution was only partly found. Because of their youth, they received 
special rations, not alcohol or cigarettes, but bonbons and chocolate instead.159  
These accounts were not exceptions. Volkssturm battalion 25/141 ‘Lützow’ consisted entirely 
of sixteen and seventeen-year-old boys, and, after first being used as auxiliaries, they were 
deployed alongside an infantry battalion.160  
In addition, the Volkssturm units that consisted of exclusively older men also had to 
give up their ‘youngest’. The adjutant of Volkssturm battalion 25/235, Leutnant Bruno Just 
wrote in his diary on 6 March 1945 that ‘We had to turn over all the men born in 1901 and 
younger to the Wehrmacht. After this the youngest is 44 years old.’161 Even disabled men were 
drafted into the Volksstum. For example, Heinz Kroll, who had a prosthetic leg, was, after six 
medical examinations by the Wehrmacht, deemed suitable to serve in the Volkssturm and was 
sent back from Pillau to Königsberg.162 That this behaviour was widespread can best be seen 
by a headline of the Preußische Zeitung, ‘Despite prosthetic leg at the forefront of a battalion 
reserve against the enemy’, which not only showed that these severely disabled men were used 
for rear area work, but were also deployed at the front line.163   
 The training of Volkssturm men intensified, with special attention paid to the 
Panzerfaust, a single-shot anti-tank weapon, but arguably one of the easiest weapons to 
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master.164 Nevertheless, accidents happened fairly frequently during the weapons training.165 
Reading between the lines, the focus on the Panzerfaust revealed that the instructors did not 
fully trust Volkssturm men as part of their units, since the weapon was especially suited to 
individual men, or a twosome, rather  than groups.166 This, in turn, had an impact on the 
Volkssturm’s reputation among Soviet troops, who regarded Volkssturm men with 
Panzerfausts as fanatics, and willing to continue to fight on their own. They were referred to 
as ‘Faustnikov’, Moses Gorelik, a Jewish partisan from Belorussia, who eventually fought in 
Königsberg, remembered. The men of his unit ‘killed Faustnikov on the spot, because no one 
looked at their age [and] they burned many of our tanks!’167 Moreover, dressing these men 
remained a problem. As army uniforms were scarce, many were supplied with Party uniforms. 
Wearing a Party uniform was like a red rag on Soviets troops, and, as Waldemar Magunia 
stressed, had an adverse effect on Volkssturm morale.168 
The Volkssturm was used as a kind of manpower pool, and the way its recruits were 
deployed seems to have been motivated by the intention to keep the ‘hard core’ of seasoned 
veterans of the different Wehrmacht divisions intact, which allowed their staying power to 
remain at a relatively high level.169 The young boys were separated from the older conscripts, 
and their motivation seems to have been an important factor in that decision.    
These boys were convinced that everything that this war asked of them they would do better than 
the ‘old’, a designation in which they even included their fathers. What the ‘old’ had ruined, they, 
the ‘young’, had to put right, indeed, they were certain that they, in this almost lost war, could bring 
about a decisive turn.170 
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These youngsters were assigned to ‘Kampfgruppe 1.I.D.’ (Battle group 1st infantry division), 
which consisted of two small regiments. During ‘Operation Westwind’, they were put in the 
first line of attack. Like most officers of the 1st infantry division, Hauptmann Lenz felt that 
during the offensive to restore the link between Königsberg and Pillau they ‘proved themselves 
worthy of the grand tradition of the division.’171 After the first pioneers had removed mines, 
the young Hitlerjugend boys stormed into the no-man’s-land towards the first objective, the 
hamlet of Metgethen. An officer remarked that ‘This day is a glorious chapter of the German 
youth, similar to Langemarck’.172 ‘Like madmen!’, another told a war correspondent. ‘They 
ran away from me. Just ran off to the front. They pulled the [barbed] wire apart with their 
hands, as if there are no mines in between. And then straight into the foxholes of Ivan to wreak 
havoc!’173 It led, however, to high casualties amongst these boys, whom of many had only 
served for a mere two weeks. The fanatical Hauptmann Hans-Joachim Schröder recalled that 
‘The attack squadrons suffered nearly 50 per cent dead and wounded. In the next few days, 
squadron leaders had to inform many a Königsberg mother about the heroic death of her son.’174 
The young boys, as a whole, were repeatedly hailed in the aftermath of Operation Westwind, 
while the older age group did not receive similar praise.175   
In contrast, the older militiamen were mainly used in the defence of the city. Their 
service in the Volkssturm was much less driven by fanatic élan, but, as Yelton found, rather by 
‘traditional values of patriotism and duty, a long-standing distrust of and distaste for their 
Slavic neighbours, and the desire to protect family and possessions against the feared 
Bolsheviks.’176 They were thus placed in less hard-pressed areas of the front. In turn, the 
Soviets were well aware that they had older men in front of them, and tried to demoralise them, 
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blasting ‘old grandfathers, go home!’ from loudspeaker cars in the sectors where Volkssturm 
units lay.177 Indeed, days before the final storming they dropped leaflets aimed specifically at 
the Volkssturm, reiterating that ‘the Nazi chiefs delay the fighting, throw you, peaceful citizens 
of East Prussia, in the battle, and try to convince you, that you should “save” your Heimat.’ 
But, it was stressed, ‘You know yourself, what kind of “fighters” you are.’178 The Soviets were 
correct in their assessment. There should be no doubt that these older Volkssturm men were 
considered expendable: in the defence plans of Königsberg, the priority was placed on the north 
of the river Pregel, where the city connected to the adjacent Samland peninsula.179 Most of the 
Volkssturm units, however, were assigned to positions south of the river, with little chance of 
escape, while the more effective units were placed to the north.180 The Hitler Youth boys had 
much better chances to survive: Volkssturm battalion 25/141 ‘Lützow’, consisting solely of 
young Volkssturm boys, was even ordered to stay out of the fighting entirely and managed to 
escape the city, in order to be deployed in Berlin.181 
There is no doubt that the Volkssturm suffered heavily in the fighting. The manner of 
their death was often brutal. Siedler found that in Königsberg ‘a very significant number (…), 
who in brown uniforms fell into the hands of the enemy, were murdered in an often bestial 
manner.’182 In all, the Volkssturm suffered much heavier losses than the regular Wehrmacht: 
of the roughly 10,000 men of Königsberg’s original contingent, 2,400 – a quarter – was listed 
as dead or missing in action after the war.183 That many of these men – young boys, invalids, 
elderly – should have properly been evacuated out of the city as civilians was hardly considered 
at all. Instead, they were subject to ever more military coercion, which will be discussed in the 
next section.  
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VI. Radicalisation through the pretext of law 
 
The intensive efforts to transform Königsberg into a battle community were accompanied by 
the increasing violence of the drumhead courts-martial. In the current historiography, this 
violence is generally traced back to Party legislation, particularly to the ‘Ordinance on the 
Establishment of Courts-Martial’, implemented on 15 February 1945 by Reich Minister of 
Justice, Otto von Thierack. The decree called for the formation of drumhead courts-martial in 
areas that were immediately threatened.184 Three weeks later, on 9 March 1945, this ordinance 
was followed by Hitler’s decree to establish ‘Flying Courts-Martial’ or the Fliegende 
Standgerichte.185 That decree authorised roving execution squads to base their judgement on 
suspicion rather than clear evidence alone. It is tempting to view the violence as a continuation 
of the National Socialist violence, which started in 1932 - 1933, a view that is put forward by 
Sven Keller.186 There is a strong case for his argument, since up to then, at a local level, 
Kreisleiter had often presided over ‘kangaroo-courts’ in their cities, and Ortsgruppenleiter had 
indeed led the charge against subversive elements in their respective districts.187  
Yet, Keller’s line of reasoning has a number of limitations. By 1945, after six years of 
war, violence was different in nature. Death – by ‘terror-bombing’ or on the front line – had 
become part of everyday life. Whereas in 1932 and 1933 acts of Party violence in Königsberg 
caused an outrage worthy of international headlines, by 1945 violence had become normalised, 
and considered part of the overall consequence of Total War.188 More importantly, by merely 
portraying violence as an inherent part of Nazi society, and by consistently linking the German 
intra-ethnic violence in 1945 back to the ‘dyed-in-the-wool National Socialists’, Keller 
underplays the dialogue between the different actors that took place at the time, and thus fails 
to appreciate its versatile nature.189 Indeed, not all Party dignitaries were in favour of an 
increase in the use of summary courts-martial. Gauleiter Joachim Eggeling of Halle-Merseburg 
asked whether it was ‘politically acceptable (…) to summarily try’ Party officials after they 
had failed to do their job and then to subsequently report on this failure in newspapers: ‘How 
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are political leaders to be trusted by the population, if such derailments are cried out every day? 
(…) Among the Wehrmacht such incidents are kept secret, in order not to damage the nimbus 
of leadership.’190 Moreover, the radicalising nature of this fragmentation of law was also 
recognised, and its implications were discussed between the highest representatives of Party 
and Wehrmacht. ‘As always with heavy setbacks, the present stage of the war is marked by a 
tendency to search for those responsible for – or guilty to – it,’ a draft proposing a more careful 
approach towards summary courts-martial read. Wehrmacht officers blamed Party officials for 
the defeats, while Party officials tried to pin the responsibility on the military commanders. 
‘On both sides there are quitters and deserters,’ the draft continued:  
 
The Party and the Wehrmacht now only have the duty to stand together, fight together, and eradicate 
parasites from their ranks. So, when the execution of the holder of a Golden Party Badge is 
announced, this is no reason for the Wehrmacht to take position against the Party; vice versa, for 
the Party there is no cause for Schadenfreude when officers are sentenced to death for desertion or 
dereliction of duty.191 
 
As a reappraisal of the summary court practices, the draft came much too late in the day, in 
mid-March 1945, and never made it into law: by then, the direction taken was irreversible. 
Throughout the war, there had been a steady militarisation of home-front law, and Germany’s 
juridical apparatus explicitly expressed the intention to fashion it to better correspond with the 
military ethos. In 1939, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, the then Justice minister, Franz 
Gürtner, opened the periodical ‘Deutsches Strafrecht’ by stating that ‘During war time we 
demand that soldiers ruthlessly and without hesitation commit life and limb to the defence of 
their people. Also in the Heimat, the personal fortune has to be ruthlessly subordinated to the 
idea of the defence of our people.’192 By 1945, those Party members who championed von 
Thierack’s ordinance were clear as to where they got their inspiration: in a circular to the 
Gauleiters, which Reichsleiter Martin Bormann distributed on 9 March 1945, he stressed that, 
in his opinion, it was the example of Generaloberst Rendulic’s treatment of ‘so-called 
stragglers’ in the area of  his Army Group, and his use of flying courts-martial, that had served 
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as inspiration. 193 Also, that same week, Goebbels, who had ‘anxiously awaited’ von Thierack’s 
decree, praised the efforts of Rendulic in his diary:194 ‘In East Prussia Rendulic has restored 
order again. In one of his reports I read that when he took over the Army Group, he counted 
some 16,000 soldiers that “lost their unit”. He reduced that number in no time to 400, using 
most rigorous means. (…) Rendulic seems to have the ambition to be among the first of our 
modern army leaders.’195 Goebbels expressed similar praise for Generaloberst (later Field 
Marshal) Ferdinand Schörner, who  
 
spends most time alongside the fighting troops, with whom he has admittedly a harsh, but yet also 
a trusting relationship. He especially targets the so-called “trained stragglers”. With that he means 
soldiers who time and again see the chance to detach themselves from the troops in critical situations 
and make off to the hinterland under some pretext. He is rather brutal to those characters in that he 
has them strung up on the first possible tree with a sign that reads: “I am a deserter and I have 
refused to protect German women and children.” That surely exerts a very deterrent effect on the 
other deserters or on those who consider deserting.196  
 
Although, as we saw in the previous sections, executions of German citizens were already well 
underway by the time von Thierack’s decree was passed, it was nevertheless an important 
moment. Its implementation signalled the beginning of a period in which both Wehrmacht, 
Party, and state, fully believed in their absolute right to judge their compatriots’ ‘determination 
to fight’.197 In Königsberg, this led to a diverse set of law enforcers. In a post-war report, Walter 
Kemsies, a German intelligence officer present in Königsberg during its siege, mentions that 
checks were conducted by police-units, Feldgendarmerie, Jagd-Kommandos of the SS and SD, 
as well as regular army officers and the Gestapo: ‘These measures caused numerous soldiers 
and civilians without proper papers to be imprisoned, yes, even executed. Often, this was unjust 
and illogical.’198 A few days after von Thierack’s ordinance, Gauleiter Koch despatched six 
special SS squads, each consisting of twelve men, into the city to carry out these duties: ‘The 
SS guard of Königsberg has to carry out raids and patrols in all accommodation and flats of 
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war wives [i.e. wives whose husbands are serving at the front] and prostitutes and summarily 
shoot all encountered conscripted men without a valid leave pass.’199 The plethora of ‘law 
enforcers’ has given rise to many sweeping assumptions regarding their motives. Although 
Klaus-Dietmar Henke accused such men of ‘settling old scores’, and having a ‘private lust for 
power, [and] pathological bloodthirst’, in Königsberg some of the executioners seemed to have 
been conflicted by their actions.200 After two Party officials had conducted a public execution 
of two soldiers who, during the final storming, had deserted and changed into civilian clothing, 
they immediately fled to the hinterland themselves, only to be caught and executed the 
following day.201  
Nevertheless, the randomness of the checks and the executions created a climate of fear 
in the city. Louis Clappier, a French prisoner of war remembered that ‘A minimum of terror 
was enough to strike fear and apathy into the population. (…) The Streifen of the military police 
combed the cellars and bunkers, hunting for deserters, people without papers and suspicious 
foreigners.’ In addition to the Nordbahnhof and Hauptbahnhof, in February and March the 
Königsberg zoo was also used as a place of execution.202 This visible violence, under the guise 
of the rule of law, ensured that civilians continued to cooperate and were easier to control. 
Thanks to the focus on the drumhead courts-martial, we tend to forget that other courts 
in Königsberg continued to operate as well. Both the fortress court, which General Lasch 
established, as well as the SS und Polizeigericht XXVII, which handled police cases in 
Königsberg, continue to pass sentences.203 Yet, unlike the drumhead courts, when these courts 
passed death sentences, it often did not result in immediate execution. Instead, up to the final 
storming, soldiers who were sentenced to death were sent to a penal battalion, Polizei Battallion 
Elias. In all likehood, this battalion was deployed in the south of Königsberg and completely 
wiped out.204 Yet, the main difference between the drumhead courts and these courts was that 
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accused soldiers were still able to argue their case, and, occasionally, walked away with minor 
sentences, such as extra guard duty.205 Being tried by these courts, however, was a privilege 
that was denied to civilians, who continued to be subject to the arbitrariness of the drumhead 
courts.  
Whether judged by the regular courts or by the drumhead courts, the rationale for their 
judgements was virtually always the same. Most condemned were judged in the light of a 
continuous struggle for Germany and by their willingness to fend off ‘un-German’ influences, 
rather than merely within the framework of the National Socialist cause. The case of 51-year 
old Alois M., a Rottwachtmeister der Schutzpolizei der Reserve, which was brought before the 
SS und Polizeigericht XXVII in late February 1945, is an example. Fearing he was about to be 
overrun by the Soviet advance, M. deserted his unit on 29 January, changed into civilian 
clothing and hid in different houses and basements. On 7 February, he was found by the Streifen 
and handed over to the SS Court. His death sentence was read out to police troops in the 
fortress:  
The Court has indeed recognized as mitigation that the accused has done his duty in the 
[First] World War and had been awarded with the Iron Cross Second Class. Also taken into 
account is that the defendant was judged to be satisfactory so far. But due to the severity of 
the deed, these mitigating circumstances cannot preserve the defendant from receiving the 
harshest punishment. He who in this decisive phase of the war tiptoes around the fulfilment 
of service and as such not only breaks his oath to the Führer, but also betrays the German 
Volksgemeinschaft, must be eradicated according to the harshness of war. He who out of 
cowardice wants to avoid deployment, has to lose under all circumstances the life that he so 
cowardly tried to safe. That expects every decent and well-behaved soldier, who in loyal 
fulfilment of duty during heavy fighting every day bravely puts his life on the line. The 
famous principle, based on the front-experience of the Führer, that the brave soldier can 
indeed fall, but that the weaklings have to fall under all circumstances, is unrelentingly 
carried out by the court.206   
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That this sentence, passed in late February by the (‘regular’) SS und Polizeigericht XXVII, was 
to be made public, reveals another dimension of the drumhead courts-martial. Within the 
context of 1945, Standgericht is often translated as ‘summary court-martial’, a speedily 
convened court without ceremony. Although trials of Standgerichte were unquestionably 
speedy, much of the legitimacy of the drumhead courts, which more often than not consisted 
of men without a legal background, rested precisely on linking their judgements to the larger 
German military legal tradition. The ceremonial element of the drumhead courts, attaching a 
sign around the necks of the victims or gathering a crowd to witness an execution, was a vital 
part of the process.207 A French prisoner-of-war recalled that when he walked beside 
improvised gallows, the five condemned soldiers all ‘had rectangular plates fixed to the chests. 
Inscriptions on the signs in large black letters: “I hang here because I’m a coward”, or “I did 
not want to protect Germany”.’208 Onlookers also played an important role in the executions. 
Sometimes crowds of over 1,000 people were gathered together to view these executions on 
the central square, the Adolf-Hitler-Platz.209 On occasion, also the church was used to 
legitimise the process. As part of a public execution of twenty-four soldiers in March, a pastor 
told the condemned men: ‘You have to fight for your relatives at home and you cannot let them 
down.’210  
Executions of military personnel, Party members and civilians continued right until the 
surrender of the city. While walking past the Nordbahnhof in early March, a labourer, Karl 
Danisch, counted no less than seventy-two bodies – some in uniform, others in civilian clothing 
– with an accompanying sign stating: ‘A soldier can die, a coward must die’.211 On 6 April 
1945, the final Soviet storming of Königsberg started, and, although it was immediately clear 
that resistance would be futile, the executions continued as before. Despite constant artillery 
and aerial bombardment, civilians were still repeatedly forced to attend them.212 Another 
civilian, Michael Wieck, again recalled walking past the Nordbahnhof during these days: 
‘There I saw hanged soldiers, who had wanted to do the only sensible thing: stop this pointless 
war. They did what the army commanders – with Hitler at the top – were too cowardly to do.  
Instead a plate was attached to their chests: I had to die, because I am a coward.’ 213 The 
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drumhead courts-martial brought the regime’s criminality right out into the open, and rank 
among the clearest examples of what Sven Keller has deemed ‘violence as a means of 
communication.’214 The ceremonial aspect of these courts is therefore of vital importance to 
understand their practice, as it unambiguously communicated the line that authorities expected 
the population to adhere to.215 
The extent of the killing is difficult to judge. After the war, in a newspaper article in the 
expellee newspaper Ostpreussen-Warte, a commentator claimed that there were ‘hardly any 
lampposts left in Königsberg to hang the condemned.’216 A member of one of the six SS-guard 
commando squads who had been despatched by Gauleiter Koch claimed to have participated 
in over 200 executions.217 The Volkssturm man, Adolf Klein, remembered that the drumhead 
courts were dreaded among the civilian population, as ‘every day [they] executed men, women 
and children for minor offenses, primarily in public.’218 He estimated that, in March alone, 
between thirty to forty people were executed every day.219 The names of these people were 
announced on large posters shortly afterwards.220 If these numbers are correct, some 1,500 
people would have died throughout the fortress era as a result of the different drumhead courts-
martial.  
The Soviet besiegers seemed to confirm such numbers, with the Red Army newspaper 
‘Red Star’ claiming that ‘in the fortress dozens of deserters were shot each day.’221 Upon 
entering the city, Major K. Melnikov found that many deserters ‘had been shot and then hung 
upside down and not removed for a few days. In each edition, the newspaper “Königsberger 
Zeitung” had printed the lists of the soldiers executed for desertion. Platoon commanders were 
ordered to read the lists to their soldiers.’222 Although the exact number of executions is 
impossible to reconstruct, if we accept the conservative number of 1,500 during a period of just 
over two months, this translates into the execution of almost one per cent of all the people 
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present (civilians and soldiers), or almost three per cent of the garrison of 50,000. Comparing 
these numbers to the earlier findings of Messerschmidt and Wüllner, who traced the deaths of 
some 27,000 people back to summary courts-martial, we find that German intra-ethnic violence 
increased significantly in the final months of the war. The case study of Königsberg shows that 
extreme violence was not necessarily born out of a tendency to maintain order in an alien or 
hostile environment abroad; it was dependent on local factors and actors, and largely 




In the summer of 1944, the German Wehrmacht fell back on East Prussian territory. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, the contact between soldiers and civilians was initially limited, since 
the area of operations around the province’s borders was cleared of its population. The first 
time that German troops in East Prussia came into contact with large numbers of German 
civilians was in January 1945, as the Soviet offensives pushed westwards. By the end of that 
month, German soldiers and civilians were trapped in and around Königsberg. Of the 200,000 
civilians who were present in the city when it was first encircled, around 100,000 still remained 
by early April, despite the existence of a corridor to the port city of Pillau. The majority of 
these people were fully deployed in the defence of the city, either as part of the Volkssturm, or 
because they had to perform Festungsdienst, with women and youths being allocated a more 
active role than before. The fortress command’s efforts to transform Königsberg into a 
Kampfgemeinschaft offer clear insight how the concept of Total War could shape a local 
community. Those who were considered part of this community were not judged according to 
their loyalty to the Volk, but to their willingness to contribute to the local war effort.  
 This chapter has demonstrated the role the Wehrmacht played in the regulation and 
enforcement of the rule of law in Königsberg, particularly highlighting its preparedness to 
resort to extreme means of coercion. It traces this behaviour back to its stay on the Eastern 
Front, where – driven by ‘criminal orders’ – hostility between civilians and troops was actively 
fuelled. The connection between the Weltanschauungskrieg and the German army’s behaviour 
abroad has been the focus of sustained research, yet this research has not been expanded to 
include military violence towards its own citizens. Although the defining characteristic of 
earlier Wehrmacht violence against civilians, its racial component, lost its importance as troops 
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moved back into Germany, other factors, such as alienation, panic, stress, and trauma, increased 
as the war continued. Moreover, both the sense of military camaraderie and the fear of a 
repetition of ‘1918’ assured that a psychological distance remained in place between troops 
and civilians.  
In the Soviet Union, members of the Wehrmacht had adhered to a completely different 
set of laws that met the demands of the barbarous nature of the Eastern Front, and, even though 
the laws on the German home front had also considerably hardened during the war years, 
military law was more stringent. This difference clearly manifested itself in Königsberg, where 
the remaining civilians were expected to adapt – virtually overnight – to the ‘extreme 
normality’ of the front. The impossibility of this demand became evident in the first week of 
military rule in the city, when officer patrols struck in force against ‘dissenters’, rounding up 
men who had gone into hiding, or executing people caught entering the abandoned houses of 
neighbours who had fled. The population did not challenge this behaviour, but accepted it with 
a resigned attitude. 
These developments were recognised by the Party. It feared that these emergency legal 
measures in German territory would weaken its authority and would lead to a further decline 
in support for the regime. Thus, heavily influenced by military law, in February and March 
1945 it implemented regulations concerning summary courts martial along similar lines to the 
military. Yet, due to the fragmented state of Germany, the proclamation of these laws did not 
automatically lead to their implementation. Local actors would have a significant impact on 
the practice of these courts, as their evaluation of the situation determined the immediacy of 
setting an example, while their personal convictions remained of importance in individual 
cases. In resect to Königsberg, the two-month long proximity to the front line meant that the 
Party and the army used the full panopoly of the law at their disposal in the most ruthless 
fashion. This process represented the final step in their cumulative radicalisation under the 
pretext of law, and eventually pushed many communities to progress towards previously 





The year 1945 will ultimately be considered as one of the most violent in German history. For 
the East Prussian capital of Königsberg it was its final year, since on 4 July 1946, the city was 
rechristened Kaliningrad, after the recently deceased Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin, who, 
as the political scientist Richard Krickus somewhat sarcastically pointed out, ‘never visited the 
place.’1 Königsberg faced a death struggle for its status as a German city, a battle it would 
ultimately lose. Five years later, all German citizens had been expelled, and in the years that 
followed the new Russian authorities sought to erase all signs of what they considered to be 
‘Prussian militarism’, culminating in the destruction of the ruins of the Königsberger Schloss 
in 1968.2 During the siege, few people envisioned themselves as part of a German future for 
Königsberg. This microstudy highlights that the concerns of the principal actors did not centre 
on their role in the ‘Third Reich’; rather, it reveals how strongly people clung to their immediate 
local environment, and how this impacted on behavioural patterns.  
 Chapter 1 served to set the scene by analysing the main groups of actors – the East 
Prussian civilians, the Wehrmacht, and the Party – as well as the environment in which they 
operated, and the way in which they perceived it. Königsberg, the as capital of East Prussia, 
had long been presented as the easternmost bulwark of Germandom, and defences around the 
city had consistently been strengthened in fear of ‘the East’. This Grenzland-narrative was also 
adhered to under National Socialism, although this never translated into a population that was 
significantly more resolute than their compatriots in other parts of Germany. Nevertheless, 
from the summer of 1944 onwards, large parts of the East Prussian population were deployed 
in the construction of the Ostwall defensive positions along the province’s border, while that 
autumn its men were called up to serve in the Volkssturm. The two efforts – the first two Total 
War drives in the province – showed that, on a local level, Party and Wehrmacht were willing 
and able to cooperate, and that, as a sense of urgency set in, they both proved fully prepared to 
deploy civilians in defensive efforts. Under the surface, however, there was friction between 
the two, largely caused by the inroads made into each other’s traditional power structures. 
Whereas the Party allocated itself more martial tasks, the Wehrmacht took over large parts of 
local administration as the front line drew nearer. This was particularly the case in cities that 
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were designated Festungen, or fortresses, which, within the German defensive strategy, were 
to be held to the last man. When General Otto Lasch took control of Königsberg as fortress 
commander, the Wehrmacht's recent experiences in the Soviet Union would have been fresh in 
his mind. Not only had cities proven to be costly to conquer, the subsequent rule had been 
marked by distrust towards an unfamiliar population, whose hostility repeatedly led to unrest 
or even open rebellion. This perception differed considerably from that of local Party officials, 
and bore even less resemblance to the attitude of Königsberg’s civilian population towards 
their own city.  
By 1945 Festungen were poorly regarded by German troops: not only had the word 
Festung been completely hollowed out by their own propaganda, during Operation Bagration, 
the 1944 Soviet summer offensive, the strategy had proved disastrous. The German fortress 
cities, however, had been considerably better prepared for their function, were better stocked, 
and were incorporated in larger defensive systems. Consequently, Königsberg stayed in 
Germans hands in late January 1945, and would remain so for over two more months. During 
this period, the final authority came to rest with a staff consisting of military personnel, led by 
General Otto Lasch, and Party officials, led by Kreisleiter Ernst Wagner. The working 
relationship between the two men was good, but, to a certain extent, rested upon the willingness 
of Wagner to subordinate himself to Lasch. Wagner was willing to do so, because, besides 
legal authority, the Wehrmacht also had moral authority over the Party. There was no doubt 
that few of East Prussia’s other Party members truly cared whether Königsberg would hold or 
not, since most of them, Gauleiter Koch included, had left the city shortly before the Soviet 
encirclement. This action ranged the remaining Party members against the absent Party elite, 
rather than against the Wehrmacht, not least because the army had stayed put, fighting off the 
Soviet attack at the city’s borders. As a result, a martial mindset came to permeate the combined 
fortress staff. Rather than interacting with events on a national level, it was these local 
dynamics that determined how Königsberg’s population would experience the final months of 
the war.   
 Chapter 2 stressed the city’s insular nature by providing an in-depth analysis of the 
different themes in Königsberg’s propaganda, both prior and during its siege. During the final 
months of 1944, large parts of the East Prussian population definitively broke with the idea of 
a larger German Volksgemeinschaft, feeling that the National Socialist regime had proved 
unable to meet its promises. Contributing to this notion was the realisation that the province 
was about to become a battle field: while the increasing presence of front-line and Trosse troops 
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on East Prussian territory kindled the first anxieties, the atrocity propaganda that followed in 
the wake of the Gumbinnen Operation truly fuelled the traditional fear of ‘the East’ even 
further. In January 1945, this fear became a reality, and by the end of the month most of East 
Prussia was in Soviet hands and Königsberg was surrounded.  
The direction that local propagandists took during the city’s two-month siege reveals 
that a utilitarian approach dominated the way they sought to interact with their audience. From 
the first day of the siege, sustained efforts were made to forge a Kampfgemeinschaft, based on 
Königsberg’s ‘battle’, rather than on Germany’s ‘struggle’. What eventually emerged was a 
reaction to the population’s more outspoken aversity of the Party, and the need to provide a 
tailor-made answer to the NKFD agitators at the other side of the front line. Rather than paying 
attention to developments on a national or international level, propagandists instead devoted 
most of their energy to addressing local issues. The ‘Fortress identity’ came to rely heavily on 
what was at hand: instead of linking the defence of the city to the defence of National Socialist 
principles, propagandists invoked an image of Königsberg as a centuries-long embattled 
bulwark of Germandom. As part of this effort, the population and garrison of Königsberg were 
‘spurred on’ by the heroes of Königsberg’s history, such as General Ludwig Yorck von 
Wartenburg and the philosopher Immanuel Kant. In the East Prussian Volkssturm Knight’s 
Cross recipient, Ernst Tiburzy, propagandists found a tangible example of defiance, who they 
repeatedly used to replace the grandiose boasts of the different Nazi figure heads.  
This local approach is also reflected in the set of rumours that the fortress command 
sought to introduce. Their focus on local issues meant that there was little need to inform people 
about matters beyond their immediate horizon, while their rapid spread attests to the 
willingness of significant parts of the population to continue to consider the information that 
reached them as plausible. The fortress command’s persistence in seeking to shape popular 
opinion in the city can be clearly observed in the wake of the discovery of Soviet atrocities in 
the Metgethen suburb, west of Königsberg. The orchestrated release of the initially embargoed 
news, which combined coverage in the official Party outlet, the Preußische Zeitung, with a 
rumour campaign spearheaded by soldiers of the divisions deployed during the suburb’s 
recapture, reveals the lengths propagandists were still willing to go to by this stage of the war. 
Given the continuous destruction of the city, these men also had the vital task of upholding the 
idea that Königsberg was still worth defending. The reluctance of the population to leave the 
city, even as a corridor was created between Königsberg and Pillau, is a sombre testament to 
the success propagandists had in downplaying the dangers that the population was exposed to.  
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This behaviour seemingly conflicts with what is regarded as one of the core tasks of an 
army: the protection of its civilians. Chapter 3 points to the continuities in the behavioural 
patterns of the German troops from their time in the occupied Soviet Union, and established 
that the German troops that retreated into Königsberg in January 1945 had long had different 
immediate priorities. The actions of the troops who fell back on East Prussian territory already 
revealed that their mindset had been shaped – barbarised – by the years of war on the Eastern 
Front. There, these men had been taught to disregard civilian property, and this behaviour 
continued once back on East Prussian soil. Complaints about the poor behaviour of troops 
spread almost as soon as the Wehrmacht entered Germany, and turned into outrage as their stay 
in the province continued. The wanton destruction and the plunder of German property worried 
commanders, but, despite the introduction of strict orders to counter soldiers’ behaviour, 
remained an unresolved problem until the end of the war. In the light of a continuous retreat, 
the soldiers’ actions are understandable, especially since the decision-making processes that 
underpinned evacuation measures in East Prussia essentially differed little from those during 
the earlier years of retreat, and thus did not require the average soldier to rethink his behaviour. 
In this period, the impetus behind ‘evacuation’ was not the preservation of property. Instead, 
extensive orders were passed down to assure that military and civilian materiel was either 
broken down, evacuated, paralysed, or destroyed; a policy whose effects would be felt well 
into the post-war years. Troops were also to adhere to this policy once back in Germany, which, 
as reports of numerous local officials indicated, they did readily and without question or 
consideration. 
As it moved into East Prussia, the Wehrmacht also played a role in the evacuation of 
civilians. The organisation of their evacuation rested with local Party officials, but with large 
parts of the province threatened by Soviet attack, they were ordered to cooperate with military 
commanders. Although at times the collaboration was strained, by and large Party and 
Wehrmacht reached agreement with relative ease. The demands of the military centred around 
the removal of local populations from the area of operations, and, as such, the concerns for 
civilians – or better the lack thereof – were identical to those earlier on the Eastern Front. Once 
the Soviet offensives commenced in January 1945, military concerns immediately gained the 
upper hand, and concern for civilians was no longer a priority. Trains and ships were prioritised 
for the transport of ammunition and the wounded, while roads were cleared of refugees to allow 
the army unrestricted movement. It is in this regard that ‘cumulative radicalisation’ manifested 
itself. Although the concept is traditionally used to explain the implementation of the 
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Holocaust, the implementation of the evacuation policy in East Prussia bears a striking 
resemblance to many of its aspects. The Wehrmacht’s radical stance towards civilians found 
consensus among its ranks, as it allowed commanders to present themselves as determined 
defenders of Germany.  With the defence of Germany as the overriding concern, the Party elite 
also accepted this course, or even tried to outdo the Wehrmacht. The pervasiveness of this 
attitude, however, meant that civilian interests were routinely ignored.  
This becomes particularly clear during Operation Westwind, the operation that sought 
to connect Königsberg to the port of Pillau. By allocating three of the garrison’s five divisions 
to it, and by positioning the strongest remaining division in such a way that it would be able to 
head west on short notice as well, General Lasch left the population dangerously exposed in 
the case of a Soviet attack. In this critical chapter of Königsberg’s siege, it was clear that 
Lasch’s loyalty lay with his troops, and that the care for the population was at best of minor 
importance. In the period following the successful break-out, the evacuation of civilians was 
still not actively pursued, despite the existence of a corridor to Pillau. In the newly established 
‘refugee camps’ on the Samland, the care for evacuees remained low, with famine and diseases 
rampant. Unsurprisingly, civilians were often reluctant to be evacuated from Königsberg, and 
by mid-March the evacuation of Königsberg was halted. From then on, the population of 
Königsberg even increased, since refugees from around the city flooded back to the city in 
search of proper food and shelter. It meant that about 100,000 civilians found themselves in 
Königsberg as the final Soviet storming commenced. Although there is no doubt that the 
fortress command was aware of these numbers, it undertook no attempts to pursue alternatives 
to prevent a high civilian death toll. Multiple Soviet calls for surrender, both immediately prior 
to and during the final storming, or the idea of declaring Königsberg an open city, were 
dismissed out of hand. With surrender closely linked to dishonour, the defence of the city 
continued for over three days, by which time Soviet troops had advanced deep into the city 
centre, and were closing in on Lasch’s command post. Perhaps the clearest evidence of the 
German army’s disregard for its population are the terms of Königsberg’s capitulation: no 
stipulations were included to assure their subsequent safety, and no efforts were made to protect 
their status as civilians.  
This hard line can also be distinguished in the way the military sought to ensure 
Königsberg’s Kampfgemeinschaft. Chapter 4 discussed how the army’s arrival led to a sharp 
increase of intra-ethnic violence in the city. During the previous years on the Eastern Front, 
German troops had actively supported the regime’s various genocidal policies and criminal 
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orders, and fought with increasing ruthlessness against a much-dreaded, visible or invisible, 
enemy. This resulted in a ‘barbarised’ mindset, with which they returned to East Prussia. Their 
arrival on German soil did not necessarily alleviate feelings of fear and anxiety, if only because 
on a day-to-day basis nothing changed for the troops: they still faced the same enemy, and they 
were still part of close-knit military structures that were held together by a sense of 
Kameradschaft. The constant rotation of troops caused by the large military losses increased a 
sense of mistrust among the men, while they were now also confronted with the civilians’ 
defeatist attitude. Parallels could be drawn to the ‘stab in the back’ of 1918 and the following 
collapse of order and rule of law, especially as the Party was seen giving in to civilian demands.  
To quell any potential unrest, General Lasch sought to establish a ‘Wehrmacht rule of 
law’ immediately after his arrival in the city. Officer patrols, Streifen, were to restore order in 
Königsberg and bring deserters to the front, and, in this capacity, were given considerable 
leeway to determine what constituted ‘disorder’, or who exactly qualified as a ‘deserter’. 
During the first week of Königsberg’s siege, in late-January 1945, they executed men and 
women for minor infractions, signalling an abrupt departure of an already stringent Home Front 
regime. Other officers even acted on their own initiative and executed those they considered 
‘cowards’, fully exploiting the authority that the late-war military regulations provided them 
with. From a military standpoint, this approach was highly successful: not only did Königsberg 
stay in German hands; the army was also immediately recognised as the final authority in the 
city. It marked the beginning of an era during which the extreme normalities of military life 
became the norm. In the midst of artillery shelling and aerial bombardment, the Fortress 
command provided food, shelter, water and electricity for the population, and also assured that 
stores, banks, and cinemas remained open for the people who were willing to contribute to the 
envisioned Kampfgemeinschaft. But this willingness was – of course – relative: the decision to 
stay in Königsberg was above all shaped by a reluctance to flee, or was rooted in the 
consideration that living out the war in a familiar environment would be the best chance of 
surviving it.  
For a significant group, moreover, leaving Königsberg was strictly forbidden: as many 
as 10,000 Volkssturm militia men were deployed during the defence of Königsberg, and these 
men were fully integrated in the fortress’ command structure. The fortress command even 
differentiated between the different age groups: young boys were used in first wave of attack 
during the assault on Metgethen, whereas the older men were given defensive tasks on poorly 
held sectors of the front. Moreover, in early February, the fortress command proclaimed 
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Festungsdienst, or Fortress Service, which called for in the complete integration of the civilian 
population in the fortress’ defensive efforts. With all men of military age already at the front, 
Festungsdienst encompassed older children, the elderly, and women, who were all to contribute 
to the fortress’ defence for four hours per day. The decision signalled the final step towards 
Total War, and was justified by pointing to the safety the city provided despite being 
immediately threatened by Soviet forces. Subsequently, the willingness to contribute to the 
defence became the unofficial measuring rod of the civilians’ relation to the 
Kampfgemeinschaft.  
The continuing reliance on the strict military mindset ensured that – even though they 
were now fighting on German territory – army commanders continued to consider the defence 
of an area as their primary goal. There should be no doubt that the Party elite looked at the 
army’s stringent emergency measures and its ruthless use of civilians with both admiration and 
concern. On the one hand, the Wehrmacht’s means of coercion were seen as highly effective 
in ensuring the involvement of the population; on the other, set against the existing legislation, 
their severity and increasing grip on civilians’ lives corroded the traditional rule of law. Again 
following the pattern of ‘cumulative radicalisation’, throughout February and March laws were 
enacted that assured the Party’s place in summary court-martial proceedings. This led to an 
increasing and diverse set of perpetrators, in turn resulting in an explosive increase in the 
number of victims. Personal motivations, such as revenge, might have played a role in the 
severity of the summary courts-martial, but impotence in the face of the dire situation and 
misdirected forward panic nevertheless seem to have been of overarching importance.  
It is near-impossible to determine to what extent this final intra-ethnic violence was 
perceived as extraordinary, since violence and National Socialism had always had a symbiotic 
relationship. Violence was born out of National Socialism, just as National Socialism was born 
out of violence. Already during the Weimar regime, clashes between SA and Communists had 
been framed as a Hobbesian struggle of ‘every man against every man’, while also a few years 
later Home Front support for the war effort certainly partially rested on the ability to ‘bring 
distant terrors near’ by exposing ‘the aggressive intentions of Jewish Bolshevism.’3 Those 
distant terrors were infinitely nearer on the Eastern Front, where the lives of German troops 
were indeed, in Hobbes’ words, ‘nasty, brutish and short’.4 The behavioural patterns of the 
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Wehrmacht in East Prussia highlight an aspect which, within the research into its relationship 
to the Nazi regime, remains underappreciated: the Wehrmacht was not merely violent because 
it was part of the National Socialist apparatus; it was also an instrument of violence itself. 
Eventually, violence migrated together with the Wehrmacht, and, in the end, indeed brought 
the terrors of the Eastern Front to the streets of Königsberg.   
Reconciling developments in other East Prussian cities with the findings of Königsberg 
has allowed for a better appreciation of the diversity of the different relationships in the city. 
In Königsberg, all aspects that were needed to pit the military and Party against the population 
were present, and, as such, the city fits well within the grand narrative of the fall-where-you-
stand rhetoric of Germany 1945. Yet, most of East Prussia’s cities, such as Allenstein, 
Marienwerder, Tilsit, Insterburg, or Elbing were not stubbornly defended; the extensive 
defensive systems around Lötzen were even abandoned without a fight.5 Many cities on the 
borders of East Prussia were evacuated on time. Not every house became a bunker, not every 
town became a fortress. Yet, the decision to base the defence of Germany around its cities was 
the most tangible step towards Total War, and, especially since most refugees fled towards 
them, brought the majority of the German population into close contact with combatants. 
Subsequently, the proximity of civilians’ defeatist sentiments to soldiers’ negative emotions of 
fear and suspicion had the potential to turn cities into pressure cookers.6  
What would eventually determine how a city and its inhabitants underwent the final 
months of the war, however, were local dynamics, attitudes, and loyalties. In Königsberg, the 
complexity of behavioural patterns can best be seen by the harsh stance of the officers of the 
1st (Ostpreussische) infantry division, who, although primarily recruited in Königsberg, did 
not hesitate to carry out executions of their former city neighbours to cement martial law. It is 
therefore impractical to talk about ‘the’ Wehrmacht during the final year of the war, but we can 
nevertheless draw some conclusions. Firstly, there are clear limits to the well-worn idea of the 
Wehrmacht as an obstacle for radicalisation in German society: in Königsberg, it can even be 
considered as a ‘stakeholder of violence’, since by readily resorting to it, the fortress command 
was able to establish its authority virtually overnight. During a time of omnipresent confusion, 
executions could communicate a simple message: either you assist in Königsberg’s defence – 
or you die. Although less explicit, this was also the line that was adhered to during East 
                                                          
5 Willems, “Defiant Breakwaters or Desperate Blunders?”, 359. 
6 The range of emotions surfacing within a city faced with severe adversity is beautifully examined in 
Albert Camus’ 1947 novel La Peste.  
198 
 
Prussia’s evacuation, as those unable to contribute to the province’s defence were virtually left 
to fend for themselves. Secondly, the Wehrmacht contributed significantly to the destruction 
of Germany’s infrastructure, turning on the same society it had protected for years. Indeed, in 
its purpose, the March 1945 ‘Nero-order’, so often portrayed as an outburst of a Führer 
disillusioned by his own people, differed little from an already widely acceped military pratice. 
Lastly, the troops’ constantly expanding image of the enemy during Nazi Germany’s 
Weltanschauungskrieg also included civilians, and in that respect their brutalised behaviour 
towards their own population above all attests to deep-seated group imperatives. Once the 
Wehrmacht returned to East Prussian soil, the totality of the war ensured that the troops’ 
preconceptions of the civilian as ‘other’ inevitably came into conflict with their duties as 























Appendix 1: Manpower in Festung Glogau, 20 February 1945.  
 
 
Encircled in Fortress       9,348 people 
 
Of which: reliable (stoßkräftig und grabensicher) hardly   1,500 
 
Of Volkssturm      2,000 persevering 
 
Of those retreating from positions, again to be collected, 
  and redeployed elements without battle value, completely 
  untrained, morally inferior, about     2,000 
 
Of conscripted civilians needed for maintaining of 
  the viability of the city      1,263 
 
Wounded        1,023 
 
Civilian women, a few children and old men  
  unable to work       996 
 
Picked up and ruched-together foreigners     566 
 














Appendix 2: Number of civilians in Königsberg, January to April 1945.  
 
Königsberg during the siege  
Source Late 
January 



























    100,000 – 
120.000 
civilians  
Dr. Will, Oberbürgermeister 120,000 – 
130,000 
inhabitants 





     
Wegener  Well over 
100.000 
    
Propaganda office East 
Prussia report 6-2  
 125,000      
Propaganda office East 
Prussia report 15-2 
(corrected) 
 135,000     
Kriegstagebuch des OKW, 
15-2 
 135,000     
Report to State Secretary by 




19-2    
    
SD report 26-2    -14,000     
SD report 27-2    -17,000     
Propaganda office East 
Prussia report 28-2  
(Concerning 26-2) 
  - 51.000 
refugees 
from KB to 
Pillau 
   
Waldemar Magunia   From 26-2 onwards 90,000 
people to Pillau 
  
Major der Reserve Kurt 
Dieckert  
  70.000 to Pillau, 10.000 returned    
Friedrich Dorfmüller, 
Oberstabsinterdant 
  Down to 90,000 and up to 
130,000 again  
  
Dr. Will, Oberbürgermeister    50,000 people over land and sea 
from Königsberg to Pillau 
  




due to full Peyse 
   
Dr. Hans Schäfer, Ia der 
Festung  
   Civilians poor 
back into the city  
  
Klaus von der Groeben, 
Landrat des Kreises Samland, 
3-3  
   150-160.000 





SD report 5-3     154,000 civilians   
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SD report 6-3     Only 3,000 of 
16,000 persons 
showed up for 
evacuation 
  
Es geschah von zehn Jahren     Wagner on 7-3: 
everyone out by 
15-3, cancelled on 
9-3 already  
  
SD report 10-3     - 2,500 on  9-3   
SD report 11-3    No evacuation on 
10-3. First refugee 
camps cleared 
  
SD report 12-3     - 4,000 in night of 
10-3  
  
SD report 14-3 (Concerning 
situation from 12-2 onwards)  
   Evacuation 
postponed until 
further notice due 
to technical issues 
  
SD report 15-3    No evacuation   
SD report 16-3    No evacuation   
SD report 17-3    No evacuation    
SD report 18-3    55,000 civilians   






Notes of lecture to Army 
Group North 24-3 
   70,000 civilians    
Dr. Will, Oberbürgermeister   70,000 – 80,000 inhabitants  90,000 – 100,000  
Ernährungsamt des 
Oberbürgermeisters 






    150.000 just prior 
to storming  
 
 Dr. Starlinger     110,000  
Dr. Paul Schroeder, 
Oberfeldarzt der Wehrmacht 
und Verbindungsoffizier zum 
Festungsstab 








General Lasch, According to 
Sinzig 
    150,000 (?) lives  
Hauptmann d. R. Lemke     90,000 inhabitants   
Chief of Fortress staff 
Süsskind-Schwendi  
    110,000 women 
and children  
 
Kampgruppe Schubert      130,000   
Kreisleitung in Kemsies     30,000 civilians died in preliminary 
bombardment, 6,500 soldiers 
Dr. Eugen Sauvant      Artillery ‘devastating effect’ on 
civilians 






und 3. Pz. Armee 
     50,000 
POWs 
Matskowski, Bürgermeister 
Ponarth (1-5)  
     90,000 
Matskowski, Bürgermeister 
Ponarth (15-5) 
     Over 100,000 
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Appendix 3: Strength of Garrison Festung Königsberg immediately prior to the final 
storming, April 6, 1945.  
Infantry divisions 





60 light guns 
43 heavy guns 





31 light guns 
21 heavy guns 
no armoured 
support 





43 light guns 
48 heavy guns 





41 light guns 
48 heavy guns 
no armoured 
support 
48 7.430 men 
* Attached were Sich. Rgt 75 and Fest. Inf. Btl. 1441 
 
Further present in Königsberg:  Volkssturm  5,000 men  
Fest. Pak Verband I 800 men  
Festungspioniere 900 men 
Police battalion 500 men 
49 foreign guns, ranging from 7,62 cm to 15,2 cm.  
Total manpower:  
‘Kampfstärke’, (‘battle strength’),   28,617 men. 
 ‘Tagestärke’, (daily-/maximum strength)  47,800 + 5,000 Volkssturm 
 
Source: RH 2/335, 175-176: Op. Abt/ I N/ LdS Bef. Vortragsnotiz Betr.: Festung Königsberg, 
6.4.1945.    
 
In the days between 31 March 1945 and 6 April 1945 the staff of the 61st Infantry division and 
the decimated ‘Kampfgruppe Hannibal’ also arrived in Königsberg.  




Appendix 4: The capitulation of Königsberg 
 
 
Commander of Fortress     10.4. 45 
         Königsberg           . 
 
 
  Order concerning marching-off of the remnants of the troops. 
 
 
1.)    The officers keep their side arms (but only blade weapons) 
 
2.)    Every officer can bring along a personal orderly 
 
3.)    The officers can bring along their kit (as long as it can be carried personally  
         or by the orderly).  
 
4.)    Troops gather in companies or columns under the guidance of a responsible  
        officer or non-commissioned officer  
 
5.)    They bring with them their weapons with ammunition until they encounter  
        Russian troops. There they will then lay down their weapons and  
        ammunition.   
 
6.)    Until Russian lines are reached, a white flag is to be carried at the head  
         of every column. 
 
7.)    March route: Leave the city by crossing the railway bridge and the  
        pontoon bridge constructed westerly thereof near the Nasser Garten. 
 
8.)    Russian troops shall not fire at German troops lined up in order 
 
9.)    Eliminating remaining strongholds is the task of the Russian army 
 
10.)  The above measures are to be executed immediately  
 
  The Commander:     For the commander 
            The Chief of General staff 
 
      LASCH              SÜßKIND-SCHWENDI 
General der Infanterie           Oberst i.G.  
 
 












ARCHIV STADT KÖNIGSBERG (DUISBURG) 
 
22032 -  Königsberg 1939-1945 
 
22032-1:  - Dispatch Bomber Command 
- Herr Hill, Bericht aus Königsberg (Pr.) 
- Tatsachenbericht eines Arztes über den Leidensweg der deutschen      
   Bevölkerung  
 
22032-2:  - Kurt Dieckert, Auszüge aus den Tagebüchern der Panzer-Gren.Div.  
  “Großdeutschland“ 1945 – erhalten von Helm. Spaeter 
- Walter Kemsies: Stimmungsbilder aus Königsberg i. Pr. 1945 (Die   
  Festungszeit der ostpr. Hauptstadt) (Verfaßt um 1946) 
- Artur Krüger Report concerning Metgethen  
- Werner Strahl Erlebnisse Januar bis Mai 1945   
- Dr Twiehaus Die Letzte Tage von Königsberg 
- Günter Wegner, Abschrift 
- Letter anon. Verbindungsoffizier  
 
22032-3: - Pamphlet Haß unsere Pflicht, Rache unsere Tugend  
- Brochure An alle Hausbesitzer!  
 
22034 - Königsberg 1945-1948  
 
22034-4:      - Anonymus: Erlebnisse einen Königsberger Beamten 
    - Wolf Henger Oberst a/D.: Artl.-Kurzbericht zum Endkampf um die Festung   
Königsberg    
   - Oberleutnant Eberhard Knieper, Bericht über meine Erlebnisse in   
Königsberg in der Zeit von Mitte Februar bis Anfang April 1945 (undated) 
- Hauptmann Banneitz, Ic der Festung: Erlebnisbericht über meine Tage in der 
Festung Koenigsberg   (undated)  
- Oberforstmeister Lehnerdt: Verteidigung von Königsberg (undated) 
- Obergefreiter Sinzíg: Meine Erinnerungen an die letzte Stunden in 
Königsberg  (4.12.56) 
- Hptm. d. R. Lemke: Die letzten Tage von Königsberg (undated) 
- Major i.G. a.D. Dr. Hans Schäfer, Ia der Festung, Der Fall Königsbergs 
  (1.12.56) 
- Major Schaper: Nameless paper, concerns deployment of 974th Regiment (7. 
   Februar 1957) 
- Major d. Res. Dieckert: Bericht über die Einschließung Königsberg   
- Dr. Eugen Sauvant: Die letzten Tage von Königsberg 27. Januar bis 10.April  
1945 (undated) 
- Major I.G. Telle, Ia der 367. Inf. Div.: Bericht  
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- Bericht des Ia der „Kampfgruppe Schubert“ Major der Pol. Friedrich Neumann,  
über den Einsatz in Königsberg März/ April 1945.   
- Jos Beck: Zu den Fragen von General Haenle 
 - Generalleutnant O.v. Natzmer: Einsatz der 4. Armee ab Februar 1945 (undated) 
- Oberst i.G. Von Süsskind-Schwendi: Gespräch mit Herrn General d. Inf. Lasch 
um Ostern 1945 
- Hauptmann d. Res. Sommer: Vermerk (undated)  
- General d. Inf. Chill, Luftstreitkräfte in Ost. und Westpreußen 1945   
- General d. Inf. Chill, „Koch, ein wackerer Kämpfer“.  
- General d. Inf. Chill, „Verlauf der Kämpfe in Ostpreußen“.  
- Friedrich Dorfmüller,Vernichtung des Führerbefehls „Verbrannte Erde“ 
(undated)  
- Friedrich Dorfmüller, Oberstabsinterdant der Reserve: Übernahme der 
Geschäfte als leitender Intendant in Königsberg (undated)   
- Friedrich Dorfmüller, Oberstabsinterdant der Reserve:  Zusammenstoß mit dem   
stellv. Gauleiter Großherr (undated) 
- Friedrich Dorfmüller, Oberstabsinterdant der Reserve: Verlegung meiner 
Dienststelle nach Niederbrennen des Ärztehauses  (undated)   
- Friedrich Dorfmüller: Letzte Zusammentreffen mit dem Chef des Stabes am 
9.4.1945 (undated)  
- Friedrich Dorfmüller, Oberstabsinterdant der Reserve: Ferngespräch des 
Kreisleiter Wagner mit Gauleiter Koch am 7.4.1945 
- Friedrich Dorfmüller:  Gespräch mit Herrn General d. Inf, Lasch um Ostern 
1945.  
- Friedrich Dorfmüller: Berichterstattung – mit Storch aus dem eingeschlossenen 
Königsberg ausgeflogen – bei Heeresgruppenintendant und Oberquartiermeister 
in Heiligenbeil in den ersten Februartagen (undated)  
- Pamphlet: 9 February 1945: Aufruf! Packt alle an!  
- Memorandum betr. Schifffahrt, Königsberg, den 23.3.45  
- Auszug aus einem Bericht von Oberst i.G. Mendrzyk O.Qu. bei der 3. Panzer-
Armee 
- Aufzeichnungen des Hauptschriftleiters der Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung 
Wegener über seine Erlebnisse in Königsberg Januar/März 1945 (undated)   
- Auszugsweise Abschrift aus einem Bericht von Wegener, Der Untergang von 
Königsberg (undated) 
- Waldemar Magunia: Der Volkssturm in Ostpreußen 1944/45 (10.April 1955) 
 - Waldemar Magunia: Abschrift (12.2.1955)  
 
22034-3   - Aus der Rundfunksprache von Professor Baumgarten 
  
22095  - Militär 
 
22095-1:  Pamphlet Der Deutsche Volkssturm  





BUNDESARCHIV – (BERLIN LICHTEFELDE) 
 
NS 6 Partei-Kanzlei 
 
NS 6/ 135: Meldungen, Erfahrungs- und Stimmungsberichte über die Haltung der Wehrmacht 
und der Bevölkerung angesichts der Verschlechterung der Kriegslage 
NS 6 / 348: Bd. 39: Rundschreiben, Anordnungen, Verfügungen, Bekanntgaben des 
Stellvertreters des Führers bzw. der Partei-Kanzlei. 
NS 6/ 354: Befehlsführung bei abgeschnittenen Truppenteilen und Bestimmungen über 
Festungen, Verteidigungsbereiche usw.; Plünderungen durch deutsche Soldaten in 
geräumten Gebieten; Feindpropaganda; Maßnahmen zur Stärkung der Front durch 
Erfassung Versprengter.  
 
 
NS 19 - Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS 
 
NS 19/813: SA-Sturmführer Herbert Nerger, Panzer-Grenadier. 
NS 19/2068: "Meldungen aus dem Ostraum"  
NS 19/2606: Berichterstattungen über Auflösungserscheinungen an der deutschen Ostfront  
NS 19/2721: Befehle der Heeresgruppe Weichsel, insbes. zur Stärkung des Kampfgeistes  
NS 19/3118 : Verhalten von Offizieren und Männern, sowie speziell von Festungs- und 
Kampfkommandanten in aussichtsloser Lage. 
NS 19/3814: Bevorratung und ARLZ-Maßnahmen auf zivilem Sektor im Bereich der 
Ostfestungen.  
 
R 55:  Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda 
 
R 55 / 464: Berichte der Reichspropagandaämter Linz, Königsberg, Salzburg 
R 55 / 602: Bd.: 21 Einzelne Propagandaaktionen, propagandawichtige Meldungen, 
Stimmungsberichte der Reichspropagandaämter 
R 55/ 616: Umquartierung der Zivilbevölkerung aus feindbedrohten Gebieten  
 








BUNDESARCHIV – LASTENAUSGLEICHSARCHIV (BAYREUTH) 
 
Ost-Dok. 8 -  Berichte von Angehörigen der Politischen Führungsschicht aus den 
ostdeutschen Vertreibungsgebieten zum Zeitgeschehen von 1939-1945  
 
Ost-Dok. 8/506: O. Horn, Oberlanwirtschaft bei der Landbauernschaft Ostpreußen 
„Erfahrungsbericht über die Ernährungslage für die Zeit Ende November 1944 bis April 
1945. 13.7.1955.  
Ost-Dok. 8/507: Kurt Jacobi, Ministerialdirigent im Reichsministerium des Innern. Räumung 
der Provinz Ostpreußen 1944-1945. 6.3.1953  
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Ost-Dok. 8/508: Karl Friedrich, Beauftragter des Reichsverteidigungskommissars Ostpreußen 
„Bericht über Flüchtlingsabtransporte in Pillau im Jahre 1945“. 23.3.1956 
Ost-Dok. 8/510: Kurt Dieckert, Verbindungsoffizier zwischen Zivilverwaltung und 3. 
Panzerarmee, April 1948.  
Ost-Dok. 8/511: Bei den Kämpfen im Samland erbeutete russische Befehle, Russische 
Befehle vorwiegend Taktischer Art und sonstige Papiere (February 1945) 
Ost-Dok. 8/518: Dr. Carl Brenke (Stadtverwaltung in Königsberg) Die Vorgänge in 
Königsberg seit Bedohung der Stadt (Bericht zum Arbetsplan der Dokumentation der 
Vertreiung) 1944-45.  7.3.1953 
Ost-Dok 8/519: Hans Leberecht von Bredow, Oberst der Gendarmerie  
„Partisanenbekämpfung in Ostpreußen“ 1944-1945 (ohne Datum)  
Ost-Dok. 8/523: Kurt Chill, Generalleutnant der Infanterie (16.3.1953)  
Ost-Dok. 8/527: Günther Engel, Angehöriger der 58. I.D. (18.2.1953)  
Ost-Dok. 8/528  Eduard Black, Hauptmann der Gedarmerie und Gendarmerie-Kreisführer des 
Kreises Samland „Bereicht über die Ereignisse im Samland nach dem Einrücken der 
rissischen Armee im Jahre 1945“ (19.12.1953) 
Ost-Dok. 8/530: Erich Dethleffsen, Generalmajor, Chef des Generalstabes des AOK 4„Die 
Rolle des Gauleiters Erich Koch bei der Verteidigung der Provinz Ostpreußen 
(23.11.1949)  
Ost-Dok. 8/531: Klaus von der Groeben, Landrat des Kreises Samland: „Das Ende in 
Ostpreußen. Den Ablauf der Geschehnisse in Samland“1944-1945 (1.10.1952)  
Ost-Dok 8/532: Dr. Walther Grosse, Generalmajor „Der Heiligenbeiler Kessel“ 
(Verteidigung des Brückenkopfes Heiligenbeil) 26.2.1954 
Ost-Dok. 8/536: Dr. Paul Hoffmann, Regierungspräsident beim Oberpräsidium Königsberg, 
stellv. Oberpräsident:  Räumungsplan für Ostpreußen 1944 (11.3.1955) 
Ost-Dok. 8/553: Ernst-August Lassen, Oberst, Chef des Generalstabes des XXVIII. A.K. 
„Kämpfe des XXVIII. Armee-Korps um Memel und im Samland Ende 1944 und Anfang 
1945“ beigefugt: 8 Kartenskizzen (Januar 1948) 
Ost-Dok. 8/557: Burkhart Müller-Hillebrand, Generalmajor, Chef des Generalstabes des 
Panzer-Armeeoberkommandos 3: Die Kämpfe der 3. Panzerarmee in Ostpreußen 1944-
1945 (18.12.1952) 
Ost-Dok. 8/559: Oberst Medrzyk, Oberquartiermeister der 3. Panzerarmee: Gegensatz 
zwischen Verwaltungs- und Parteidienststellen und der Führung der 3. Panzerarmee in der 
Frage der Räumung (16.12.1952) 
Ost-Dok. 8/560: Walter Marquardt, Oberregierungsrat beim Oberpräsidium in Königsberg 
Die Aufstellung eines Räumungsplanes für Ostpreußen 1943-1945 (24.6.1952) 
Ost-Dok. 8/561: Heinrich Lindner, Regierungsrat, Unterabteilungsleiter beim 
Reichsverteidigungskommissar: Bau von Befestigungen in Ostpreußen 1944-1945 
(10.12.1952) 
Ost-Dok. 8/563: O. von Natzer, Generalleutnant, Chef des Generalstabes der Heeresgruppe 
Mitte (Nord) „Truppenteilen der Heeresgruppe und deren Einsatz in Ostpreußen“ 
(24.9.1952) 
Ost-Dok. 8/565: Schaefer, Oberst: Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Räumung in 
Ostpreußen 1944-1945 (ohne Datum) 
Ost-Dok.8/567: Walter Elkes „Vom Pregel zur Elbe“ (Einsatz von Jagdkommandos des 
Volkssturmes) 1945 (ohne Datum)  
Ost-Dok. 8/569: Artur Salecker, Kreisbaumeister des Kreises Samland: Bau eines 




Ost-Dok.8/579 Hans-Heinrich Wendtlandt, Oberstleutnant, Kommandeur des 
Grenadierregiments 1094„Der Endkampf“ (Die Öffnung des Landesweges vom Samland 
nach Königsberg, Kampf um Königsberg, Gefangenschaft) 1945-1949 (ohne Datum) 
Ost-Dok.8/580: Erich Zerahn, Oberfinanzpräsident in Königsberg: „Erste Belagerung 
Königsberg vom 30.1.-22.2.1945“ (14.10.1953)   
Ost-Dok.8/584: Wenzel, Oberregierungsrat, Referent beim Reichsverteidigungskommissar 
Die Einstellung des Gauleiters Koch zum ostwallbau und zur Räumung Ostpreußens, 
Verhältnis zwischen Koch und Reg. Präsident Dargel 1944-1945 (10.12.1952)  
Ost-Dok.8/586: Dr. Victor Werbke, Stabsoffizier beim Festungskommandanten von 
Königsberg: Aufstellung neuer Truppenteile in Königsberg, Verhältnis zwischen Stab 
Lasch (General d. Inf. Und Kommandant der Festung Königsberg) und Parteidienststelle  
(4.6.1953)  
Ost-Dok.8/588: Dr. Hellmuth Will, Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Königsberg: Die Kämpfe 
um die Stadt Königsberg, Räumung der Stadt 1945 (19.2.1955)  
Ost-Dok.8/591: Günther Heysing, Oberleutnant, Kriegsberichter:„Von Leningrad bis 
Königsberg“ Ostpreußische Erinnerungsblätter eines Kriegsberichters (Dezemer 1953) 
Ost-Dok. 8/592: Waldemar Magunia, Präsident der Handwerkskammer Königsberg: Der 
Volkssturm in Ostpreußen (10.4.1955)  
Ost-Dok. 8/593: Waldemar Magunia, Präsident der Handwerkskammer Königsberg: Der 
Ostwall, seine Entstehung, sein Verlauf und sein Bewährung mit Kartenskizzen 
(10.4.1955) 
Ost-Dok. 8/594: Waldemar Magunia: Gauleiter Erich Koch und die Räumung Ostpreußen 
(10.4.1955) 
Ost-Dok. 8/596: Dr. Med. Schroeder, Obermedizinalrat, Mitarbeiter der Gauärtzkammer 
Königsberg: „Die Aktion Koch“ (Die Gesundheitlichen Betreuung der zum Ostballbau 
befohlenen Zivilbevölkerung) 1944 (15.7.1953)  
Ost-Dok. 8/598: Adolf Klein, Angestellter beim Oberforstamt Elchwald in Pfeil: Einsatz der 
Volkssturm in Königsberg 1945 (29.3.1952)  
Ost-Dok. 8/600 Bruno Just, Bataillons-Adjutant (11.6.1952)  
Ost-Dok. 8/602 G.Makowka, Bürgermeister a.D. „Aufzeihnungen über die Ereignisse in den 
letzten 3 Monate in Königsberg/PR.“ 1945 (Januar 1946)  
Ost-Dok. 8/608: Dr. Martin Knobloch, Mitarbeiter beim Reichsverteidigungskommissar: 
Verschiffung der Flüchtlinge von Pillau und Königsberg aus 1944-1945  (19.11.1955)  
 
Ost-Dok. 10 - Berichte über Verwaltung und Wirtschaft in Ostpreußen, Pommern, 
Ostbrandenburg und Niederschlesien, 1930-1945. 
 
Ost-Dok. 10/162: Verzeichnis von Drucksachen der Stadtverwaltung Königsberg (ohne 
Datum)  
Ost-Dok. 10/168: Leopold von Knobloch, Dezernent der Regierung in Königsberg: 
Erlebnisse während der Zugehörigkeit zur Volkssturm-Besatzung des Königsberger 
Schlosses am 8. Und 9. April (1960) 
Ost-Dok. 10/887: Major der Reserve Kurt Dieckert: Nachlassmaterial über den Kampf um 
Ostpreußen (1955) 
Ost-Dok. 10/888: Major der Reserve Kurt Dieckert: Einsatz der 1. Ostpreußischen 
Infanteriedivision (1956) 
Ost-Dok. 10/889: Major der Reserve Kurt Dieckert: Einsatz von weiteren Einheiten des 
Heeres, der Waffen SS, der Marine und Luftwaffe (1956) 
Ost-Dok. 10/890: Major der Reserve Kurt Dieckert: Die Einschließung und Belagerung von 
Königsberg (1956)  
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BUNDESARCHIV – MITLITÄRARCHIV   (FREIBURG) 
 
RH 2 – Oberkommando des Heeres/ Generalstab des Heeres 
 
RH 2/316: K.T.B. Anlagen vom 1.11.44 bis 30.11.44 
RH 2/317: K.T.B. Anlagen vom 1.12.44 bis 31.12.44 
RH 2/331a: K.T.B. Anlagen vom 1.1.45 bis 31.1.45  
RH 2/331b: K.T.B. Anlagen vom 1.1.45 bis 31.1.45  
RH 2/332: K.T.B. Anlagen vom 1.2 bis 28.2.45 
RH 2/333: K.T.B. Anlagen vom 1.3. bis 26.3.45  
RH 2/335: K.T.B. Anlagen vom 1.4. 45 bis 8.4.45  
RH 2/2020: Lage- und Feindlagemeldungen der Heeresgruppe Nord 11. Feb. - 4. März 1945 
RH 2/2024: Pz. AOK 3, 16. Jan. - 7. Feb. 1945 
RH 2/2025: Armee-Abt. Samland 8. - 28. Feb. 1945 
RH 2/2027: Armee-Abt. Samland und Festung Königsberg 1. März - 9. Apr. 1945 
 
RH 26 – Infanteriedivisionen  
 
RH 26-1/100: KTB der I.ID (aufgezeichnet von Hptm. Albrecht Meier-Hartigshof) 1939-
1945   
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